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U.S. AIR FORCE COMBAT
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SAFE SIDE (U)

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FINAL REPORT

1 Sep 66 - 11 Aug 67.

DIRECTORATE OF
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OPERATION SAFE SIDE

FINAL REPORT (U)

1 October 1967

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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ABSTRACT

The final report of Operation SAFE SIDE presents the results of a USAF one-year test program to determine the organization, equipment and training requirements for the establishment of Air Force Combat Security Squadrons. These squadrons will provide the Air Force with an improved capability to provide protection for air installations located in a hostile environment.

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Chapter 1

SUMMARY, GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Purpose and Scope. This is the final report of a one-year USAF test program - Operation SAFE SIDE - conducted during the period 1 September 1966 through 11 August 1967. This program developed an Air Force Security Police unit specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the following tasks:

a. Evaluate advanced security equipment, including intrusion detection/surveillance devices, communications equipment, weapons, vehicles and other individual and unit organizational equipment.

b. Evaluate Air Force Security Police training methods and requirements for air base defense.

c. Acquire the experience necessary to develop the doctrine and tactics for air base defense in a limited war or insurgent environment.

2. Background. The conflict in SEA has required the USAF to operate in an insurgent environment in which there are no front lines and where there is the constant threat of sabotage, commando-type raids, and mortar, artillery, and/or rocket attacks. In addition the Air Force has been required to provide its own internal defense for its air bases. Lacking the in-house capability to perform this defense

function, a study was initiated to find a means for providing adequate protection and defense for future Air Force deployments to hostile environments. The study, as approved by the Chief of Staff, USAF, recommended that a special base security force, organic to the USAF, be organized, trained and equipped to perform this function. Operation SAFE SIDE was an evaluation of this specially trained and equipped unit of USAF Security Police designed to provide protection and security of forward air bases. The reports, facts and findings of the SAFE SIDE Operation coupled with a current functional study and recent systems analysis of air base vulnerability and defense have been used to assist in determining:

a. The optimum size and magnitude of USAF Combat Security Police forces;

b. The most effective organization for such forces;

c. The required equipment and training for such forces;

d. The basic USAF concepts for the security and limited defense of air installations located within insurgent environments; and

e. The optimum methods for employing these security forces.

3. Operation SAFE SIDE. The evaluation of Operation SAFE SIDE involved two phases: (1) training, and (2) employment within a hostile environment. The 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T)

was designated and organized on 1 July 1966 and functioned as the test vehicle for this operation.

The USAF concept for the local ground defense of air installations located in limited war or insurgent environments was employed. This concept involves the employment of an integrated sector defense system within a three-ring model of defense in depth with the specific application of the basic principles of defense.

The outer ring of the model, generally located along the perimeter of the installation would provide for deterrent and detection through the use of barriers and sensors. The middle ring would provide for interception and neutralization through the use of mobile reaction teams. The inner ring would control entry to and provide for static defense fortifications around vital areas. Varying characteristics of the individual installation will necessitate minor modification of this model.

4. Findings and Recommendations.

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Finding: The current Air Force concept of the three-ring defense in depth within the installation perimeter is pragmatic and sound. (Chapter 3)

(2) Recommendation: That the concept be made a part of the Air Force Doctrine and, future Security Police forces be trained and equipped to carry out this concept.

(3) Finding: That proposals which provide for centralized control of the installation defense from a single command post require unduly sophisticated and costly data processing and display systems.

(4) Recommendation: That the installation defense be controlled by sectors, each of which monitors its own sensors and relays recommendations to the central command post for approval and implementation.

(5) Finding: Although there are conditions which may require the use of ambush and other type patrols, these represent less than ideal solutions to the installation defense problem.

(6) Recommendation: That Combat Security Police Units be trained in patrol tactics but that such patrols only be used when sufficient men and sensor equipment are not available to fully implement the three-ring defense in depth concept.

(7) Finding: Air support is a vital element of the installation defense system which can provide additional warning/reaction time for installation security forces and limit or preempt damage from standoff

weapons. Appropriate agencies have been tasked to define the vehicles and tactics required as an integral part of the installation defense system. (Chapter 4)

(8) Recommendation: That present programs be continued.

b. Organization:

(1) Finding: The 559 man squadron outlined in Annex C is an effective organization for providing internal defense of air bases in limited war environments.

(2) Recommendation: That follow-on Combat Security Police Squadrons be so organized.

c. Individual Equipment:

(1) Finding: The equipment provided was in excess of that required for the mission.

(2) Recommendation: That the reduced equipment list at Annex J (Part A) be adopted as standard for the Combat Security Police Squadron.

d. Organizational Equipment:

(1) Vehicles

(a) Finding: The M-series vehicles were far superior to the commercial models and are adequate interim vehicles for the mission. However, better vehicles are required which should be

lighter in weight and have a greater cross-country capability. (Annex G)

(b) Recommendation: That all future Combat Security Police Squadrons be provided M-series vehicles as an interim measure and that development efforts be continued to provide a more air-mobile vehicle with a greater cross-country capability.

(2) Weapons:

(a) Finding: The M-16 with the MX-148 grenade launcher and the M-60 machine gun were well suited for the mission. However, both the M-16 and the XM-148 require modifications to improve their performance. Modifications for the M-16 are already underway. The XM-148 requires modifications to provide a better sight and eliminate the trigger pull problem. There is still a need for increased short range firepower in the installations defense system. (Annex H)

(b) Recommendation: That the M-16 be accepted as standard equipment for Combat Security Police Units. That the XM-148 grenade launcher be modified to eliminate present shortcomings and that efforts be continued to increase the unit firepower by developing such equipment as the 40 MM grenade cannon.

(3) Radios:

(a) Finding: The commercial non-tactical radios subjected to rough, field handling and prolonged exposure to adverse weather conditions fell short of the tactical requirement. The tactical radios on the other hand had the range, durability and serviceability characteristics desired by a Combat Security Force. (Annex I)

(b) Recommendation: That a study be initiated to examine tactical radio sets currently in use within the U. S. Services and determine which sets best meet the Combat Security Police Force needs. In the interim, recommend the radios and landline equipment listed in Annex J (Part B, Section 4), be adopted for Combat Security Police Squadron use.

c. Unit Training:

(1) Finding: The 15 week SAFE SIDE "pilot course" was satisfactory, and with further refinement and modification can be reduced to 10 weeks. There is also a need to give NCOs and officers a separate course of training to fit them for appointments as Combat Security Police supervisors.

(2) Recommendation: That a 10 week training course be approved for airmen being assigned to follow-on Combat Security Police Squadrons and that NCOs and officers be given special separate training to fit them for supervisory duties.

(3) Finding: Every individual selected for instructional duties must be formally trained, and selected instructors required to periodically attend specialized training courses on tactical security support equipment (TSSE) and support weapons.

(4) Recommendations: (i) Future instructors attend a formal instructor's training course provided by Air Training Command, and Air University; (ii) A special course be established to train selected instructors on the employment, utilization, care, and maintenance of tactical security support equipment, and (iii) Selected instructors periodically attend specialized weapons courses.

(5) Finding: 15% of the airmen assigned to the 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T) were eliminated for either lack of motivation or unsatisfactory physical standard.

(6) Recommendation: Personnel assigned to follow-on Combat Security Police Squadrons be specially selected to meet the rigorous training standards.

(7) Finding: It was not possible to maintain proficiency in assigned primary AFSC during the training and test phases of Operation SAFE SIDE, therefore, Hq USAF agreed to remove all personnel from OJT during this period.

(8) Recommendation: A separate UTS and SKT be developed

for Combat Security Police personnel and an AFSC shredout or AFSC prefix or suffix be accomplished to ensure their recognition.

f. Security Police Dogs:

(1) Finding: The scout dog is excellent for patrol missions, however, as Combat Security Police operations will normally be limited to within the base perimeter the sentry dog is considered more suitable.

(2) Recommendation: That Combat Security Police Squadrons be provided with sentry dogs to the ratio recommended in Annex C.

g. Tactical Security Support Equipment (TSSE)

(1) Finding: Surveillance and detection equipment significantly enhances the capability of the security forces to detect threats emanating from beyond the installation perimeter. However, presently available sensors are unable to adequately discriminate between a threat and a non-threat, even when employed in mixes. Therefore, sensors must be located so that the discrimination function can be inferred, or backed up by security forces to perform the discrimination function.

(2) Recommendation: (i) Sensors presently being procured for use in RVN should be continued at an accelerated rate; R&D efforts must be continued to up-date technology and seek new and diversified techniques; and (ii) The TSSE list contained in Annex J, Part C, be

approved for the Combat Security Police Squadrons.

h. Communications

(1) Finding: The base defense Command and Control system must be supported by a tactical security communications network which is independent of other base communications. This requirement is vital to insure non-interference with and prevent overloading of these communications systems during attacks.

(2) Recommendation: That present development efforts to provide this communications capability be continued at an accelerated pace.

i. Standoff Weapon Attacks

(1) Finding: There is no adequate system for coping with standoff weapon attacks.

(2) Recommendation: Although this responsibility has been assigned to the Army by JCS direction, the USAF must continue to press for an early solution to this problem. Special emphasis should be given to testing the feasibility of the terminal defense proposals.

Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

1. Background. Even before the Air Force became involved in the current Vietnam conflict commanders had been plagued with the problem of base defense. As a result of USAF experience during the Korean War the Air Force launched a massive ground defense training effort under the 355 series of Air Force directives. However, a few years after the Korean stalemate this program slowly began to deteriorate. In 1956 these directives were rescinded and during the years following little was done by the Air Force in the area of base defense.

2. Until early 1964, Air Force activities in Vietnam were limited to an assistance role implemented by the Military Assistance Advisory Group. There was no requirement for USAF Security Police support of MAAG activities. During 1964, concurrent with the increased insurgency activities, the MAAG was replaced by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, thus increasing USAF advisory activities. The Air Force recognized a new situation which required operation from air bases located in a hostile environment. In August 1964, the Chief of Staff, in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the heavy concentration of U. S. aircraft on Vietnamese bases would provide a prime target for the enemy and questioned the

capability of Vietnamese Air Base Security Forces to defend these bases. The Chief of Staff recommended the repositioning of certain aircraft to Thailand to reduce base vulnerability. This concern was confirmed by the attack on Bien Hoa in November 1964. On 22 December 1964, the Commander of 13th Air Force commented: "The only way off-base mortar and small arms fire can be prevented from attacking our aircraft is for the U. S. Army or U. S. Marines to occupy the area surrounding these airfields, we can't depend on the RVN to accomplish this, and it would take at least a battalion of U. S. troops to do the job adequately. No increase in Air Police personnel, 10, 100, or 500 can accomplish this job because they are not trained, organized or equipped for this type operation .... "

3. In December 1964, the Chief of Staff approved a CINCPAC request for additional USAF Security Police to improve security of Republic of Vietnam air bases, but advised the CINCPAC and the JCS that this measure failed to solve the threats to U. S. resources and only forceful action to insure perimeter defense, coupled with Security Police augmentation would materially reduce vulnerability. Subsequently, numerous attempts were made by CSAF through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain additional ground force support.

4. By February 1965, the conflict in Vietnam has escalated to the point where tactical Air Force units were being deployed to Vietnam for full-scale operations. Concurrently, it became evident that the Air Force required a rapid and substantial increase in its capability to secure its installations against the mounting threat.

5. In August 1965, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF, requested The Inspector General conduct a detailed security survey of all bases in Southeast Asia which contained USAF resources. In addition to pointing out that current USAF Security Police were not adequately organized, trained or equipped to provide for the security defense task required in an insurgent environment, the survey revealed that US ground forces in RVN would not be committed to static defense of air bases. This survey also indicated that USAF resources located on air bases in RVN were subject to three types of thhreat. These were: (i) internal threats - those involving theft, espionage, and sabotage, (ii) perimeter threats - those concerned with raids for diversion, harassment, destruction, or resupply, and (iii) exterior threats - standoff attacks employing recoilless rifles, mortars and/or rockets of increasingly longer ranges (now out to approximately 14 km). It was also learned during this period that U. S. Army and other friendly ground forces in RVN could not

be spared to provide static defenses of air bases and other critical facilities.

6. In December 1965, COMUSMACV called for "a greater level of participation in self-defense by every element and every individual" within his command. He pointed out that he could not afford to use his combat battalions in a purely static defense role. He told subordinate units they would have to perform a defensive role. This was to include patrolling, the establishing of outposts, and providing of their own reaction forces.

7. During the period July 1964 to January 1966, Air Force Commanders were making efforts to shore-up internal close-in security through the use of TDY security police and base augmentees. During the 2nd quarter of FY 66 security police manpower inputs for RVN were increased from 148 to 2880. By the end of January 1966, sufficient security police were available to provide adequate close-in protection for USAF resources at the four original bases, i.e., Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Da Nang and Nha Trang. However, it was not until mid-March with the arrival of necessary equipment, construction of facilities, and the initiation of a security training program did these personnel represent a competent security force.

8. Though the internal security capability had greatly increased, the problem of defense against an overt attack at the base perimeter remained entirely unresolved. Additionally, the problem of defending the base against mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocket attack remained and has continued to remain prevalent. These inadequacies resulted in a continuation of overt attacks by small hostile forces which penetrated base perimeters, attacking priority resources and inflicting casualties against USAF personnel. Mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket attacks also continued causing severe damage to USAF resources and personnel.

9. In November 1965, The Inspector General directed that a formal study be conducted to analyze the problem of security of air installations located in hostile environments with a view toward developing Air Force doctrines and concepts for air base defense. The concept which was developed visualized the formulation of a base defense organization designed to provide a ground defense capability against an insurgent threat. It was advocated that the Air Force establish a special security police force equipped and trained to perform the function of air base defense.

10. In April 1966, the Chief of Staff directed that a special security police unit be formed, trained, and employed in an active combat

theater. This project was designated Operation SAFE SIDE.

11. Objective. The objective of Operation SAFE SIDE was to evaluate within an active combat theater the adequacy of the concept, training, equipment and tactics of USAF Security Police organization designed to provide security for Air Force installations and resources in an insurgent environment.

12. Command and Control. The 1041st USAF Security Strike Force Test Squadron, later redesignated the 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T), was organized and designated on 1 July 1966. It functioned as a field extension of The Inspector General, Headquarters USAF, under the operational control of the Director of Security Police. This unit was tasked with:

a. Evaluating advanced security equipment including intrusion detection/surveillance devices, communications equipment, weapons, and vehicles.

b. Evaluating Air Force security police training methods and requirements for the local ground defense of air bases.

c. Acquiring the experience necessary to develop Air Force doctrine for air bases located in limited war or insurgent environments.

13. Purpose. Operation SAFE SIDE was conducted in two phases: training and employment.

a. Phase I - Training (5 Sep - 16 Dec 66). The primary purpose of this phase was to equip and train the 1041st Security Police Squadron for deployment to an air installation in RVN - and to evaluate the Air Force's ability to conduct such training.

b. Phase II - Operational Deployment (16 Jan - 4 July). During this phase of Operation SAFE SIDE the 1041st Security Police Squadron was deployed to Phu Cat Air Base, RVN, and was assigned to the Commander, 37th Combat Support Group (PACAF). The squadron was placed under the operational control of the Installation Director of Security Police and tasked to provide surveillance and protection in depth along specified sectors of the base perimeter. To accomplish this task the unit employed tactical security support equipment along selected portions of the base perimeter, established observation/listening posts, conducted recon patrols and ambushes, and provided a mobile security reaction force for deployment within their assigned TAOR.

14. Combat Security Police Functional Study. In January 1967, the Chief of Staff directed that a functional study be initiated to determine the size and nature of the USAF Security Police forces required for the defense of future Air Force resources located in hostile environments. The study recommended that a combat security force

consisting of 10 squadrons of 559 men plus supervisory personnel be developed over a five-year period. In addition the study recommended the establishment of a combat security police training center. The Chief of Staff approved the study and directed that action be initiated to implement the USAF Combat Security Program as proposed. However, the procurement of resources was to be held at a five squadron level with the establishment of a training base and staff to support a program capable of growing to ten squadrons by the end of FY 1973. The Tactical Air Command was designated single manager to administer, train, and deploy the security police forces.

15. This force will be designed primarily to provide security support for USAF tactical units deployed to bare bases in hostile environments. Combat security police units will be deployed in advance of, or concurrent with, the combat units. In addition to its primary mission this force will be capable of:

a. Providing augmentation support for other security police forces under emergency operations.

b. Providing defense/security for minor installations, such as deployed radar or mobile communications units.

c. Aiding civil control in the protection of U.S. interests and property.

d. Providing security for USAF units on deployment exercises.

e. Developing or evaluating tactics, doctrines and equipment for the defense of air bases.

f. Providing ground combat training for other USAF elements.

g. Providing security and search parties in the event of nuclear incidents.

h. Providing additional security forces for CONUS dispersal plans and to furnish emergency security for SAC missile sites.

16. These forces will employ the USAF concept for the security of air bases in limited war or insurgent environments. This concept is based upon a three-ring model of defense in depth. The outer ring would provide for deterrence and detection through use of fences, mines, and sensors. The middle ring would provide for interception and neutralization using mobile reaction teams. The inner ring would control entry to and provide for static defense fortifications around restricted areas. Varying characteristics of individual installations will require minor modification of this model.

17. The combat security squadron force is not designed to operate without external defense support, nor to cope with standoff enemy

weapons without air support, nor to deal with enemy forces larger than company size.

Chapter 3

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Chapter 3

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. USAF Limited War Insurgency Threat Model. In formulating an operational concept for the ground defense of air installations located within a limited war or insurgent environment first consideration must be given to the threat. The following threat model, used as the basis for current USAF air installation ground defense doctrine, was based predominantly on the threats associated with an evolving insurgent - limited war environment. This threat is that of clandestine operations conducted within a limited war area or insurgent environment to achieve destruction or damage to USAF forces, weapon systems or other resources. For the purpose of security and local ground defense, the term "clandestine operations" has been adopted to denote those forms of enemy actions that are considered to deal with actions of the enemy who approach their target area covertly or with actual intent concealed (such as infiltrating the indigenous working force on base with intent to commit sabotage or the covert movement of a band of guerrillas into an area adjacent to an installation with the intent to raid or fire upon the installation). This threat is further considered in the following context: (i) Internal threats - those involving theft, sabotage and

espionage; (ii) Perimeter threats - those concerned with raids on the installation, and (iii) Exterior threats - standoff attacks employing recoilless rifles, mortars and/or rockets.

2. Air Installation Defense - Geographical Zones. It is considered convenient for the purpose of explanation and discussion, to relate the techniques and operations of air installation defense to one or more of three separate geographic areas:

a. External Defense Zone - area outside the air installation boundary.

b. Perimeter Defense Zone - area within the immediate vicinity of the installation boundary.

c. Internal Defense Zone - sensitive or vital areas within the installation.

3. External Defense Zone. This area should be the early warning zone where surveillance is maintained to detect any possible preparations for attack, against which appropriate counteractions can be taken. The existence of such a demonstrated surveillance/detection and reaction capability will in itself be a deterrent to enemy action. These external defenses serve the purpose of deterring the enemy, detecting undeterred actions, and bringing the enemy force under fire. Ideally, this zone should extend out from the installation for

a distance at least equal to the maximum effective range of the weapons known to be in the possession of the enemy.

4. Perimeter Defense Zone. The concept of a perimeter defense line is based on the accepted procedure of firmly fixing and engaging the attacking element to prevent its access to the installation. This is based on the fact that in almost all cases a partial penetration or an attack upon an air installation has a great likelihood of seriously inhibiting or negating the function for which the installation exists. Therefore, perimeter area defense should not be predicated upon the concept of yielding the installation to the attacker with the intent of regaining it by counterattack. That is, generally the perimeter zone should be prepared to conduct a defense in place. Therefore, this zone will in most cases be prepared with fortifications and barriers that will assist in directly destroying or repelling the aggressor.

5. Internal Defense Zone. Within this zone which includes the installation's vital resources and facilities, basic internal security principles are applied. In addition, established practices regarding protective measures as reflected in current directives are applied as required.

6. Responsibilities. In almost every conceivable limited war or insurgency area which the USAF has found, or will find itself, the area immediately adjacent to and surrounding the air installation (TAOR) will be the responsibility of one or more friendly ground force commanders. Thus the installation commander will be responsible for the security and defense of the area within the defined perimeter of the installation. This division of responsibility though subject to controversy, has the advantage of being based on clean-cut geographical divisions. However, regardless of the strength of the internal or external forces, it is important that the installation defense organizational structure be so unified to ensure adequate control over all the forces by a single command center.

7. USAF Concept of Local Ground Defense. Insurgent strategy in attacking an air installation which houses an obviously stronger military force has been to draw on the element of surprise and the ability to concentrate forces at the weak point in the installation defenses. Inasmuch as the insurgent relies heavily on surprise and rapid approach, penetration, attack, and withdrawal, the value and need of effective surveillance and quick reacting security forces is readily apparent.

8. The USAF concept for the local ground defense of air installations

involves the employment of an integrated sector defense system within a three-ring model of defense in depth with the specific application of the basic principles of defense. The outer ring of the model, generally located along the perimeter of the installation, would provide for deterrence and detection through the use of barriers and sensors. The middle ring would provide for interception and neutralization through the use of mobile reaction teams. The inner ring would control entry to and provide for static defense fortifications around vital areas. Varying characteristics of the individual installations will necessitate minor modifications of this model. For example, at some installations one or more of these rings may merge within a sector(s).

9. It must be clearly understood that this concept of operation does not infer that any two installation defense systems can or will be identical. There is no standard to be followed. The defense system of every air installation must be "tailor-made" to suit each location.

10. The evaluation of security/defense systems employing this concept revealed that:

a. In terms of concept, the general principles of internal security operations (i.e., close-in protection, circulation controls, support in depth, detection and reaction) are fully valid for the limited war

security - defense capability being sought. Similarly, established Air Force policies regarding protection measures (passive defense) are valid.

b. It is essential that the perimeter of an installation be defended to provide the needed threat deterrent and minimize the chances of the penetration type attack. These forces must be provided with an all-weather defensive capability.

c. Presently employed internal security system techniques have been generally effective against internally generated threats. However, with a more effective perimeter system, the numbers of internal security personnel presently required probably can be reduced.

d. Evaluation of security communications, command and control systems has concluded that a tactical security communications network, independent of other base communications activities, is required in order to exercise rigid control of all elements of the installation defense system. This includes the requirement that the system be provided with discrete allocation of radio frequencies to avoid interference with other communications functions being carried out on the installation.

e. At the present time no adequate system is available to provide pre-attack detection of standoff attack threats. Additional development effort along these lines to include the development of not only a preempt but terminal defense system is required. In the interim improved intelligence systems appear to offer the best, most rapid means of providing pre-attack information.

Chapter 4

UNIT ORGANIZATION

Chapter 4

UNIT ORGANIZATION

1. The Threat. The main ground threat to a forward operating base will come from small groups of enemy who have avoided or filtered through the external defense forces. These groups (probably of up to Army Company strength) may be local guerrilla forces or highly trained commando-type troops. They avoid pitched battles and are masters in the art of surprise attack. A forward air base complex offers an attractive target for enemy troops of this category.

2. Mission. The mission of the Combat Security Police Squadron must be to ensure that the work of the forward operating base continues with the minimum interruption from enemy ground forces. The organization herein postulated is the absolute minimum required at a base to satisfy this aim.

3. Factors Considered. In arriving at the proposed squadron organization the following factors were considered:

a. The three-ring, sector base defense model already described in this report.

b. The present RVN threat model where the area to be defended varies from 4-1/2 - 9 square miles to accommodate a 5000 - 9000

foot airstrip (7 - 14 mile perimeter).

c. The Bare Base Security concept when it is essential for combat security units to deploy to the FOB with, or in advance of, the initial Air Force unit.

d. Command and control requirements.

e. The employment of support weapons, scout dogs, surveillance and detection equipment.

4. SAFE SIDE Organization. During the training phase of Operation SAFE SIDE several alternate models were evaluated. The one selected for the operational phase was further refined to meet the particular security needs of the developing air base and permit the operational evaluation to continue. In brief, the 1041st Security Police Squadron fighting elements consisted of an Observation and Surveillance Flight (1 officer and 37 airmen), a Close Combat Flight (2 officers and 78 airmen), a Weapons Support Flight (1 officer and 31 airmen), an Operations Section (1 officer and 21 airmen) and a Scout Dog Section (15 airmen).

5. Future Organization. The recommended future organization is shown at Annex C. It comprises a 559 man squadron of three Field Flights (6 officers and 161 airmen each), a Tactical Headquarters

(3 officers and 4 airmen) and a Headquarters Administrative Flight (51 airmen), employing an optimum balance of officers, NCOs and airmen to provide effective control and experience at all levels.

6. The squadron package is designed to:

a. Be readily air transportable.

b. Provide a continuing 24 hour defense capability.

c. Give maximum flexibility in the utilization of manpower and firepower.

d. Deploy either as a complete unit or as tactical sub-units with the capability to react immediately on arrival at the FOB.

e. Allow breakdown into three independent flights and a tactical headquarters for employment in either primary or secondary roles.

7. The Combat Security Police Squadron and Independent Field Flight personnel summary charts are shown at Annexes D and E, respectively.

Chapter 5

MATERIEL

Chapter 5

MATERIEL

1. The equipment provided for Operation SAFE SIDE was in excess of that needed by a 200 man combat security unit since the exact requirement could not be determined prior to the test, and because many of the items being evaluated were new to the Air Force. Items are categorized under three main headings, namely, individual, organizational and tactical security support equipment (TSSE). This chapter covers the first two categories, and TSSE being largely in a development and trials stage is treated separately in Chapter 8.

2. Individual Equipment.

a. The majority of this equipment was issued to all assigned personnel in October/November 1966 during the training phase in Hawaii. Thereafter it was maintained by the individual until the operational phase was completed in July 1967. In all it was subjected to approximately eight months continuous use and generally proved adequate in both quantity and quality.

b. Three types of field uniform, two types of combat boot and a baseball type fatigue hat were the subject of special evaluation. It was concluded that the most practical uniform for use by combat security personnel in tropical climates was the camouflage fatigues,

the tropical combat boot and a camouflage hat made of soft material with an all round bill. A summary of individual issued equipment and clothing test results can be found at Annex F.

3. Organizational Equipment.

a. Vehicles. The vehicles selected for Operation SAFE SIDE were from the military series. They were used on very rough terrain, varying from shallow rice paddies to unbroken country. All vehicles performed well and coped with the adverse weather and ground conditions. However, as was expected, even the four wheel drive vehicles could not negotiate the deep mud and rice paddies after tropical downpours. Only the M-113 armed personnel carrier could surmount these hazards. Detailed vehicle performance data is contained in Annex G.

b. Weapons. The M-16 rifle and M-60 machine gun were selected as the basic weapons for the test. Both proved ideal for use by combat security units. They are lightweight, reliable, durable and capable of producing the desired firepower. The only shortcoming is the incompatibility of the ammunition. A complete analysis of all weapons is in Annex H.

c. Housekeeping Equipment. This included administrative and billeting equipment that is in general use within the Air Force. With

exception of tentage this equipment was satisfactory. Tents were large, heavy and not readily air transportable. Furthermore, erection was a lengthy process and improvements were costly in materials, manpower and time. The requirement is for a small, six man, lightweight tent that can be erected and disassembled rapidly. Recommended scales of issue are in Annex J.

d. Radios and Landline. Commercial non-tactical radios, US Army tactical radios and a landline system were used during the operational phase. The commercial radios were the same type as those used for all USAF non-tactical radio nets in the CONUS; for which use they are most satisfactory. However, then subjected to rough, field handling and prolonged exposure to adverse weather conditions; for which they were not designed, they fell short of the tactical requirement. The tactical radios on the other hand had the range, durability and serviceability characteristics desired by a combat security force. The landline system was successfully employed for both operational and administrative tasks. The only limitation was found to be the 12 drop switchboard. This was rectified by acquiring further boards. A detailed account of radios is in Annex I.

e. General Equipment. This includes all organizational equipment

not falling into any of the foregoing categories. In common with housekeeping equipment is in general service use and not subject to suitability comment. The recommended scale of issue may be found in the equipment list in Annex J.

4. Conclusions.

a. The equipment selected for the test allowed a realistic evaluation to be made and enabled the Air Staff to arrive at the optimum needs for future Combat Security Squadrons.

b. The test results confirmed the suitability of much of the equipment, highlighted certain deficiencies and provided useful and timely information which assisted greatly in the production of the future squadron equipment list. Furthermore, the results proved that in general, the individual and organizational equipment selected from the USAF and US Army Inventories will satisfy the Combat Security Force needs.

5. Recommendations. It is recommended that (i) the equipment list in Annex J be adopted as standard for Combat Security Police Squadrons, (ii) a study be initiated to examine tactical radio sets currently in use within the US Services and determine which sets best meet the Combat Security Police Force needs.

Chapter 6

TRAINING

Chapter 6

TRAINING

1. Introduction. Operation SAFE SIDE required the development of a traini g program which would prepare the 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron to fulfill its role as a "test" ground defense unit for the Air Force installations located in a limited war insurgent environment. In addition, and equally important, Operation SAFE SIDE called for an evaluation to be subsequently tested in combat, of the Air Force capability to conduct such training. Based upon this criteria, lessons learned in Vietnam and using selected training material from the Infantry School and the Ranger Course at Ft Benning, Ga., a comprehensive 15 week training program was developed. This program was aimed at producing a unit capable of conducting hard hitting ground defensive operations, around the clock, day or night over all types of terrain.

2. Discussion.

a. Training Program. The 15 week training program developed in the Directorate of Security Police was composed of three phases f training.

(1) Phase I - academic subjects presented in a classroom atmosphere. This provided the student with knowledge of basic

subjects such as air ground operations, field sanitation, chemical warfare, and also provided the theory aspect required for training in weapons and tactics which were also conducted in this phase of training.

(2) Phase II - covered field training for the student body conducted or monitored by cadre instructors. This phase also covered unit field training after the cadre instructors and student body were integrated into the organization as it would function during the operational phase.

(3) Phase III - covered orientation of the squadron members with the base and surrounding area which would be the location for the operational phase of operation SAFE SIDE. This included a detailed familiarization with the terrain and geographic features of the area using maps, aerial photographs and stand tables. A more detailed coverage of specific subjects taught is contained in Annex K.

b. Course Design. The organization and design of a training program must have the end product in mind at all times. It cannot be expected that all ranks be taught the same subjects at the same level of competence. For example, a fire team member who is an A1C or below need not learn as much about leadership and tactics

as should his NCO or officer supervisor. It is also important that the airman, NCO and officer students remain segregated while undergoing training and should not be trained together except when entering a unit training phase.

c. Individual Proficiency Evaluation. During the training phase of SAFE SIDE, three types of individual proficiency evaluation were periodically required as a method of gauging the progress of each student as the training progressed. In addition, a combat water survival test was administered to determine which individuals were weak or non-swimmers so that added precautions could be taken to insure their safety while working in or around water. A more detailed discussion of each of these tests is contained in Annex L.

d. Cadre Training. The training program called for instruction in several areas for which the US Air Force had no training references; for example, the 81 mm mortar. To ensure the proper instruction was given, selected personnel were sent to existing service schools that taught the required subject. This special cadre training is reviewed in detail in Annex M.

e. Instructors. It was originally planned that 45 instructors would be needed to conduct the training program. However, at no

time during the training phase were that many available. At the onset of training, 29 instructors were in place at the training site. By mid-October the number had increased to 35. A breakdown of the instructors and their qualifications is as follows:

(1) In place at the onset of training:

19 personnel who had graduated from or completed US Army Ranger School including four who had also completed the O'Neal course in combatives.

2 graduates of the Special Infantry Weapons Course.

2 qualified small arms weapons instructors.

4 personnel who had been injured in Ranger training and were not recycled.

2 launguage specialists.

(2) Additional personnel in place by mid-October:

4 more personnel who had completed Ranger School.

2 more personnel who had been injured in Ranger Training School and were not recycled.

(3) This shortage of instructors was further complicated by the fact that only four of the thirty-five had received formal instructor training.

(4) A further complication to the shortage of instructors was the fact that the officers and several of the higher ranking NCOs had to be used in supervisory capacities and their availability as instructors was limited.

(5) These factors combined, resulted in a less than ideal situation and were as serious a problem as the equipment shortages. It is certain that a more efficient, better organized and more professional training program would have been possible with a larger group of well qualified instructors had time permitted proper instructor selection and training. Nevertheless, the training program was satisfactorily presented as shown by the units performance in the operational phase.

f. Attrition. Seven Personnel were eliminated for lack of motivation, 3 for disciplinary reasons, 2 for humanitarian reasons and 12 for physical disqualification for a total of 24 or an attrition rate of 15%. This is an unacceptable rate and reflects the need for the establishment of selection criteria which must be adhered to if proficient Combat Security Police units are to be maintained.

g. OJT Training. In anticipating the problems involved in providing proficiency training during the SAFE SIDE test, within an individual's primary AFSC, an agreement was made with Hq USAF

to remove all personnel from OJT for the duration of the test program. During the training phase the unit was advised that OJT participation would be required. This action was, however, delayed until the units arrival at the operational test site. A problem not anticipated was the assignment of 19 three level air policemen to Operation SAFE SIDE. The assignment of three level air policemen by PACAF was contrary to the selection criteria established by Hq USAF. Although previous experience in the Air Police career field was considered essential as a prerequisite for assignment, the units mission and concept of operations provide no means for maintaining proficiency in the career field. The problem of trying to maintain proficiency in assigned primary AFSC versus proficiency in the units mission requirements will continue to be a problem until there is a shredout of 811XX AFSC or a separate AFSC established if the combat security police concept is established.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. SAFE SIDE training program content was satisfactory as evidenced by the performance of the SAFE SIDE unit during its operational phase. Although this course of training was 15 weeks in length, it must be realized that this was a "pilot course" and

refinements and modifications based on lessons learned point toward a more comprehensive course of 10 weeks in length. Furthermore, it is recommended that NCO and officer students be given separate training from airmen to fit them for appointments as Combat Security Police supervisors.

b. This unit had onl 4 qualified, formally trained instructors. The need is for every individual selected as an instructor to have these formal qualifications. Furthermore, there will be periodic needs for selected instructor attendance at training courses to ensure currency in specialized subject matter required for this training.

c. Personnel to be assigned or selected to the Combat Security Police Force must be both mentally and physically fit to accept this rigorous training.

d. To ensure airmen career progression is not jeopardized a separate UTS and SKT must be developed for Combat Security Police personnel. In addition, an AFSC shredout or AFSC prefix or suffix must be accomplished to ensure this recognition.

Chapter 7

SECURITY POLICE DOGS

Chapter 7

SECURITY POLICE DOGS

1. Sentry Dogs. In RVN, sentry dogs and handler teams have proven to be a key element in patrolling perimeter areas and the more remote regions within the base boundary. Their use on perimeter patrol greatly reduces the benefits which might otherwise accrue to the enemy through his skillful use of darkness, vegetation, and natural or man made terrain features. Publicizing the presence of the dogs - letting them be seen in the vicinity of the air base and in adjoining communities - adds to their deterrent value.

2. Scout Dogs. In order to provide improved detection and early warning on patrols, observation/listening posts, and to assist in the detection of tunnels harboring arms, food caches, and/or enemy personnel, the scout dog was employed and tested by the 1041st Security Police Squadron.

a. Fourteen newly purchased German Shepherd dogs, originally programmed for sentry dog training, were selected for scout dog training. Since the USAF did not have a scout dog training program and the US Army Scout Dog School could not accommodate the training requirement in the time available, a program was established at Lackland AFB. Three Army instructors, assigned to the USAF Sentry Dog course, who had previous experience with the Army Scout Dog

program, served as instructors for the program.

b. Handlers were selected for the test program from volunteers who were former honor graduates of the USAF Sentry Dog Handlers course. Upon completion of scout dog training program, handlers and dogs joined the 1041st in Hawaii for the SAFE SIDE unit training program.

c. The scout dogs and handlers were shipped to the test site as a part of the advanced party to acclimatize the dogs. Though a 30-day acclimation period was set aside, the dogs were ready to work within a 4 to 6 day period. This was also true at the training site in Hawaii. Based on previous experience in RVN dogs should be acclimated under most conditions within 14 days if proper protection and control is provided.

d. The scout dogs were used on 36 patrols (401 hours), 54 ambush/blocking force positions (447 hours), 430 outposts (3108 hours and 152 camp security patrols (1606 hours). During the test period a total of 49 dog days were lost due to nonavailability of handlers who were sick or injured and 41 dog days were lost because of ill dogs.

3. Conclusions. The following conclusions were reached:

a. The scout dog as a means of providing detection and early

warning on patrols - outposts, etc., greatly enhanced the capability of the security unit.

b. It was felt that the dog and handler could have been more quickly integrated in the unit training program if the handlers had received prior SAFE SIDE type individual training or if the scout dog instructors had been subjected to both individual and unit SAFE SIDE training.

c. The employment of the scout dog on a listening post during the hours of darkness provides such positions with almost all the capabilities of the same positions during daylight hours. Although during the hours of darkness visual observation is considerably reduced, the utilization of the dog's smelling and hearing senses makes up for a good portion of this loss.

d. Results of the SAFE SIDE test indicate that it would be highly desirable to have patrol dogs that are capable of attacking, preferably on silent command. In this respect the sentry dog's value must not be underestimated. He is vicious, will attack on command, has proven to be invaluable in RVN and best suited for the internal security mission under both normal and limited war conditions.

4. Recommendation. That sentry dogs be established for use by Combat Security Police Squadron.

Chapter 8

TACTICAL SECURITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

Chapter 8

TACTICAL SECURITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

1. General. Various types of tactical security support equipment have been designed to assist security forces detect infiltration attempts into vital areas or installations. Results of tests conducted by 7th AF in RVN, including the SAFE SIDE test, have shown that surveillance and detection equipment significantly enhance the effectiveness of security forces to defend against enemy ground threats emanating from beyond installation perimeters. This equipment is potentially more effective and reliable than both personnel and dogs during periods of darkness. It is anticipated that when perfected this equipment will replace sentries and dogs performing surveillance tasks at the base perimeter and over remote areas on the base. This will then permit more effective employment of available security forces in a response role.

2. Conclusions. Despite the high potential of tactical security support equipment, it is only a more sophisticated aid for security forces. Its value is therefore directly proportional to the skill of the users and the manner in which it is employed.

3. The performance characteristics and techniques differ in each type of equipment. Therefore, a mix of equipment should be used

employing more than one detection technique. Furthermore, a single line of detection equipment should not be used until performance is perfected and a high degree of reliability is established.

4. An effective communications system is required to collect, analyze and display the information so that decisions can be quickly made. This display should be maintained at defense sector level and monitored at the CSC.

5. None of the equipments presently offer a reliable discrimination capability which will permit operators to identify the specific cause of the alarm. Likewise, they are all subject to false alarms. All are limited, in varying degrees, by the type of soil in which they can be emplanted, by terrain, by the presence of other electrical/electronic elements, and by the amount of activity in the area in which emplaced. Certain types are only suitable for semipermanent or permanent installation which requires the use of digging equipment, a labor force, and considerable time. Others can be quickly and easily emplaced, and some, as in the case of light intensification devices, are hand held. As a result of these constraints and to insure effective defense, installation and employment plans for TSSE should be carefully engineered for each base and for Combat Security Police Units.

6. A detailed analysis of each type of equipment tested by the 1041st Security Police Squadron is at Annex N.

7. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

a. TSSE presently being procured be provided for security forces in hostile environments on a continuing basis.

b. Efforts be continued to upgrade and improve these equipments.

c. R&D efforts be continued to update technology and seek new and diversified techniques.

d. Major emphasis be placed on airborne application of surveillance and detection techniques.

e. Selection, installation, and checkout of this equipment for individual bases be done on an integrated system basis, to include a command and control element.

f. An integrated program for air base defense be developed. This program to be comprised of airborne/ground-base equipment, security forces, command and control, selective penalty and suppression techniques, and defense concepts and doctrines.

g. A surveillance and detection system be developed specifically for combat security forces.

h. A program be established to formally train security forces on the employment and operation of these equipments.

i. The TSSE list contained in Annex J, Part C, be approved for Combat Security Police Squadrons.

Chapter 9

AIR SUPPORT (U)

Chapter 9

AIR SUPPORT (U)

1. (U) Introduction. During the Operation SAFE SIDE test period, experience was gained in the area of close air support for a tactical security force. This chapter will cover the planning for air support, evaluation of the three types of aircraft utilized, and recommendations for future operations.

2. (C) Planning. In order to acquire air support for Operation SAFE SIDE, a meeting was held on 20 February 1967, at the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN. As a result of this meeting the 4th Air Commando Squadron, 14th Air Commando Wing, Nha Trang Air Base, RVN, was designated as the organization to furnish nightly AC-47 "Dragonship" cap over Phu Cat Air Base. Several requirements had to be met before the cap would be utilized effectively. These are:

a. To fire within the base TAOR, a curfew zone had to be established. This zone was established with the approval of the Binh Dinh, Phu Cat, An Nhon and Binh Khe District Chiefs. The curfew hours were set up from 1900 to 0600 daily. (NOTE: A curfew zone is a designated area where during the specified hours all unauthorized personnel entering may be shot upon detection.)

b. In order to control the AC-47, a tactical call sign, frequencies and communications equipment had to be obtained. On 27 February the tactical call sign "Slim Judge" was assigned to base defense units at Phu Cat by 7th Air Force (DECOS). On 13 March the Senior Signal Officer, 1st Field Forces, Nha Trang, assigned the 1041st the FM frequencies 42.90/43.40 on a non-interference basis. (NOTE: Assignment of FM frequencies in Vietnam is the responsibility of the US Army.) Communications equipment to control the AC-47 was borrowed from Army and Air Force units in the Phu Cat area. This equipment included a PRC-25 FM transceiver and a VRC-24 UHF transceiver.

c. Direct communications with all friendly forces in the Phu Cat area had to be established. This problem was resolved with the establishment of a Joint Defense Command Post (JDCP). The JDCP utilizing the borrowed equipment controlled the AC-47. Additionally, the JDCP was integrated into the MACV US Advisory Team FM radio net, and had a ROK liaison NCO assigned for coordination with all ROK units in the area. Direct landline communications with TACC, DASC Alfa, and II Corps DASC are installed for the 37th Fighter Wing and authority for co-use by the JDCP has been granted by the 7th Air Force.

d. For the AC-47 to fire outside the base TAOR, a request had to be made to DASC Alfa.

3. (U) A briefing was conducted on 2 March 1967 to acquaint all US, ROK, VN, and ARVN representatives on the above procedures.

4. (U) Ground Control. Initially the ground control of aircraft was accomplished by the Duty Controller in the Combat Security Operations Center (CSOC). During the first two weeks of this operation the Air Operations Officer conducted a course of instruction for all controllers and duty officers. This course included air/ground terminology, AC-47 capabilities, target identification and marking, communications standards, and proceaures necessary to receive permission to fire. Prior to transferring control of the AC-47 to the JDCP, the 37th Security Police Squadron duty officers and controllers received similar training. This training information is contained in paragraph 3-21, Direct Air Support Procedures, which is a portion of the Combat Security Operations Order, included as Annex B to this report.

5. (C) Aircraft Evaluation. Three aircraft were evaluated for close air support during Operation SAFE SIDE, the AC-47, O-1E and UH-1F. A summary of each aircraft function and capability is as follows:

a. AC-47. The AC-47 "Dragonship" was the primary aircraft

employed for close air support. It has three General Electric mini guns which operate singly or simultaneously. The guns are fired by the pilot through a trigger button on the yoke. Sighting is obtained through a gun sight, graduated in mils, located at the pilot's left shoulder. The aircraft is capable of firing 4,500 or 6,000 rounds in 15 seconds depending on the type of guns installed. Two types of mini guns are presently in use, one has a 1,500 round supply pod, the other a 2,000 round pod. The AC-47 is capable of firing 100 meters away from friendly forces if the target is properly identified. In an emergency, 50 meters will provide a reasonable margin of safety. The mini guns are basically anti-personnel and will not inflict appreciable damage on a bunkered or armor plated target. With all three guns firing simultaneously, one round will impact in each square inch of the target area. Normally 21,000 rounds of ammunition are carried on each mission and in addition the AC-47 carries 45 flares. Each flare has 2,000,000 candlepower and burns for three minutes while descending by parachute. Extremely close coordination between the air crew and ground forces is required to insure that the proper area is illuminated and friendly forces positions are not disclosed. One method tested which proved very effective was using 1041st mortar

illumination to pinpoint the target area and having the AC-47 drop its flares on the mortar flare. The AC-47 normally flies at 3,000 feet above the ground which has been determined to be the optimum altitude to escape small arms fire and still have lethal impact from the mini guns. (NOTE: The mini gun tracers burn out at approximately 2,500 feet and can not be used to start ground fires.) The AC-47 has proven to be a very effective deterrent to ground attack. Its sustained illumination capability of two hours and 15 minutes and deadly accuracy make it a virtual necessity for every Air Force base in Vietnam. In addition to the above stated capabilities, the AC-47 can also be used for the following missions: reconnaissance of the TAOR and adjacent areas, direction of air strikes, target identification for ground forces, air drop of supplies or security forces, energency communications, and interrogation of seismic devices. One drawback to the use of the AC-47 is its response time. If a reaction force were needed in South America, the AC-47 could be deployed early so as to arrive simultaneously with the security force. However, if this force were to deploy to Africa, it would take a considerable amount of time to predeploy the AC-47. Approximately 30 days per aircraft were required to initially ferry them to Vietnam.

b. O1-E. The O1-E is a single engine light observation plane. It has the capability to carry one observer in addition to the pilot. The O1-E has four rocket launching tubes, two under each wing. Additionally, a supply of hand fired smoke grenades is usually carried. The O1-Es which supported Operation SAFE SIDE were assigned to the Capital ROK Infantry Division. On a daily basis an aircraft would fly a two hour reconnaissance mission over the area located within a 20,000 meter radius from Phu Cat Air Base. Any significant sightings were reported to the 1041st CSOC. The FACs assigned to fly these missions were briefed by the 1041st Combat Intelligence Section to survey any area located outside the base TAOR where reports of enemy activity had been received. After the Da Nang rocket attack the FACs were briefed by the 1041st on the types of launching emplacements used. The fact that the pilots are familiar with the local terrain gives a distinct advantage. If the VC had tried to mount a rocket attack against Phu Cat Air Base, the launching sites would have undoubtedly been reported prior to the attack and the organization responsible for the TAOR would have been able to take effective counter measures. Additionally, the O1-E was tested in conjunction with the Armored Personnel Carrier. A simulated problem was devised and the O1-E directed the APC to

the objective area and marked the target with smoke. Direct communication between the O1-E and the APC was maintained by FM radio.

c. UH-1F. The UH-1F is a turbopowered helicopter which is configured in both a Special Air Warfare (SAW) and an unarmed "slick" version. On 1 May 1967, one "slick" UH-1F assigned to the 20th Helicopter Squadron, 14th Air Commando Wing, Nha Trang Air Base, arrived at Phu Cat for evaluation in support of Operation SAFE SIDE. Rapid on and off load of nine man Immediate Reaction Teams with scramble takeoff was tested. It was determined that three minutes were required from the time the alert was sounded until the helicopter with IRT aboard was airborne. In an area where landing by helicopter was impossible, personnel of the 1041st tested rapelling from an altitude of approximately 200 feet. These tests proved that the employment of a UH-1F in conjunction with a tactical security force offered a significant advantage both in reaction time and ability to deploy into any type of terrain. The SAW configuration provides for a 90 million candelpower searchlight with both white and infrared capability, flare illumination, 14 rockets, and two 7.76 mini guns and a twelve thousand round supply of ammunition. The aircraft can stay airborne for a three

hour period, if required.

6. (C) Conclusions. Each of the aircraft tested offers advantages to a tactical security force. However, the UH-1F has proven to be the most practical. It is air transportable by C-130/141 by simply removing the rotors. At the employment site the rotors are replaced and the aircraft can be airborne in thirty minutes. The Special Air Warfare configuration can be used for flying cap, supplying firepower by rockets and machine guns, and providing illumination. The unarmed or "slick" version can be used to either airland or airdrop personnel and equipment, rappel reaction forces into an objective area, drop illumination flares, provide aerial resupply to troops in the field, perform medical evacuation functions, and be used for reconnaissance of the TAOR. An ideal modification of the UH-1F to support a tactical security force would include two (2) 5.56 machine guns, a 40 mm gattling grenade launcher, personnel detector chemical, and loudspeaker for paywar operations.

7. (U) Recommendations. Although the Air Force does not normally assign aircraft direct to ground forces, it is recommended that future combat security police forces have their own aircraft assigned. A detachment of three Special Air Warfare and three

unarmed UH-1Fs is considered optimum support for a Combat Security Police Squadron deployed to a forward air base.

8. (U) To reemphasize the need for integrated close air support to assist tactical security operations, the following extract from a MACV Seminar of 12 June 1967 representing 7th Air Force position is reproduced:

> "Ideally, any aircraft utilized in direct support of installation security should have the capability to observe, detect, discriminate and destroy. The AC-47 to a limited extent provided all of these capabilities, but a more effective firepower and mobility capability could be developed through the use of armed helicopters in conjunction with the AC-47. It is strongly recommended that helicopters be provided solely in a base defense role, and that these helicopters be placed under the command of the tactical commander responsible for the defense of the installation . . . . "

9. (C) Seventh Air Force is currently initiating a base defense test program to evaluate means of providing an increasing base

defense capability. This program will incorporate new tactics utilizing armed helicopters, AC-47s, O-1s and O-2s as well as newly developed base defense equipment.

ANNEX A

HQ 37th COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

OPLAN 207-67 (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters

37th Combat Support Group (PACAF)

United States Air Force

APO 96368

12 April 1967

Aerospace Security Operation Plan

OPLAN 207-67

Effective Date: 12 April 1967

F. C. Keish, Colonel, USAF
Commander

JOHN F. HUNTER, Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, Security & Law Enforcement

Downgrade at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

Copy 7 of 25 copies

CONFIDENTIAL

CSP 67-004 ANNEX A

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Task Units and Distribution List

Task Units	Nr of Copies
Comdr, 37th Combat Support Group	1
Comdr, 537th Troop Carrier Squadron	1
Comdr, 459th Troop Carrier Squadron	1
Comdr, 37th Security Police Squadron	5
Comdr, 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T)	1
Comdr, 819th Civil Engineering Squadron	1
Comdr, 37th Transportation Squadron	1
Comdr, 37th Services Squadron	1
Comdr, 37th Supply Squadron	1
Comdr, 1883rd Comm Squadron	1
Comdr, 37th Civil Engineers	1
Comdr, 421st MMS	1
Comdr, Det 5009, OSI	1
Director of Personnel, 37th Cmbt Spt Gp	1
Base Operations (Disaster Preparedness)	1
OTHER DISTRIBUTION	
Hq 7AF (IGSL)	4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION (U)

1. (U) Purpose: The primary purpose of this plan is to develop effective security operations which will insure that aerospace operational resources and other USAF assets are provided maximum security under the various conditions which might be encountered. It also provides:

a. Clandestine threat analysis for training and indoctrinating personnel.

b. Basic objectives sought by the security operations and general design of those operations.

c. The formal directive for assigning security tasks to specific assigned/attached units of the 37th Combat Support Group.

d. A basic vehicle to insure that every planned variation in combat force readiness or launch procedure is provided all efficient, coordinated security support.

2. (U) Security and Protection Operations: Emergency security postures are maintained to actively deny hostile elements the opportunity to destroy or inflict ground damage to USAF resources. To be effective, the security program must include efficient security Police operations, augmented as necessary, as well as an awareness and discharge of individual responsibilities by all personnel of assigned/attached units. The appropriate Expanded Security Posture (ESP) is implemented upon occurrence, when practical, or in anticipation of hostile ground action against USAF resources. The specific ESP will depend upon the type and severity of the hostile threat or action that is encountered or anticipated. ESP's are not necessarily progressive and a Commander may go directly from VI to IV or III, for instance.

3. (U) Directive Nature of the Plan: The providions of this plan are directive upon all assigned, attached, and tenant units which task or responsibilities have been assigned.

4. (U) Office of Primary Responsibility: The office of primary responsibility for this plan is the Chief of Security Police, 37th Security Police Squadron.

5. (U) Security Instructions:

a. The overall classification of this plan is SECRET. Each annex and page have been classified according to content

b. Authority is granted to make extracts of this plan as necessary for preparation of supporting or related plans and training. Officers directing extracts be made will be responsible for security control of information extracted.

c. The content of this plan may be released, disclosed or disseminated to appropriately cleared base military officials and officials of other US Services, who are co-occupants of the base and are involved in base security operations or otherwise have a need to know.

d. All task units will provide copies of their implementing instructions for this plan to BSP not later than 15 days after receipt of this plan.

e. This is a Group 4 document: Downgrade at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10.

6. Superseded Plans: This plan dated 12 April 1967, supersedes OPLAN 207-67 dated 20 January 1967, which will be destroyed in accordance with AFR 205-1.

SECTION I

SECURITY THREAT ANALYSIS (U)

1. (U) Mission: The mission of the 37th Combat Support Group is to provide logistical support and security protection for the two squadrons of C-7A (Carribou) aircraft assigned to the 537th and 459th Troop Carrier Squadrons, which support the U. S. Army mission in Vietnam. The C-7A mission includes the airlift of assault troops and associated equipment, logistical support for army installations and remote outposts aerial observation, radio relay, and medical evacuation of casualties from predesignated receiving centers.

2. (U) Geographical location and terrain: Phu Cat Air Base is located at map coordinates BR 900420. The installation is just off route # 1, approximately 17 miles northwest of Qui Nhon. It lies in a ten-mile wide lowland with the exception of the lowlands which extend to the north and the southeast, the mountains rise on all sides of the base and range from three to six miles from the base perimeter. The lowland area is primarily devoted to the production of rice. The higher ground on which the base is situated is virtually surrounded by rice paddies and rolling terrain covered with dense underbrush and trees. A small portion of the southern perimeter is bordered by the Song Con River. To the east and northwest of the base perimeter are a few hills from which one has an extensive view of the base.

3. (U) Climatology: Phu Cat Air Base and the surrounding area are located in a semi-tropical climate. January is the coldest month of the year, with the mean minimum temperature in the high 60's and the mean maximum temperature in the high 70's. February through the middle of August are the months of the dry season during which precipitation is very light. August is the hottest month of the year with the mean minimum temperature in the high 70's and the mean maximum temperature in the mid 90's. September marks the beginning of the Northwest Monsoon Season which brings the rain. The rainy season results in a marked decrease in temperature and a marked increase in humidity and thunderstorm activities. The rainy season reaches its peak in October and tapers off through December. During this period, water usually covers all flat, lowland areas. Vehicular travel is impeded throughout the base and surrounding area as a result of mud and/or flooded roads. These road conditions could definitely affect the response time of security force vehicles. The weather, however, has little significant effect on VC operations except during periods of low visibility. During periods of low visibility the VC have a greater chance of moving undisclosed from one location to another due to the lack of friendly air surveillance. Greater emphasis, therefore, should be placed on perimeter security, during periods of low visibility, in order to prevent or subdue any hostile actions directed against Phu Cat Air Base.

4. (C) Sociological, Psychological, Political, and Economic: A dominant sociological force within the Vietnamese social structure is the tremendous reliance upon the family group as the basic integral unit of society. It is, therefore, understandable that family loyalty is vastly more important than any loyalty to the state, ideology, or religion. The fear of being chastised by the family or the village is stronger than the fear of being punished by the local ruling government. This force is particularly strong in rural areas such as the area in which Phu Cat Air Base is situated. As the family unit could potentially be exploited by either side, it is not uncommon that family ties, obligations and welfare are incorporated within VC propaganda campaigns. We must consider that the VC could effectively govern the actions of a whole family by influencing or persuading key members of the basic family unit. This family loyalty factor necessitates, due to the great number of indigenous personnel employed by the US Air Force and RMK at Phu Cat Air Base, a rigorous security clearance program be followed in order to regulate as closely as possible the hiring of those indigenous personnel who have relatives actively supporting the VC. An intense feeling of nationalism is becoming an increasingly more important factor in the thought and decision making processes of the Vietnamese people and their leaders. With this realization, the VC have attempted to cloak their movement under the aura of nationalism at the same time, the VC grasp every opportunity to encourage popular discontent with the existing government. Thus, the VC hope to alienate the South Vietnamese people from the existing government and American forces. At present, the VC are reportedly engaged in agitation operations in the hamlets which had to be evacuated due to the construction of the base. The VC aim is to incite the people to claim monetary compensation for the land lost as a result of their forced resettlement. There is no doubt that these displaced people are dissatisfied since being forced to move by American forces. These people are easy prey for VC propaganda, and might easily cooperate and lend support to VC intelligence efforts and to the execution of subversive and sabotage operations. Economically, the local area has been hit less severely by inflation than other parts of South Vietnam. As Phu Cat Air Base grows, and along with it the military population, the danger of inflation will become increasingly greater in the area. If the VC are successfully able to blame the existing government and allied forces for an increase in prices and for the inflationary trend in general, they will have additional anti-government and anti-United States propaganda to include in their campaigns (with the local populace) thereby making it easier to gain greater cooperation and support for VC operations. The political situation within the area is considered pacified. Exercise of authority over the civilian populace is administered by the Province Chief and local authorities, to include District Chiefs and District Police authorities. The overall control exercised is considered strong. The base lies in two districts, Phu Cat and An Nhon.

5. (U) Physical Security Aids:

a. Perimeter:

(1) (U) Perimeter fencing: the perimeter is bordered by a fence consisting of 3 strand concertina wire; on the north, the perimeter is double fenced, and fencing is lacking on portions of the southern perimeter. A 200 yard section of the east perimeter fence is illuminated by low intensity lighting. This area is just north of the main gate and covers approaches to the RMK storage area.

(2) (C) Intrusion detection devices: Seizmographic and metal detection devices (T-SE) and a variety of Starlite scopes which are capable of scanning unlighted areas, are used at various positions along the perimeter by forces of the 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T) (Operation Safeside).

(3) (C) 81mm Mortar: Additional protection for the base perimeter is afforded by two 81mm Mortars, which are utilized for illumination. One is located on a 360° observation post, centrally located and also a position adjacent to the Security Police armory. An additional mortar section of 4 mortars is located in the 1041st base camp area.

(4) (U) M-113 APC's of the 1041st are strategically located at various points on the base after the hours of darkness and with six man fire teams, are used as immediate reaction forces.

(5) (C) Flare/gunship: One AC-47 "Spooky" aircraft orbits the area each night. The aircraft is armed with miniguns and flares for direct air support of the base.

b. Internal: Aircraft of the 537th and 459th Air Transportation Squadrons. Priority A aircraft, are parked on the apron of the temporary airstrip. Surveillance by close-in walking sentries, sentries in guard towers, and during the hours of darkness, sentry dog teams.

6. (C) Enemy Forces: In the mountains northwest of the base, the enemy is known to have forces which could mobilize to battalion size units. The enemy weapons include assorted small arms, 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles. The enemy is also known to have small guerrilla units (from one to five squads), operating in the local area. These units are capable of conducting harassment and/or perimeter penetration activities. Their weapons consist of assorted small arms, grenades, mines, machine guns, and 60mm mortars.

7. (U) Enemy capabilities:

a. (C) Probable courses of action in order of probability:

(1)(C)Infiltration for the purpose of intelligence gathering. The enemy is not only fully capable of, but undoubtedly is continuously conducting this type of activity on the installation. Although all indigenous personnel employed at Phu Cat Air Base are being cleared by Vietnamese Military Security Service (MSS) authorities, background investigations are frequently sketchy and incomplete. Considering that there are over 1500 indigenous personnel on the installation, the base is extremely vulnerable to intelligence gathering by enemy agents. All personnel must be kept fully aware of their security responsibility under the provisions of the 205 series directives and a vigorous security education program must be continually conducted.

(2)(C)Mortar/heavy weapon attack. The enemy is fully capable of this type of attack. The dense undergrowth and rice paddies which surround the base offer exceptionally good cover for fire teams to move into positions within mortar range. In addition, the proximity of housing and cattle grazing areas to the base perimeter affords the enemy the opportunity to remain in the area constantly and enables him to establish mortar/heavy weapon positions prior to an attack while remaining relatively unnoticed. Small hills east and northwest of the base afford exceptionally fine vantage points from which to direct and/or conduct a mortar/heavy weapons attack. The hills to the northwest look down on the temporary airstrip and the permanent flight line which is under construction. The hills to the east look down on the cantonement area and the 819th CES (Redhorse) area. The C-7A's are particularly vulnerable as there are no revetments and a direct hit is not necessary to cause extensive damage. In order to minimize death and injury to personnel, it is imperative that all personnel be fully cognizant of base passive defense plans and what they should do in the event of such an attack.

(3)(C)Mortar/Heavy weapons attack with follow-up penetrations by sapper agents or small force of less than company strength. The enemy is fully capable of this form of attack particularly from the north and west where numerous ravines, dense undergrowth and abandoned housing area afford the enemy cover in organizing and approaching the installation. The installation is also vulnerable to attack from the south due to the proximity of the Song Con river. The enemy could make great use of the river to facilitate the movement of personnel and equipment over considerable distances in a short period of time. More extensive damage and casualities can be anticipated if the enemy is successful in his penetrations. Caution must be exercised to defend against attempted penetrations from two or more directions. In order to protect the installation from attacks of this nature, coordination and communication with all friendly forces must be maintained. Friendly forces will be invaluable in providing the installation with positive early warning so that adequate forces can be mobilized prior to the attack. Communications are maintained via PRC-25 in Central Security Control and the ROK Liaison NCO in CSC.

(4) Surreptitious entry into the base by saper squad(s) and subsequent attack directed at personnel and vital resources. The enemy is fully capable of accomplishing such an attack. The approach routes outlined above provide the best cover, however, the lack of security in depth because of the location of the cantonement and support facilities areas make those areas particularly vulnerable to this form of attack. The importance of alertness of perimeter sentries, prompt reporting by installations personnel of suspicious persons, and the maintenance of the capability to provide quick reaction capability cannot be over-emphasized in combating this type of attack.

b. (C) Possible courses of Enemy Action:

(1) Infiltration of the base through legal guise for the purpose of sabotage or assassination of key personnel. Constant vigilance and prompt reporting of suspicious persons, actions, packages, or devices is the best preventive measure.

(2) Attack by an enemy force of battalion size. At the present time, the enemy is not capable of mounting such an attack in the immediate area without detection. It is possible, however, that he could import a force of sufficient size from the mountainous area which surrounds the base. The best defense for this form of attack is to maintain positive ground and air intelligence so that such a buildup would become obvious and friendly forces could engage the enemy.

8. (C) Friendly Forces: The following forces are available to aid in the protection and defense of the base. It should be noted that positive communications with all friendly forces are maintained through Central Security Control (CSC), manned 24 hours a day.

a. (U) U. S. Air Force:

(1) (C) The main defense force is the 340 man 37th Security Police Squadron. During the most vulnerable hours, 2200 to 0600, approximately 68 security policemen and 44 sentry dog teams provide perimeter security for the base.

(2) (C) The 226 man 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T) provides surveillance and protection in depth along the northern, western, and southern perimeter of the base as specified in the 1041st Combat Security Operations Plan. This squadron provides observation/listening posts, recon patrols, ambushes, area surveillance, jeep patrols and immediate reaction team (IRT) deployment within their assigned TACR both during daylight and during the hours of darkness.

(3) (U) Second only to the Aerospace Security Forces in training and capability are the 262 augmentees assigned to the Security Police Squadron to be used as necessary. These men are fully trained in base security defense procedures and marksmanship. They are normally employed when intelligence indicates an enemy penetration is imminent or probable in the foreseeable future. These personnel are to be deployed in their TAOR as prescribed in annex D and shown on the map in section II part IV.

(4) (C) In direct support of the base security forces is the flare/gunship (AC-47), capable of providing illumination and concentrated firepower against enemy positions. This aircraft is orbiting the base nightly between the hours 2200-0300.

(5) (U) The remaining US Air Force complement consists of medical, transportation, food service personnel, etc, who provide vital support to the base internal defense force, but who are not normally employed in actively defending the installation. During an attack, they normally comply with passive defense procedures and take cover. The exceptions are under ESP I when the possibility of a massive enemy attack exists and every individual is employed in the defensive positions, to preclude the enemy force from overrunning the base. This force numbers approximately 2000 personnel.

b. (C) Republic of Korea (ROK) Forces:

(1) Phu Cat Air Base lies within the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) of the ROK Capital Division, and specifically within the TAOR of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Cavalry regiment. One company, the 8th Company of the 2nd Battalion, is encamped in the western portion of Phu Cat Air Base proper. It provides outer perimeter defense, which includes patrols and nightly ambushes.

(2) One Platoon of 8th Company, camped on the south perimeter.

(3) One Platoon of 8th Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment is located on the northwest perimeter.

(4) Just outside the east perimeter is Headquarters, 1st Infantry regiment, a battery of the 60th Artillery Battalion and a Company of the 1st Infantry Regiment. These units provide patrols along the southeastern perimeter.

c. (U) U. S. Army

(1) 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery

(2) Phu Cat Air Base is connected to the U. S. Army Sub Sector communication net by means of a PRC-25 radio, located in Central Security

Control. Through this communication net, Phu Cat Air Base has the capability of contacting all U. S. Army units within Binh Dinh Province and also requesting flare/gunship assistance and MEDEVAC.

d. (U) Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Forces

(1) (U) Regional Forces/Popular forces are located in the vicinity of Phu Cat Village, 5 miles north of the base and in Binh Dinh, located approximately 5 miles south of the base.

(2) (C) The ARVN Training Center with a US Army advisory group is located 1 mile northeast of the base with approximately 800 to 1000 men.

SECTION II

PART I

Master Security Priority List (U)

I. (C) Priority A.

a. In-commission Tactical and support aircraft (to include aircraft in minor maintenance with repairs taking less than 48 hours).

(1) C-7A Aircraft, parked on the apron on the east side of the temporary airstrip, Sector 4.

b. POL Area and Trucks.

(1) POL Facilities, Sector 3.

(2) Gas and trucks located in the POL area, Sector 3.

c. Munitions Storage area (MMS), sector 2

II. (C) Priority B.

a. Central Security Control (CSC), Sector 1

b. Water Demineralization Facilities, Sector 1

c. Security Police Armory, Sector 2.

III. (C) Priority C.

a. Crash Fire Facilities, Sector 4.

b. Control Tower, Sector 4.

c. Cantonement areas located in the eastern part of the base, Sector 1.

d. Out of commission aircraft requiring major maintenance, located in the maintenance area near the temporary airstrip, Sector 4.

SECTION II

PART II

Expanded Security Program

Each of the Six Expanded Security Postures are described in detail in annexes hereto. All of the tasks required to support each posture are outlined in the respective annex. Commanders of task units will issue implementing directives, conduct training as required, and be prepared to implement this plan 15 days after the effective date of this plan.

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SECTION II

PART II

ANNEX A

Expanded Security Posture VI (ESPVI) (U)

1. (U) Security Objective: To maintain security of US resources and personnel by detecting and preventing enemy action, either overt or covert which could damage, destroy or prevent the use of these resources. This objective will sustain operational requirements as compatible with the standards of MACV Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3, and in accordance with protection standards outlined in 7AF Supplement 1 to AFM 207-1.

2. (U) Security Posture Required: A day to day security posture must be maintained and will be accomplished at Phu Cat Air Base by the effective utilization of assigned Aerospace Security Force personnel as follows: 8 hour day shift: 0600 - 1400; 8 hour swing shift: 1400 - 2200; 8 hour night shift: 2200 - 0600. K-9; staggered shift: 2000 - 0400 and 2200 - 0600. This sustained posture will insure the successful accomplishment of the following:

a. Detect hostile ground threats/action against operational resources.

b. Initiate immediate alarm.

c. Have security forces in sufficient number and with sufficient resources.

d. Provide appropriate and immediate armed response to detect hostile events.

e. Discriminate on the spot between real or probable hostile action.

f. Expand immediately to a more advanced security posture, if warranted.

3. (U) Posts, Tasks and Responsibilities:

a. The day to day posture of the 37th Security Police Squadron is composed of Aerospace Security Forces deployed as shown in Section II, Part III, Annex A.

b. (U) Central Security Control (CSC) will be the Command and Control Center of all security operations. CSC is located on the map as indicated in Section II, Part II. Alternate CSC will be the 1041st CSOC.

c. (U) Security Alert Teams (SAT's) will be capable of timely response to alerts within their respective sectors or as otherwise directed. In addition to the posted security forces, the remaining 37th Security Force personnel are billeted in the immediate area of CSC. Equipment and response will be as directed.

d. (U) The day to day posture of the 37th Security Police Squadron is further strengthened by the forces of the 1041st Security Police Squadron who will conduct operations and defend the assigned tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) as defined in Section II, Part III, Attachment 1 with the condition that operational techniques and tactical concepts, tactical Security Support equipment (TSSE) and other Hq USAF designed equipment and material is to be concurrently operationally evaluated.

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e. (U) 1041st Security Police Squadron activities will be conducted by [redacted] maintaining a firm defense base. Tactical operations radiating from the base outward into the TAOR are designed to insure detection and engagement of enemy penetrations of the base.

4. (U) Tasks for Staff, Assigned or Attached, and Tenant Units:

a. (U) Commanders of assigned/attached organizations will provide augmentation personnel when directed by the Commander, 37th CSG. Personnel will be of good character, mature in judgement and have no record of court-martial or under consideration for court-martial, possess as a minimum a Secret Security Clearance, and must be quartered within the confines of Phu Cat Air Base. If augmentees are used in this ESP, or any other ESP, they will mobilize and assume defensive positions within their assigned areas of responsibility or be utilized as required and directed by CSC. Each man will be equipped with the following: M-16 rifle with 100 rounds of ammunition, steel helmet with liner, poncho, flashlight, identification tags, canteen, web belt, and will be attired in the fatigue uniform. Additionally augmentees will undergo as a minimum, an eight hour training program conducted by the Security Police Training Section. The Commanders of 819th CES and 37th CSG will designate and maintain the number of augmentees for security duty as indicated.

UNIT	AUGMENTEES FURNISHED
819th CES	162
37th CSG	100

b. (U) Augmentees will be placed on special orders which will include name, rank, serial number, security clearance and DEROS. Special orders will be forwarded to the Chief, Security Police and will be kept current at all times by Unit Commanders concerned.

c. (U) Upon implementation of ESP II, all support personnel will draw M-16 rifle, 100 rounds of ammunition, steel helmet, ID tags, canteen, web belt, and prepare to assume defensive positions within their areas of responsibility upon implementation of ESP I.

d. (U) The Commander, 37th Transportation Squadron will:

(1) Make available to the 37th Security Police Squadron, on a 24 hour daily basis, a minimum of 8 jeeps, 3 2½ ton trucks. This minimum number of vehicles must be maintained at all times in good operational order.

e. (U) The Commander, 421st MMS will:

(1) Provide continuous EOD capability to respond as the situation indicates.

(2) Insure sufficient ammunition is available to the 37th Security Police Squadron to meet 7th Air Force requirements for operations and training.

f. (U) The Commander, 37th Supply Squadron will:

(1) Insure proper dispersal of all base weapons and ammunition to preclude destruction or capture in the event of an attack and/or provide efficient distribution to base personnel as required.

g. (U) The Commander, 37th Services Squadron will:

(1) Insure sufficient C-rations are available to support the 37th Security Police Squadron's daily operation, and any additional security forces which might be used in this or any other ESP.

h. (U) The Commander, 37th CES will:

(1) Insure that a 24 hour emergency power capability is maintained at CSC and Alternate CSC and will conduct periodic maintenance inspections of the boundary fence and complete repairs as necessary.

i. (U) The Commander, 1883rd Communications Squadron will:

(1) Insure that adequate communications and maintenance are available to the 37th Security Police Squadron at all times to insure complete and proper operation of the Security radio net. As a minimum, 70 portable radios must be operational at all times. Insure that a communications capability is maintained between Phu Cat Air Base and 7th Air Force Command Post.

j. (U) All assigned/attached units will provide a continuing security education program to insure security awareness, discharge of individual security responsibilities. This responsibility will include, but not be limited to reporting of unauthorized persons, suspicious actions and devices. All such situations will be reported immediately to CSC. Necessary coordination and assistance in this program may be obtained from the office of CSP.

k. (U) Commanders of units possessing priority elements and/or classified material will prepare plans for the destruction of same upon implementation of ESP I, if circumstances warrant. One copy of each plan will be forwarded to the Chief of Security Police and kept current at all times.

l. (U) The Commander, 1041st Security Squadron:

(1) Is delegated responsibility as Base Defense Officer, responsible to the Base Chief of Security Police for Defense plans and operations.

(2) Will provide 3 officers to augment the 37th Security Police as Duty Officers as representatives to JDCP.

(3) Will provide close combat reserve force for emergency in TACR.

m. (U) The following sectors are designated as areas of responsibility for the listed organizations:

(1) Sector A - 37th CSG.

(2) Sector B - 819th CES.

(3) Sector C - 37th SPS.

(4) Sector D - 1041st SPS.

(5) Sector E - ROK.

(6) Sector F - ROK.

(7) Sector G - ROK.

(8) Sector H - 1041st SPS.

n. (U) Joint Defense Command Post (JDCP) will be manned with EDO or Duty Officer and representatives from 1041st SPS, 37th SPS and ROK Force.

SECTION II

PART II

ANNEX B

Expanded Security Posture V (ESP V) (U)

1. (U) Security Objectives: This posture should be implemented when intelligence reports indicate a need for increased vigilance, and/or when DEFCON 2 has been declared by competent authority. This posture can be maintained over a period of several days or weeks if necessary. It provides the Commander with additional Security Police personnel to increase security at entry points, observation posts, and vital resources. The Commander may also constitute additional SAT's and deploy them at various locations on the base and along likely avenues of approach to vital resources.

2. (U) Security Posture Required: In order to effectively sustain security operations during this posture, days off for security police will be eliminated and Security Police training will be curtailed. Essential weapons training will be continued. Additional personnel will be posted at entry control points, and ESP V posts will be manned. Two additional SAT's will be formed for quick response and immediate assistance as directed by CSC, and a minimum of 8 hours a day, 7 days a week schedule will be maintained. All Security Police will be briefed on the increased security posture so as to insure their effective response.

3. (U) Posts, Tasks, and Responsibilities:

a. Central Security Control (CSC) will be the command and control center for all security functions. CSC has the capability, in case of attack, to contact all key personnel and relay all orders of the installation commander. Additionally, it has the capability of communicating with every security post through CSOC and nontactical radios or field phone. Alternate CSC is designated as 1041st CSOC.

b. All assigned/attached personnel will insure increased vigilance within their areas of responsibility to include search for sabotage devices and/or suspicious persons/acts and report same to CSC immediately.

4. (U) Tasks for Staff, assigned or attached and tenant units:

a. Commander, 37th Transportation Squadron: Provide 2 additional jeeps to be utilized by the additional SAT's.

b. Commander, 37th Services Squadron: Will insure sufficient C-Rations are available to sustain operations.

c. Commander, 42lst MMS will: Insure a sufficient reserve supply of ammunition is available for emergency issue and prepare for increased EOD activity.

d. Commander, 1883rd Comm Sq will: Insure that Communications Maintenance capability is provided and maintained. Reference 4g, Section II, Part II, Annex, A.

e. Commander, 104lst Security Police Squadron will: Provide additional fire teams as necessary along southwest, north and northwest perimeter and provide close combat reserve force for emergencies in TAOR.

f. Commander, 37th CES: Will provide sufficient ground power personnel to effect immediate alternate power repair or replace CSC alternate power source if required and will provide preventative maintenance on all structures.

g. Joint Defense Command Post will be manned with BDO or Duty Officer and representatives from 104lst USAF Security Police Squadron, 37th Security Police Squadron and ROK Force.

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SECTION II

PART II

ANNEX C

Expanded Security Posture IV (ESP IV) (U)

1. (U) Security Objective: This posture provides the Commander with an option for maximum utilization of Security Police over a short period of time. This posture would normally be employed when the threat is more pronounced, the situation warrants going to a higher state of security readiness than ESP V, and the mobilization of augmentees is not feasible.

2. (U) Security Posture Required: This posture is designed to provide maximum security possible to vital resources and personnel and have a ready prepared posture to counter an attack by sapper/suicide squads which could infiltrate. As such, augmentees will be placed on a one hour alert, days off for security police will be eliminated, Security Police training suspended, flights reduced to 12 on 12 off configuration, ESP IV posts will be manned, and boundary guards will be supplemented to insure early warning.

3. (U) Posts, Tasks, and responsibilities:

a. Central Security Control (CSC) will be the command and control center for all security functions. CSC has the capability, in case of attack, to contact all key personnel and relay all orders of the installation commander. Additionally, it has the capability of communicating with every security post through CSOC and nontactical radios or field phone. Alternate CSC is designated as 1041st CSOC.

4. (U) Tasks for Staff, Assigned, attached and tenant units:

a. The Commander, 37th Transportation Squadron will furnish the 37th Security Police Squadron with 4 additional 2½ ton trucks and 2 additional jeeps for utilization by additional Security Forces.

b. Commander, 37th Services Squadron: Provide sufficient C-Rations for each meal throughout this ESP.

c. Commander, 37th CES: Provide sufficient ground power personnel to effect immediate alternate power repair or replace CSC alternate power source if required.

d. Commanders of units providing augmentees will insure 1 hour alert capabilities with equipment as outlined in Section II, Part VI, Annex A.

e. Commander, 37th USAF Dispensary: Insure necessary medical assistance is available.

f. Commander, 1041st Security Police Squadron: Provide additional fire teams as necessary along southwest, north and northwest perimeter and provide close combat reserve force for emergencies in TACR.

g. General: All personnel not required for the direct support of security functions will, upon notification, comply with the base passive defense plan.

h. Joint Command Post(JCP) manned with base defense officer (BDO) or Duty Officer, and representatives from the 1041st SPS, and ROK Force.

SECTION II

PART II

ANNEX D

Expanded Security Posture III (ESP III) (U)

1. (U) Security Objective: This posture provides the Commander with an option for utilizing Security Police and augmentees over an indefinite period of time. This ESP would normally be implemented when reliable intelligence data indicates that the base is going to be subjected to an attack, the timing of the attack cannot be predicted, and the advanced state of preparedness may have to be maintained for a period in excess of 72 hours, and/or when DEFCON 1 has been declared by competent authority. This posture is a definite drain on the resources of the base and limits the capability of each organization which furnishes augmentees in performing their primary mission.

2. (U) Security Posture Required: In order to attain essential security objectives under ESP III, all augmentees will be mobilized, Security Police and augmentees days off will be eliminated, Security Police Training suspended, security flights will operate on an 8 hour on/8 off basis, and ESP III posts will be manned. Two additional 3 man SAT's and 2 QRF's (12 men) will be operational. Two officers from the 37th Security Police Squadron will be dispatched to each augmentee defense sector for liaison purposes.

3. (U) Posts, Tasks and Responsibilities:

a. Expanded Security Posture III is comprised of Aerospace Security Forces and trained augmentees deployed during the hours of darkness as shown in Section II, Part IV. The daytime posture is identical to the daytime posture under ESP VI as shown in Section II, Part III, with the exception that entry control points into the aircraft area are manned with two sentries in place of one.

b. Central Security Control (CSC) will be the command and control center for all security functions. CSC has the capability, in case of attack, to contact all key personnel and relay all orders of the installation commander. Additionally, it has the capability of communicating with every security post through CSOC and non-tactical radios or field phone. Alternate CSC is designated as 1041st CSOC.

4. (U) Tasks for Staff, Assigned, attached, and tenant units:

a. The commanders, 819th CES (Red Horse) and the 37th CSG will furnish augmentees to defend their assigned sectors. All augmentees will be mobilized, armed and formed within their specific areas of responsibility and all defensive posts manned within 30 minutes of notification. Areas of responsibility are designated in Section II, Part II, annex A (ESP VI).

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b. Law Enforcement will assume augmentee supervisory function within cantonement area.

c. Commander, 37th Services Squadron: Insure sufficient C-Rations for each meal throughout this ESP.

d. Commander, 37th Dispensary will: Insure sufficient plans and personnel available to care for any casualities that may occur during this posture.

e. Commander, 37th Transportation Squadron: Will provide two additional 2½ ton trucks, four jeeps.

f. Commander, OSI Detachment 5009: Will provide the commander, 37th CSG with any intelligence data relative to the pertinent threat.

g. Commander, 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T):

(1) Provide increased blocking forces (fire teams) and OP/LP's based on intelligence situation.

(2) Provide close combat reserve force in battle condition B for emergencies in TAOR.

h. General: All persons not required for the direct support of the Security forces will, upon notification, comply with the Base Passive Defense plan.

i. The Joint Command Post will be under the Command of the BDO and manned by representatives from the 37th Security Police Squadron, 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T) and ROK Force.

j. 37th CES: Provide sufficient ground power personnel to effect immediate alternate power repair or replace CSC alternate power source if required and provide preventative maintenance on all structures.

SECTION II

PART II

ANNEX E

Expanded Security Posture II (ESP II) (U)

1. (U) Security Objectives: This posture provides the Commander with an option for utilizing all Security Police and Augmentees to provide the maximum security possible over a short period of time. This ESP would normally be implemented when the Intelligence indicates that an attack on the base will occur within the next 72 hours.

2. Security Posture Required: In order to sustain security operations under this ESP, all augmentees will be mobilized, days off for Security Police and Augmentee personnel will be eliminated, flights will operate on a 12 on, 12 off basis, training will be suspended, support services will operate on a 24 hour basis, and additional SAT's will be manned. ESP II posts will be manned as outlined in Section II, Part V and Law Enforcement operations will be curtailed unless they directly support the security mission.

3. (U) Posts, Tasks, and Responsibilities:

a. Central Security Control (CSC) will be the coordinating control center for all security operations. Contact with CSC may be made by telephone. All Security Force Mobile Units are equipped with two-way radios and/or land line field phones. The Alternate CSC will be 1041st CSOC.

4. (U) Tasks for Staff, assigned, attached and tenant Units:

a. The Commander, 37th Transportation Squadron will make available to the 37th Security Police Squadron vehicles as required for fulfillment of the Security Police Mission.

b. The Commander, 1883rd Communications Squadron will insure around the clock maintenance of all communications systems vital to the security of the base.

c. The Commander, 37th Services Squadron will insure efficient re-supply of C-rations and ammunitions to the 37th Security Police Squadron, as necessary and required by CSP.

d. Commander, 421st MMS will insure that an EOD team is standing by CSC for immediate dispatch.

e. Commander, 37th USAF Dispensary will provide 24 hour medical service.

f. POL Section, 37th CSG will provide 24 hour operation for refueling of Security Force Vehicles.

5. (U) General:

a. Alert Notifications, notification of task units, and notification of key personnel will be effected by the Security Police at CSC. Contact with CSC may be made by telephone.

b. All support personnel will draw an M-16 rifle and 108 rounds of ammunition and will be equipped with steel helmet and liner, identification tags, canteen and web belt, form in their own area of responsibility and assume defensive positions.

c. Security Police Sector Supervisors and responsible Commanders will review required actions under ESP I and be prepared for rapid expansion if the situation warrants such action.

d. Commander, 1041st SPS will provide (in addition to manning blocking forces and Op/Lp's) entire force in battle condition B for reaction to any portion of the Air Base.

e. Alert notification, notification of task units and key personnel will be effected by CSC.

f. Joint Command Post, under the command of the BDO and manned by representatives of the 37th SPS, 1041st SPS and ROK Force.

g. The Commander, 37th CES will provide sufficient ground power and preventative maintenance personnel standing by at CSC to perform functions on as necessary basis.

SECTION II

PART II

ANNEX F

Expanded Security Posture I (ESP I) (U)

1. (U) Security Objective: This posture describes the highest expanded security posture possible with full utilization of all available personnel. The objective is a desperation type operation type operation to establish and hold, if possible, a secured line of defense around the inner perimeter of the base when external defense forces have been overrun or are unable to cope with the threat of a known enemy battalion or regiment attacking the installation.

2. (U) Security Posture required: In order to fulfill specific security objectives, provide maximum security and firepower to protect the installation, and close all gaps in the inner perimeter, all base personnel will be mobilized. Commanders will prepare to destroy priority elements and classified material that cannot be removed. All sectors, as outlined in Section II, Part V, will be fully manned. A ready armed mobile force consisting of four twelve man SAT's will be manned and subject to immediate deployment. The defense of USAF resources will be paramount, and all ESP I posts will be manned.

3. (U) Posts, Tasks, and Responsibilities:

a. ESP I is comprised of Aerospace Security Forces, pre-trained augmentees and all other available base personnel, under the command of the Commander, 37th Combat Support Group.

b. Security Police supervisors will be dispatched to designated sectors to assist unit commanders in securing defense sectors.

c. On request from ECD, necessary security police will be dispatched to provide defense Security and protection to US Forces during the implementation of 37th Combat Support Group Emergency Destruction Plan.

d. Four additional twelve man SAT's will be formed for immediate dispatch to sectors as necessary for supplemental assistance. This supplemental strike force will be armed with the following equipment:

(1) M-60 machinegun

(2) M-79 grenade launcher

(3) M-16 (1 per man)

4. (U) Tasks for Staff, assigned, attached, and tenant units:

a. All commanders will mobilize their remaining support personnel and dispatch same to defend assigned sectors as indicated in ESP VI, attached maps and below.

b. The following areas of Responsibility are assigned:

(1) Sector A - 37 CSG

(2) Sector B - 819th CES

(3) Sector C - 37th SPS

(4) Sector D - 1041st SPS

(5) Sector E - ROK

(6) Sector F - ROK

(7) Sector G - ROK

(8) Sector H - 1041st SPS

c. Commander, 37th Transportation Squadron will insure all vehicles necessary to support this posture are made immediately available.

d. Commander, 42lst MIS will insure all squadrons are provided munitions support as long as munitions are available.

e. Commander, 37th Services Squadron will insure adequate rations, water are provided all posts as necessary.

f. Commander, 1883rd Comm Sq will insure necessary and essential communications support

g. 42lst MIS EOD Section: Upon declaration of this ESP, EOD will destroy the GCA site, TACAN Site, Radio Beacon and other non-moveable resources located outside of the defensive perimeter. Upon completion EOD will standby at CSC and be prepared to destroy priority resources as directed.

h. Commander, 37th CES: Provide sufficient ground power personnel and preventive maintenance personnel standing by at CSC to perform functions as necessary .

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SECTION II

PART III

BASE MASTER PLAN MAP REFLECTING SECURITY POSTS UNDER ESP VI, V, IV.

(See Atch 1)

SECTION II

PART IV

BASE MASTER PLAN MAP REFLECTING SECURITY POSTS UNDER ESP III

(See Atch 1)

SECTION II

PART V

BASE MASTER PLAN MAP REFLECTING SECURITY POSTS UNDER ESP II, AND SECTOR ASSIGNMENTS UNDER ESP I

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ANNEX B

1041st USAF SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

COMBAT SECURITY OPERATIONS ORDER (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT SECURITY OPERATIONS ORDER
(CSOC)

Issuing Unit - 1041st USAF Security Police Sq (T)

Effective Date: 1 April 1967

DATE ISSUED: 1 April 1967

2nd Edition

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Downgrade at 3 year intervals, Declassified after 12 years

1041st USAF Security Police Sq (T) Combat Security Operations Order effective 20 Feb 67, issued 20 Feb 67 is hereby superseded by 1041st USAF Security Police Sq (T) Combat Security Operations Order effective 1 Apr 67, issued 1 Apr 67. Superseded copies should be destroyed in accordance with AFR 205-1.

Copy 21 of 21 Copies

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B

INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this document is to provide a basic field order upon which specified squadron tactical operations are to be based, and upon which fragment orders are to be issued as the tactical situation requires.

a. Annexes and appendices to this order will be issued, either as a permanent attachment, or for a stated period of currency at the termination of which they will be destroyed. This order is divided into sections as follows:

(1)	Situation	Section I
(2)	Mission	Section II
(3)	Execution	Section III
(4)	Administration and Logistics	Section IV
(5)	Command and Signal	Section V

2. Security Instructions: The overall classification of this order is SECRET. Each page and all annexes and appendices have been classified according to contents.

a. Authority is granted to make extracts of this order as is necessary for preparation of supporting orders, plans and other documents. Officials directing extracts are responsible for security control of information extracted.

b. The content of this order may be released, disclosed or disseminated to appropriately cleared military officials of both the United States and allied foreign governments when it has been determined that they have a need to know such classified information. Classified information may also be released to appropriately cleared United States Government employees who have a need to know such information.

c. This is a Group 4 Document: Downgrade at 3 year intervals: declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10.

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COMBAT SECURITY OPERATIONS ORDER

ANNEX A (Par. 2-1) Section II: Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), 1041st USAF Security Police Sq (T).

Appendix 1 (Par. 1-1): Edition 1 AMS, Vietnam 1:50,000 (Binh Dinh Province).

Appendix 2 (Par. 1-1): Edition 1 AMS, Vietnam 1:25,000 Pictomap Supplement to Standard 1:50,000 scale map (10,000 meter radius of Phu Cat AB).

Appendix 3 (Par. 1-3): Base layout of Phu Cat Air Base Drawing #005.

Overlay A: Normal Base Perimeter Defense and Close-In Security (e.g., observation & listening posts, location of IRT's & SAT's, strongpoints, machinegun and mortar positions, sentry dog posts, close-in security positions, location of TSSE, etc).

Overlay B: Base Defense Zones (indicates base defense zones assigned during emergency conditions).

ANNEX B (Par. 3-3) Section III: 1041st USAF SPS (T) Organization Chart.

Appendix 1: Organization Chart for Base Defense Forces (Emergency Conditions).

ANNEX C, Section III: Operations Orders Format.

Appendix 1: Ammendment to Frag Order Format.

ANNEX D (Par. 3-18) Section III: After Actions Report Format.

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SECTION I

SITUATION

SECTION I - SITUATION

1-1. (U) General: Phu Cat Air Base is located in Binh Dinh Province approximately 17 miles northwest of Qui Nhon off Route #1. It lies in a ten mile wide lowland area which stretches northwest from the South China Sea to the mountains. With the exception of the lowlands which extend to the north and southeast, these mountains rise on all sides of the base and range from three to six miles from the base perimeter. The lowland area is primarily devoted to the production of rice. The higher ground on which the base is situated is surrounded by rice paddies and rolling terrain covered with dense underbrush and trees. A small portion of the southern perimeter is bordered by the Song Con River and a portion of the northern perimeter by the Song La Vi River. (See Appendixes 1 & 2, Annex A)

1-2. (C) (GP-4) Enemy Forces: In the districts adjacent to the base (Phu Cat, An Nhon and Binh Khe districts) the enemy forces consist of both Viet Cong (VC and/or local guerilla) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) which could mobilize rapidly to battalion size or approximately 500 personnel. Special airfield sapper units of 300 strength have been reported in the area of our interest. VC units have reportedly been armed with 60mm and 81mm mortars, 57mm and 75mm recoiless rifles and a variety of automatic weapons and small arms. Additionally, VC bands of from 3 to 5 persons organized to harrass by perimeter penetration and carrying small arms and explosives to use on targets of opportunity have also been reported in the areas of our interest.

a. Enemy Capabilities: The enemy is capable of conducting the following hostile operations against Phu Cat AB:

(1) Infiltration for the purpose of intelligence gathering. The enemy is undoubtedly constantly conducting this type of operation on the base through the use of base indigenous employees during the day and by herdsmen, farmers, and wood cutters by both day and night. Additionally, specially tasked infiltrators may attempt to penetrate the base by night.

(2) Infiltration by small groups for the purpose of conducting harrassment operations by placing mines or booby traps, by shooting at friendly personnel, and by destruction of facilities and materiel by use of demolitions.

(3) The possibility of mortar and recoiless rifle attack, with follow-up penetration by troops of up to platoon and company strength is a constant threat. The undergrowth and rice paddies which surroud the base offer good cover for hostile forces enabling them to move within range of their weapons. In addition, the proximity of housing and cattle grazing areas within the base boundary enable hostile groups to pre-locate weapons and ammunition

1-3. (C) (GP-4) Friendly Forces: The following forces are available to assist in the defense of Phu Cat AB. (See overlays A & B, Appendix 3, Annex A)

a. U.S. Air Forces:

(1) The 37th Air Police Squadron has an authorized strength of 585 and assigned strength of 396 personnel. During the most vulnerable hours, 2100 to 0400, approximately 32 personnel and 28 sentry dog teams provide close-in security and perimeter security for the squadron TAOR.

(2) In addition to personnel of the 37th Air Police Squadron, approximately 250 augmentees are available from various base units for use during emergency conditions. (See Joint Base Defense Operations Order).

(3) The remaining, approximately 900, base personnel are not normally employed in actively defending the base. In the event of a massive attack these personnel will be used in defensive positions to aid in preventing the enemy from over running the base.

b. Republic of Korea Forces (ROK):

(1) Phu Cat AB lies within the TAOR of the ROK Capitol Division d specifically within the TAOR of the 2nd Battalion, 1st ROK Cavalry Regiment. The 11th Company, 2nd Battalion has a company command post located near the western boundary of the base at grid coordinate 876427, and a platoon of 8th Company is located in the southern most tip of the base at grid coordinate 894394.

(2) Just outside the east perimeter of the base is Headquarters, 1st ROK Infantry Regiment, Headquarters, 60th Artillery Battalion, and miscellaneous support units. The total unit strength of these ROK forces is approximately 500 personnel.

c. U.S. Army:

(1) A, B, & C Troops, 9th Squadron, 1st US Air Cavalry Division are on occasion deployed inside the northeast perimeter of the base. When aircraft are available, B Troop will provide gunship and reconnaissance support for the base.

(2) Phu Cat AB is connected to the US Army Sub-Sector (Lima), communications net by means of a PRC-25 radio located in Central Security Control. This net provides the base the capability of contacting all US Army units within Binh Dinh Province and requesting flare/gunship and MEDIVAC assistance.

d. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Forces:

(1) Regional and Popular Forces are located in the vicinity of Phu Cat Village, 5 miles north of the base. However, due to transportation difficulties it is unlikely these forces can be depended upon to provide timely, direct assistance to the base in the event of an attack.

(2) The ARVN Training Center with a US Army advisory group is located 1 mile northeast of the base. The center has approximately 800 to 1,000 trainees which, under certain conditions could be used to assist the base in the event of an attack.

SECTION II

MISSION

SECTION II - MISSION

2-1. (U) The 1041st USAF Security Police Sq (T) will defend the assigned Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) as defined at Annex A with the condition that operational techniques and tactical concepts, tactical Security Support Equipment (TSSE) and other Hq USAF designated equipment and materiel is to be concurrently operationally evaluated.

SECTION III

EXECUTION

This page is Unclassified

SECTION III

EXECUTION

TAB A DIRECTION

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3-2 Concept of Operations
3-3 Concept of Organization
3-4 Commanders Orders
3-5 Commanders Orders Group

This page is Unclassified

SECTION III - EXECUTION
TAB A - Direction

3-1. (C) (GP-4) General: Squadron operations will be conducted by maintaining a firm defense base. Tactical operations radiating from the base camp outward into the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) are designed to insure early detection and engagement of enemy penetrations of the TAOR.

3-2. (C) (GP-4) Concept of Operations:

a. Base Camp: The Squadron Base Camp is to be maintained as a firm defensive base by manning of the following:

(1) Observation tower by day.

(2) Observation and listening posts during hours of darkness.

(3) Immediate reaction force on a 24 hour basis.

(4) Base camp perimeter defensive positions as required.

(5) Use of trip flares and M-14 mines.

b. Detection: Detection of enemy activity within the TAOR will be affected by:

(1) Active and aggressive patrolling.

(2) Manning of observation and listening posts as required.

(3) Conducting area surveillance operations.

(4) Deployment and monitoring of detection devices.

(5) Receipt of timely and accurate intelligence data.

(6) Coordination with friendly forces.

c. Engagement: Engagement of enemy forces penetration of the TAOR will be met by:

(1) Reconnaissance by fire from fixed positions or patrols.

(2) Ambush and search and clear actions.

(3) Firepower from fixed positions directly against persons committing hostile acts.

(4) Mobile operations through the application of Immediate reaction teams (IRT) and Close Combat Reserve Forces (CCRF).

(5) Application of direct air support firepower as provided in this order.

(6) Firepower provided by friendly ground forces.

3-3. (C) (GP-4) Concept of Organization:

a. The squadron is organized to operate through the following sub-units: (See Annex B and Appendix 1 to Annex B)

(1) Squadron Headquarters - To administer and direct the unit.

(2) Operations Section - To control and coordinate combat security tactical operations.

(3) Support Section - To provide logistic support to the Squadron.

(4) Close Combat Flight - To provide the unit fixed defensive, and patrol capability and to provide personnel for mobile reaction capability, detection and warning capability through the use of observation and listening posts, tactical security support detection equipment and scout dogs.

(5) Weapons Support Flight - To provide the unit mortar, heavy machine gun and armored support.

3-4. (C) (GP-4) Commanders Orders: Unit orders for the conduct of defensive operations and the definition of operational procedures are to be in the four forms indicated below. With the exception of Special Security Instructions (SSI) which may be issued by Flight Commanders, the orders referenced below will be issued only on the Commander's authority.

a. Combat Security Operations Order: (CSOO) - This order will be the basic operations order for the unit and will contain data of a permanent or semi-permanent nature upon which tactical actions are to be used.

b. Combat Security Operating Procedures: (CSOP) - These are short orders of a semi-permanent nature, each order being confined to one subject only, which are serially numbered and can be rapidly issued as and when required.

c. Special Security Instructions: (SSI) - These are orders issued to the individual concerning a combat task or procedure such as duties of a fireteam member, an observer, a scout dog handler, etc. They will be issued by Flight Commanders.

d. Fragment Orders: (Frag Orders) - These orders are based on the CSOO and will be issued by the Commander's authority; (i) normally, to cover a seven (7) day period, and (ii) to cover any emergency situation. They may be issued verbally, but will usually be in writing using the format indicated in Annex B. The currency of such orders will be stated, and written Frag Orders will be destroyed when their currency expires.

3-5. (U) Commander's Orders Group: An Orders Group meeting will be held daily at 1600 hours at Squadron Headquarters unless otherwise directed. The purpose of the Orders Group meeting is to discuss the previous 24 hours tactical operation and review and up-date Fragment Orders to be placed into effect during the next 24 hour period and to discuss other operational matters. The Intelligence Officer is responsible to provide for the current intelligence brief to be presented at each orders group meeting. With exception of Combat Security Operational Procedures (CSOP) and Special Security Instruction (SSI), all orders will be issued in the format shown in Annex C, whether such orders are written or verbal. The Orders Group will consist of personnel holding the following positions. In the event the responsible individual is unable to attend the next senior individual in the command line will attend.

a. Executive Officer.

b. RAAF Liaison Officer.

c. Operational Analysis Officer.

d. Operations Officer

e. Intelligence Officer

f. Close Combat Flight Commander.

g. Weapons Support Flight Commander.

h. OIC, Support Section.

SECTION III

EXECUTION

TAB B Mission of Subordinate Unit Elements and Additional Duty Appointments

3-6. Squadron Headquarters: The Executive Officer is to command the Squadron Headquarters and is responsible to the Commander for:

a. Squadron administration, records and discipline.

b. Welfare of personnel.

c. Production and distribution of:

(1) Administrative orders.

(2) Operational orders from drafts submitted by the Operations Section.

3-7. Operations Section: The Operations Officer is responsible to the Commander for:

a. Routine conduct of operations within the directives issued from Squadron Headquarters.

b. The monitoring and coordination of unit combat elements during operations.

c. The display of intelligence.

d. The maintenance of a situation map.

e. The display of the Squadron Combat Status.

f. The establishment and maintenance of liaison with friendly forces within the squadron area of interest.

g. Providing of draft fragmentary orders and ammendments to the Executive Officer.

h. The continuous operation of the squadron armory for the provision and technical maintenance of weapons, optics and radio equipment and storage and inventory of all munitions and explosives.

i. The organization and control of the Squadron Combat Security Operations Center.

3-8. Support Section: The officer commanding the support section is responsible to the Commander for:

a. Advising the host base appropriate authorities of the Squadron re-supply requirements.

b. Advising the Commander on measures to be taken concerning supply discipline.

c. The assignment of vehicles other than those operationally assigned in pursuance of these orders.

d. Liaison with the host base medical authorities on:

(1) Medical matters.

(2) Unit hygiene.

(3) The administrative employment of squadron medical personnel.

e. The custody and adequate storage of unit material.

f. Vehicle maintenance.

g. Availability of squadron ammunition at the rates set out in these orders.

3-9. Close Combat Flight: The officer commanding the Close Combat Flight is responsible to the Commander for:

a. The deployment of the flight sub-units within the Commanders operational directives.

b. The standards of training and effectiveness of the flight personnel.

c. Standards of discipline within the flight.

d. Provide evaluation data for designated equipment.

e. Ensuring the security, maintenance and monitoring of deployed TSSE Equipment.

f. Provide evaluation data for TSSE as designated.

3-10. Weapons Support Flight: The officer commanding the Weapons Support Flight is responsible to the Commander for:

a. The deployment of the flight sub-units within the Commanders operational directives.

b. The standards of training and effectiveness of the flight personnel.

c. Standards of discipline within the flights.

d. Provide evaluation data for designated equipment.

3-11. Additional Duty Appointments: (Tactical) Officers nominated hereunder are appointed to the duties as listed:

a. Intelligence Officer:

(1) Developing and maintaining sources of intelligence through service channels.

(2) The collection, evaluation, recording and dissemination of intelligence.

(3) The presentation of intelligence briefs as required and the provision of "Situation" paragraphs for orders.

(4) Maintaining a reference library of intelligence publications and manuals.

(5) The tasking and work organization, in conjunction with the Operations Officer, of the Intelligence Element of the Operations Section.

b. Communications Officer: The Communications Officer is responsible to the Commander for:

(1) Supervision of Communications within the unit.

(2) Standards of efficiency of operators in conjunction with flight commanders.

(3) Maintaining a reference library of communication reference manuals.

(4) The layout and maintenance of internal telephone communications.

(5) Liaison with Phu Cat AB Communications section.

(6) Work supervision of the Communication Maintenance NCO.

SECTION III

EXECUTION

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3-13. (C) (GP-4) States of Readiness: The unit readiness states are:

a. Normal: Personnel on specific duty will be at their places of duty and all other personnel will be either at a directed battle condition or will be off duty.

b. Alert: All personnel to be armed, in battle order (see par. 3-24) and at their place of emergency duty as detailed.

3-14. (C) (GP-4) Battle Conditions: Battle conditions as defined hereunder are to apply. Flight Commanders are to insure that all personnel are to be made aware by daily orders, of the battle condition applying to their element.

a. Condition A: Personnel so detailed will be in battle positions, in battle or crew dress (see par. 3-24) and ready for instant action.

b. Condition B: Personnel so detailed will be in battle or crew dress and prepared to move immediately upon notice.

c. Condition C: Personnel so detailed to be ready for combat at a stated time. For example, if Condition C, one hour, personnel so detailed would be permitted to sleep out of clothing and equipment. Condition C, ten minutes, would mean that personnel would be required to sleep fully dressed, less equipment.

3-15. (C) (GP-4) Combat Security Operations Center: (CSOC) The Squadron Operations Officer is responsible for the operation of CSOC.

a. CSOC is to be manned continuously with minimum numbers as indicated below:

(1) Normal Readiness - One Senior Controller.
- One Controller/Radio Operator

(2) Alert - Senior Controller
- One Radio Operator
- One Controller

b. Displays: The Senior Controller is to insure that the following displays are current and contain valid information.

(1) Base Defense Situation Map giving locations and details of all forces deployed within the base boundary; to include TSSE locations, minefields, etc.

(2) Area Intelligence Maps - (Two USA AMS 1:50,000 Vietnam Standard Maps) Giving details of friendly and enemy forces, located within the Binh Dinh Province.

(3) Squadron Status Board: Giving strengths, standby status, vehicle and communications availability, ammunition and weapons status.

(4) Readiness and Operational alert status applying.

(5) Details of external forces on-call and available.

(6) Flight Commanders status board.

c. CSOC Senior Controller: The NCO acting as CSOC Senior Controller is responsible for the operation of the Combat Security Operations Center during his tour of duty. He will report to CSOC for a briefing by the Operations Officer 15 minutes prior to his tour of duty. He will be responsible to the Operations Officer for:

(1) Insuring that the operation of CSOC and all tactical operations are in accordance with the Combat Security Operations Order (CSOO), Combat Security Operating Procedures (CSOP), Frag Orders and all other applicable orders whether written or verbal.

(2) Ascertaining that all CSOC activities and all tactical operations are completely coordinated with the following friendly units:

(a) Joint Defense Command Post (JDCP), Phu Cat AB.

(b) Central Security Control (CSC), 37th Air Police Squadron.

(c) 11th Company, 2nd Battalion, ROK; through CSC until such time as the squadron obtains direct communications with appropriate ROK units.

(d) A, B, and C Troops, 1st US Air Cavalry Division when located on base.

(3) Insuring that necessary action is taken regarding tactical coordination of squadron sub-units. Should such action be beyond his capability, he will immediately refer the matter to the Operations Officer or next senior officer in the chain of command.

(4) Insuring that accurate information is compiled on all significant events occuring during his tour of duty and is properly recorded in the CSOC Journal. At the end of his tour of duty he will review the journal and certify its accuracy by signing it.

(5) Preparation of a written synopsis of significant events occurring during his tour. He will prepare and conduct a briefing each morning at 0730 for the Commander, RAAF CD Advisor, Operations Officer and Operations NCOIC. In the event the Commander is not present for the briefing a copy of the synopsis will be placed on his desk immediately following the briefing.

(6) Assuring that only those individuals specifically authorized are allowed to enter CSOC. Only the following personnel are authorized entry to CSOC: All officers, the Sergeant Major, all flight NCOIC's, and assigned Operations Personnel.

(7) Insure that CSOC is constantly maintained in a high state of police.

d. Operations Log: The CSOC Sr. Controller is to maintain a log of all significant events occurring during his tour of duty, including a log of messages received. In handing over to the on-coming Sr. Controller, he is to summarize in the log details of any matters outstanding. The incoming duty officer is to sign the log as taking over responsibility for the outstanding matters listed.

3-16. (U) Challenging Procedures and Rules of Engagement:

a. Challenging Procedures: The following instructions are not intended to apply to unique situations where curfew or free fire zones have been established. The establishment of such zones will be announced in Combat Security Operating Procedures (CSOP).

(1) The challenge must always be effected on the assumption that the party being challenged is hostile. Therefore, CSOC must be kept appraised of what is taking place. Likewise, the sentry must keep the challenged party under close scrutiny and at a tactical disadvantage.

(2) The command to halt must be executed in a voice loud enough to be heard by the challenged party and in a language understood by all Vietnamese is "Dung Lai", which is pronounced "Dung Lie". If the nationality of the challenged party is not known, use both "Halt" and "Dung lie". In an area of excessive noise, a whistle should also be used in conjunction with the voice command.

(3) If the challenged party does not heed the first command to halt, repeat the command in a loud clear voice.

(4) If the challenged party does not heed the second command to halt, fire a warning shot at a 70 degree angle over the head of the challenged party, followed by a third command to halt. In the event the individual fails to heed the warning shot and subsequent voice challenge, the sentry is authorized to fire to hit. (Note: The procedures set forth above are not applicable when challenging persons who are off-base. Persons who are off-base when challenged, will not be brought under fire for purposes of warning or otherwise, unless such persons are committing a hostile act and fire is authorized in accordance with the MACV Rules of Engagement).

(5) Prohibited Practices. Under no circumstances will a weapon be pointed at an individual(s) or fired into the air, merely as a bluff. A bluff shot is defined as firing to frighten or disuade under conditions where there is no intent or need to fire with intent to hit. The warning shot previously mentioned is not considered a bluff shot but is to insure that the individual is aware of being challenged. The firing of a bluff shot is misuse of a weapon and requires positive action by the Commander concerned in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10, AFR 125-22, Authorization and Use of Weapons, 12 October 1965.

b. MACV Rules of Engagement: Since the air base may be attacked by fire from outside the base or by infiltrators or agents inside the base, it shall be established policy that:

(1) Guards, sentries, out posts, watch posts and patrols will fire on any force or individual committing a hostile act either within the base or from outside the base. A hostile act is defined as firing in the direction of the base, setting up weapons within range of the base (unless prior clearance has been secured by friendly forces), attempting to infiltrate or overwhelm by numbers an outpost or failure to halt when ordered to do so when within the base.

(2) All necessary force to defeat an attack shall be applied. Such force may include small arms, automatic weapons and crew served weapons and artillery fire; armed helicopter attack; attack by aircraft or attack by infantry or armored formation.

(3) All reasonable care will be taken to reduce damage to innocent personnel and buildings, but defense of the air base will be considered as over-riding.

c. Guard Order: The following MACV Guard Order will apply to all personnel of this organization when engaged in tactical operations.

(1) "I understand that it is my duty to defend the air base against any action which may threaten life or property. Effective attack may be made by mortars, small arms, low trajectory weapons and other devices located outside the perimeter of the airfield as well as by infiltration".

(2) "I understand that I am authorized and directed to utilize whatever force is necessary to render an attack harmless, whether the attack comes from inside or outside the base".

(3) "If I observe an attack or threat from outside the base I will report the attack or threat and take the position or force which threatens the base under fire with the most effective means at my disposal. Within the base, I will not fire unless it is either a direct assault, I see weapons being emplaced, or the personnel refuse to halt. When I observe weapons being emplaced, a direct assault, or flashes which I can recognize as a weapon directed against the air base, I will respond with maximum effective firepower".

3-17. (C) (GP-4) Weapons and Ammunition: Basic weapons assigned to each individual, security of weapons, weapons safety and cleanliness and basic load of ammunition are indicated below.

a. Weapons assignments are as follows:

(1) All personnel are assigned an M-16 rifle as their basic weapon. In addition, all personnel F-6 and above have been assigned a caliber 38 revolver. Those assigned the cal. 38 will, as the situation requires, viz, alerts and all tactical operations, will carry the M-16 rifle.

(2) Each close combat fire team will be assigned an M-60 machine gun. The team member assigned this weapon must provide for its constant security and daily cleaning. In addition, one XM-148 grenade launcher will be assigned per fire team.

(3) Three (3) cal. 50 machine guns will be mounted on the three APC's and kept there at all times except for daily cleaning. When not in use these guns will be kept covered. The remaining cal. 50 machine guns have been issued to the Weapons Support Flight and will be deployed in accordance with current frag orders; otherwise they will be stored in a locked connex container.

(4) Mortars, when not deployed or employed from fixed positions, will be stored in the connex container maintained by the Weapons Support Flight. The mortar section is responsible for their daily cleaning.

(5) All other weapons will be stored and secured in the armory.

b. Basic load requirements for assigned weapons:

(1) M-16 rifle - 120 rounds - individual to have available at all times.

(2) M-60 machine gun - 1500 rounds - teams to have available at all times.

(3) Cal. 50 machine gun - 1500 rounds.

(4) Cal. 38 revolver - 18 rounds.

(5) 81mm Mortar -110 rounds (50 Illum, 50 HE & 10 smoke).

(6) M-148 grenade launcher when issued - 6 White Star Clusters and 6 frag grenades

c. Weapons Security:

(1) Heavy weapons will not be deployed outside a secure area without fire team support.

(2) Vehicles with mounted weapons will not be left unattended at any time while outside the base camp.

d. Weapons Safety:

(1) All weapons will be cleared prior to entering the camp cantonment area. Designated clearing pits will be used for this purpose.

(2) When magazines are carried in the M-16 rifle the weapon will be on safe with no rounds in the chamber.

(3) Frag grenades will be used primarily from bunkered and/or foxhole type positions. When carried on patrols or other combat type missions they will be carried by Fire Team Leaders, Patrol Leader, Assistant patrol leader, section and Flight Supervisors only.

3-18. (U) After Action Reports (AAR): In order to document certain type tactical operations After Action Reports (AAR) are required. The format for this report appears at Annex D.

a. When personnel are involved in tactical operations as indicated below, the Flight Commander primarily responsible for the mission as indicated in the Frag order will submit an After Action Report in draft form to the Operations Officer. The Operations Officer will prepare the report in final form in the correct format and make distribution as indicated in Annex C.

(1) Any squadron tactical operation in which the enemy is engaged.

(2) Any tactical operation in support of friendly forces in which the enemy is engaged and/or sighted.

(3) Any other tactical operation as directed by the Commander.

b. All Hq, CSOC and flight personnel will be briefed on the requirements for completing an AAR in order that accurate and timely information will be provided the responsible Flight Commander.

3-19. (C) (GP-4) Limitations on Operations Outside Unit Tactical Area of Responsibility: The TAOR of the 1041st USAF SPS (T) as defined in Annex A does not include any areas located outside the boundaries of Phu Cat AB. Therefore, all personnel engaged in preparing tactical operations orders, all supervisory personnel and personnel subject to being engaged in tactical operations will acquaint themselves with the limits of the 1041st TAOR and will not, during any tactical operations, cross the boundary of this TAOR. This does not preclude fire being brought to bear on the enemy located outside the TAOR under the MACV Rules of Engagement, provided the limits of the TAOR are not crossed by personnel of this organization.

3-20. (U) Supporting Fire From Friendly Ground Forces:

Pending

3-21. (C) (GP-4) Direct Air Support Procedures: One AC-47 "Spooky" aircraft will orbit the Phu Cat area for 5-5½ hours each night. The aircraft, armed with 3 miniguns, will carry 21,000 rounds of ammunition and 45 flares with 2,000,000 candle power illumination and a burn time of 3 minutes per flare. The aircraft will be under the operational control of JDCP. Operational control may be transferred to the 1041st CSOC depending on the tactical situation.

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) The AC-47 will not fire or drop flares unless directed by the ground controller, except to defend itself from hostile ground fire.

(2) The ground controller has permission to order the AC-47 to fire within the base TAOR, only after assuring that there are no friendly forces within 100 meters of the hostile fire.

(3) Use of the AC-47 to fire within the ROK TAOR upon request from the ROK CAP INF DIV Commander, will only be authorized in accordance with the MACV Rules of Engagement. Control of the AC-47 will remain with the JDCP ground controller.

(4) Request for flare drops, within the aircrafts capability will be authorized by the JDCP ground controller. Flares may be dropped without permission outside the base/ROK TAOR. All requests for flare drops will be made to JDCP giving grid coordinates for the area to be illuminated.

(5) In specific instances, upon direction of the Commander, 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T), or his representative, control of the AC-47 may be passed to a forward ground controller located in the vicinity of the hostile action. This forward ground controller will utilize the AFC FM or PRC-25 radio set for direct communications with the AC-47. The ground controller, JDCP, will monitor all requests for flare/fire and insure there are no friendly forces, unknown to the forward ground controller, in the area. In the event the ground controller at JDCP must cancell a request made by the forward ground controller, he will contact the AC-47 by radio and state, "disregard request", control of "spooky" returned to "Slim Judge" (see communications procedures).

b. Communications Procedures:

(1) Call Sign: "Slim Judge" is the tactical air/ground call sign assigned to Base Defense Units at Phu Cat AB. The call sign "Slim Judge Alpha" is assigned to the 1041st CSOC for use when control is transferred from JDCP. Forward ground controllers will be authorized call signs "Slim Judge 01, 02, etc.", by the ground controller at JDCP when required. The JDCP will notify "Spooky" when control is passed by stating "Spooky" 33, this is Slim Judge, control of your aircraft is passed to Slim Judge 01". "I will maintain a listening watch on all assigned frequencies".

(2) Frequencies: During the interim period until frequencies are assigned to "Slim Judge", we will co-use DASC ALFA's frequencies assigned to the AIO, ROK CAP INF DIV. Frequencies are FM 32.4, UHF 301.5, VHF 121.6. Authorized ROK CAP INF call signs are, airborne, "Cookie, Cookie 01", etc., and ground station, "Ragged Scooper 40 thru 52". In the event of wide spread attack, an airborne FAC may assist in identifying target for "Spooky 33". He will use a "Cookie" call sign and coordinate with us.

c. Target Identification:

(1) The best procedure for target identification is voice (giving location by grid coordinates or easily seen landmarks) target marking by tracers, WP, etc.

(2) "Spooky" aircraft can detect hostile tracer/mortar fire when flares are not illuminated. Illumination of flares causes these sightings to be diminished due to the light they produce.

(3) When marking a target by tracer/WP mortar, care must be taken to avoid hitting "Spooky" with ricochet or mortar trajectory. In no case will fire be directed towards aircraft as "spooky" will shoot back without clearance from the ground, assuming that it is hostile fire. The aircraft will fly in a left hand 360 degree orbit. Targets should be marked only on request by "Spooky" when he is in firing position over friendly forces (see diagram). Once a target is marked, verbal communications should verify target. Example: "Spooky 33, this is Slim Judge 01, target marked". "Slim Judge 01, I have your mark, permission to fire". "Spooky 33, this is Slim Judge 01, permission granted". "Spooky 33, this is Slim Judge 01, adjust fire 50 meters northwest". Do you want a mark? "Slim Judge 01, this is Spooky 33, mark target". "Spooky 33, this is Slim Judge 01, target marked". "Slim Judge 01, I have target, firing".


HOSTILE FORCES
ORBIT
MARKING/FIRING AREA
FRIENDLY FORCES

(4) When requesting flares, grid coordinates and/or prominent landmarks should be used. After the first flare is dropped, the ground controller contact "Spooky" to adjust illuminated area, if necessary. A radio call with meter corrections, i.e., "Spooky" 33, this is Slim Judge, adjust flare release point so as to illuminate area 100 meters northwest". The area we wish lit is the rice paddie north of the abandoned houses".

(5) Verbal Communications:

(a) All communications will use standard air/ground terminology: "Roger" - Communication acknowledge, this is not to be used as an affirmative answer to a question. "Affirmative" - Self explanatory. "Negative" - Self Explanatory. "Wilco" - I will comply. "Say Again" or "I say Again" - repeat last transmission. "Over" - I am listening for your transmission. "Out" - communications complete, I am going off frequency. "Charlie, Charlie, Charlie" - used for affirmative when communications is unreadable.

3-22. (U) Patrol Procedures: It is the responsibility of all Flight Commanders and NCOIC's as well as those individuals who are designated as Patrol Leaders to insure that the procedures described herein are complied with. Generally the following sequence of events will apply to the forming and conducting of tactical patrols.

a. Operations Section:

(1) All Frag Orders will originate with the Combat Security Operations Center (CSOC) and will be based on the tactical evaluation of the enemy situation, and as directed by the Commander. No patrols will be formed for any reason unless directed by the Commander or Operations Officer through the CSOC.

(2) The Frag Order will be given to the appropriate Flight Commander(s), and any unit section OIC involved in the operation. Normally the Close Combat Flight Commander will provide personnel for all patrol activities.

b. Close Combat Flight:

(1) Upon receipt of the Frag Order, the Flight Commander will designate the NCO or Officer to act as Patrol Leader and will assign specific Fire Team(s) to participate in the patrol action.

(2) Coordination will be made between the Close Combat Flight and other flights providing attached personnel. The coordination should include time and date warning orders and patrol orders are to be given. All personnel who are scheduled for the patrol will attend the briefing given by the Patrol Leader.

c. Patrol Leaders:

(1) The Patrol Leader will prepare the warning order and patrol order following the standard five (5) paragraph patrol order format. The sequence of events for rehearsals, food, logistics and administration are the responsibility of the Patrol Leader.

(2) Before the patrol departs the base camp, or when stated in the Frag Order, a copy of the patrol order will be given to the CSOC Duty Officer or the Operations Officer.

(3) The Patrol Leader will insure that his patrol is conducted in the proper manner at all times and that all patrol personnel understand that the mission is of paramount importance to be completed at all costs, unless otherwise directed.

(4) The Patrol Leader will insure that information and material collected and observations and actions taken by his patrol are accurately reported to the Intelligence NCO at the Patrol De-briefing immediately upon the conclusion of the patrol.

d. CSOC: All patrols originated by this unit will be monitored by CSOC and will communicate directly with CSOC on the assigned frequency, using the assigned call sign. Phase lines, unusual events, enemy contacts, etc., will be reported promptly unless otherwise directed by CSOC.

3-23. (C) (GP-4) Avoidance of Sterotyped Tactics: Officers and Non-commissioned officers are to insure that sterotyped tactical procedures are avoided as far as possible. Tactical procedures which tend to become routine and sterotyped are: the changing of the guard at a certain time, patrolling on the same route, the nightly occupation of the same listening posts, bunkers, etc., and squadron alerts at standard times. The enemy studies our techniques and if such become constant and predictable, the enemy may take positive action such as ambush or avoidance tactics to counter.

3-24. (U) Tactical Uniforms and Equipment: The following normal standards for uniforms and equipment are established for all personnel. The Operations Officer may vary battle and crew dress depending on the tactical situation.

a. Battle Dress. With the exception of crewmen assigned to machine guns, mortars and armored personnel carriers, the following battle dress will apply to all squadron personnel when engaged in any tactical operation.

(1) Jungle/Camouflage uniform.

(2) Jungle boots.

(3) Helmet with camouflage cover (night reconnaissance patrols may be authorized to wear the soft cap (USAF Design); this change will be announced in the appropriate Frag Order when authorized.

(4) Web harness with magazine pouches, canteen, first aid pouch, combat knife, bayonet and compass.

(5) M-16 rifle with basic load of ammunition.

(6) Identification tags, ID card and Geneva Convention Card.

b. Crew Dress: The following crew dress will apply to all personnel assigned to machine gun, mortar and armored personnel carrier crews:

(1) Jungle/Camouflage uniform.

(2) Jungle Boots.

(3) Helmet with camouflage cover (except APC crew members will wear the interphone helmets).

(4) Web harness with ammunition pouches, canteen, first aid pouch, combat knife and compass.

(5) 38 caliber revolver with basic load of ammunition.

(6) Crew served weapon with basic load of ammunition.

3-25. (C) (GP-4) Tactical Allocation Vehicle: The following tactical vehicles are permanently allocated as indicated: (14 Jeeps and 3 weapons carriers)

a. Squadron Headquarters: 1 Jeep (radio) - Commander
1 Jeep (no radio) - Hq Staff

b. Operations Section: 1 Jeep (radio) - OIC
1 Jeep (radio) - Intelligence

c. Close Combat Flight Hqs: 1 Jeep (radio) - Flt Commander

d. Close Combat Section Leaders: (each) 2 Jeep (radio)

e. Close Combat Patrol Vehicles: 3 Jeeps (radio)

f. Close Combat Reserve Force: 3 Weapons Carriers (radio)

g. TSSE SECTION: 1 Jeep (radio)

h. Weapons Support Flight Commander: 1 Jeep (radio)

i. Mortar Section: 1 Jeep (radio)

j. Medical Section: 1 Jeep (no radio) MEDIVAC)

3-26. (C) (GP-4) Tactical Vehicle Identification: In order to identify and control unit tactical vehicles during operational use all squadron tactical vehicles will be identified as indicated below:

a. All vehicles will be marked with a squadron name plate as indicated. The squadron emblem will appear on the upper (light blue) portion of the name plate.

Light Blue
Dark blue

b. Permanently allocated tactical vehicles will be marked on the lower (dark blue) plate as indicated below:

(1)	Commander	Hq - 1
(2)	Hq Staff	Hq - 2
(3)	Operations Section	Ops- 1
(4)	Close Combat Flt Hq	C - 1
(5)	Close Combat Section Hq	C - 2 thru C - 4
(6)	Close Combat Reserve Force	CCRF
(7)	Weapons Support Flight Hq	W - 1
(8)	Mortar Section	M - 1
(9)	TSSE Section	T - 1
(10)	Med Evac	ME

3-27. (U) Civic Actions and Psywar:

Pending

3-28. (U) Emergency Withdrawal Actions:

Pending

3-29. (C) (GP-4) Unit Intelligence Procedures: The NCOIC of the unit intelligence section is responsible to the Intelligence Officer for the implementation of the following recording procedures:

a. The maintenance of an Intelligence Log giving details of:

(1) Visits made.

(2) Reports received.

(3) Use of section vehicle.

(4) Specific tasks detailed and completed.

b. The compiling of all reports received, verbal or written, on the Intelligence Report Form and the passing of the form for distribution action to the Intelligence Officer, or in his absence the Operations Officer, and the filing in serial order of the duplicate copy.

c. The display on area intelligence maps at JDCP and CSOC of information received.

d. The maintenance of enemy OOB folders.

e. The maintenance of an Intelligence Source Register containing details as follows:

(1) Unit, formation or organization.

(2) Means of contact, liaison, R/T Net, telephone, etc.

(3) Nature of intelligence available, e.g., Perintrep and Insum, Air Recce Reports, agents reports.

(4) Personalities and (appointments of source organization).

f. The issuance of weekly brief Perintrep by 1200 hours each Saturday containing details as follows:

(1) Changes in local enemy order of battle (OOB).

(2) Changes in local friendly OOB.

(3) Any significant events in theatre.

(4) Brief summary of local events for period.

3-30. (C) (GP-4) Emergency Actions: For the purpose of this order, emergency actions are defined as those tactical operations caused by enemy action or suspected enemy actions which occur within 500 meters of the 1041st Base Camp.

a. Emergency actions are divided into two categories as indicated below:

(1) Those emergency actions, which in the opinion of the Commander, Executive Officer or Operations Officer require a general base camp alert.

(2) Those actions which are within a 500 meter radius of the base camp, but due to their limited nature do not require a general base camp alert.

b. In the event emergency actions result in a general base camp alert the procedures outlined in the appropriate CSOP will apply.

c. All other emergency action which fall within a 500 meter radius of the base camp when deemed necessary by the Operations Officer will be dealt with as follows:

(1) The Operations Officer will immediately notify the Commander and will request that the Orders Group (see Par. 3-5) report to CSOC.

(2) All other personnel not performing normal duties (e.g., administrative, support and operations personnel not on duty, personnel not engaged in either tactical operations or base camp security) will immediately report to their respective living quarters in order to be available for emergency use.

(3) Personnel working within the confines of the base camp are normally required to be armed or to have weapons within reach except during meal hours.

(4) In the event emergency actions are necessary during meal hours personnel will be notified accordingly and will immediately vacate the mess area and repair to their living quarters where they will remain on standby.

d. Examples of emergency actions are indicated below:

(1) Enemy or suspected enemy forces sighted within 500 meters of base camp.

(2) Enemy sighted within 500 meters of base camp or suspected enemy forces which are fired upon by either personnel of the 1041st USAF

SPS (T), US Army units located on Phu Cat AB, personnel of the 37th Air Police Squadron or ROK personnel.

(3) Enemy forces which launch an attack against the 1041st base camp.

3-31. Up-Channel Reporting (IAW AFR/AFM 207-1)

Pending

3-32. (C) (GP-4) Immediate Action and Reserve Forces: In order to provide an immediate action and reserve force capability the following forces will be established and deployed in accordance with current directives.

a. Immediate Reaction Teams(s) (IRT): Each team will consist of one 6 man fire team mounted inside a M-113 APC. Teams will deploy in battle dress (par. 3-24) unless otherwise directed in frag orders. The Fire Team Leader will be designated the IRT Leader and it will be his responsibility, working in conjunction with the APC Commander, to respond immediately to all directions received from CSOC. When responding to tactical situations appropriate battle formations will be used and this decision will rest with the IRT Leader. Normally IRT's will be deployed from base camp in accordance with Frag Orders; however, during hours 0700 to 2100 hours daily one IRT will be available in Battle Condition C plus 30 minutes. During the hours 2100 to 0700 one IRT will be available in Battle Condition C plus 5 minutes. At least six hours prior to an IRT assuming duty, the Close Combat Flight Commander in cooperation with the Weapons Flight Commander will insure that CSOC is advised of: (i) The fire team to be designated as a part of the IRT; (ii) the name of the fire team leader; and (iii) the name of the APC Commander. The IRT Leader will keep CSOC advised of his location and will insure that during the hours 2100 to 0700 that the team remains together at all times.

b. Close Combat Reserve Force: The CCRF will be the primary reserve force of the unit and will consist of a minimum of one fire team section. The CCRF will deploy in battle dress (par. 3-24) unless otherwise directed in Frag Orders. The section Leader will be designated the CCRF Leader and it will be his responsibility to respond promptly to all directions received from CSOC. When responding to a tactical situation appropriate battle formations will be used and this decision will rest with the CCRF Leader. A CCRF will be available in Battle Condition C plus 1 hour during the hours 0700 to 2100 daily. During the hours 2100 to 0700 the CCRF will be available in Battle Condition C plus 15 minutes. At least six hours prior to the CCRF assuming duty, the Close Combat Flight Commander will insure that CSOC is advised of: (i) the section to be designated as the CCRF; (ii) the name of the Section Leader; and (iii) the number of fire teams assigned. The CCRF Leader will keep CSOC advised of his location and will insure that during the hours 2100 to 0700 that CCRF fire teams remain together at all times.

SECTION IV

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TAB D GENERAL

4-1 Administration
4-2 Mess
4-3 Materiel
4-4 Armory
4-5 Administrative Transportation
4-6 Medical Evacuation
4-7 Disposition of Prisoners
4-8 Disposition of Captured Equipment and Documents
4-9 Casualty Analysis

4-1. (U) Administration: The Executive Officer is responsible to the Commander for administration, discipline and welfare of assigned personnel. Administrative procedures for the unit will be in accordance with USAF, PACAF, 7th Air Force and local base directives. Squadron procedures will be specified in Squadron Standing Operating Procedures (SOP).

4-2. (U) Mess: The Squadron Mess will operate at normal hours as defined in Squadron Standing Operating Procedures except when directed by CSOC. The Squadron Support Section will maintain a five (5) day supply of Combat Rations ("C" rations) to be used only in the case of emergency and only through direction of CSOC. In addition, the mess will provide combat rations for personnel engaged in tactical operations as directed by CSOC.

4-3. (U) Materiel: All personnel are responsible for equipment in their possession or under their control. Procedures concerning the loss, damage, or destruction of government property are outlined in Squadron SOP's. The OIC, Support Section will be notified immediately of the loss of or destruction of sensitive equipment such as weapons, vehicles, TSSE and any high value item.

4-4. (C) (Gp-4) Armory: The Squadron Armory, a 24 hour operation, is located at the north end of the base camp and is the responsibility of the Operations Officer (see par. 3-7h). It will be manned at all times by assigned personnel or personnel rostered by the Operations Section.

a. Munitions:

(1) The following basic load requirements are established and will be available at the armory for immediate issue:

(a)	M-16	320	43,200
(b)	M-60	1,500	61,500
(c)	.38 Cal.	50	3,350
(d)	.50 Cal.	1,500	9,000
(e)	12 Ga.	20	360
(f)	81mm	110 (50 HE, 50 Illum and 10 Smoke)	
(g)	40mm	12 (6 frag and 6 Illum)	144

(2) The following munitions are stored in two ammunition dumps as indicated. Munitions will be segregated by class and compatability and properly marked. Explosive safety will be closely adhered to. All munitions will be shielded by sand-bag revetments.

(a) Location #1: 150 meters northwest of the Armory near the supply area contains .38 Cal., 50 Cal. (API & ball link), 7.62mm (M-60) and 12 Ga.

(b) Location #2: 400 meters southeast of the Armory near the motor park contains .50 Cal., API and ball link.

b. Explosives: Explosives as indicated below will be stored at Location #1. Particular care will be taken to insure that all sensitive items are stored in conex containers. All explosives will be shielded by sand-bag revetments.

(1) 81mm Illum

(2) 81mm Smoke

(3) 81mm HE

(4) 66mm (LAW)

(5) MK-2 Frag Grenades

(6) A.P. Mines

(7) 40mm (XM-148)

(8) Blasting Caps (Elect. & Non-Elect.)

(9) Fuze (Detonating & Blasting Time)

(10) Primer Cord

(11) Comp. C-4

(12) TNT

c. Weapons: All weapons not issued to personnel will be kept in the Armory. Weapons will be cleaned daily and will be maintained available for immediate issue when directed by CSOC. Weapons cleaning equipment will be available for issue to Flight and Section NCOIC's as required. Periodic weapons inspections will be conducted by qualified armorers at least monthly after coordination has been accomplished with Flight and Section NCOIC's.

(1) Fire and safety directives will be rigidly enforced at all times. No Smoking areas will be established and properly posted. Violation of these directives will be immediately reported to the Operations Officer.

d. Inventory Procedures: Strict accountability will be maintained of all munitions, explosives and weapons by the NCOIC of the Armory.

(1) Munitions and Explosives: Munitions and explosives will be inventoried in accordance with current Air Force directives as supplemented by PACAF, 7th Air Force and local base directives.

(2) Weapons: All squadron weapons will be inventoried and accounted for on the 1st and 15th of each month, except those weapons stored in the Armory which will be inventoried and accounted for at the end of each duty shift. Accurate records and receipts will be maintained of all weapons issued.

4-5. (U) Administrative Transportation: With the exception of those unit tactical vehicles on permanent dispatch as outlined in Par. 3-25, Section III, Tab C, all vehicles will be obtained from the Unit Motor Pool as outlined in Squadron SOP's. In all cases priority will be given to tactical requirements.

4-6. (U) Medical Evacuation: Injured personnel will normally be attended by a Squadron Medical Technician. Those not in critical condition will be evacuated by land transportation to the 37th Combat Support Group Dispensary or the 819th Civil Engineer Squadron Dispensary. Critically injured personnel will be evacuated by aircraft to a US Army Field Hospital, Qui Nhon when directed by a medical officer. Requests for air evacuation will be initiated by CSOC to the base CSC.

4-7. (C) (Gp-4) Disposition of Prisoners: All captured enemy personnel will be immediately stripped of all clothing and searched thoroughly at the point of capture. When captured while under fire, prisoners will be removed as quickly as possible after a preliminary search and then searched more thoroughly once in a safe area. Upon completion of the strip search prisoners will be bound and blindfolded and escorted to the area in rear of the intelligence section tent and will be kept under constant guard. Upon notification that enemy prisoner(s) have been taken, CSOC will immediately contact the local OSI Detachment for disposition instructions.

4-8. (C) (Gp-4) Disposition of Captured Equipment and Documents: All captured enemy equipment and documents will be released to the Squadron Intelligence Officer or his representative as soon as possible. Upon receipt of captured enemy equipment or documents the Squadron Intelligence Officer will immediately notify the local OSI Detachment for disposition instructions.

SECTION IV

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TAB E Operational Analysis

SECTION V

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

SECTION V

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

TAB F GENERAL

5-1 Command
5-2 Landline Communications
5-3 Internal (Squadron) Radio Communications
5-4 External Radio Communications
5-5 Authentication
5-6 Pyrotechnics

This page is Unclassified

5-1. (C) (GP-4) Command: The 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (T) is located at grid coordinate BR88304525, telephone number 262. The 1041st Combat Security Operations Center is located in tent #9, telephone number 231 (see Annex E for 1041st Comm Net).

a. Manning of Nets: Control and out stations are to be manned as follows:

(1) Falcon Control - At all times.

(2) At alert state of readiness - all controls and out stations.

(3) At conditions "A" and "B" - squadron elements affected.

(4) Otherwise as directed by CSOC.

b. Net Integrity: Flight Commanders are to ensure that net integrity is maintained by only having authorized out stations transmit. Vehicles in use that are fixed with radio and are not authorized out stations are to have the microphone removed and returned to the armory. Radio sets issued for "listening out" purposes are only to transmit in an emergency.

5-2. (C) (GP-4) Landline Communications: The Squadron Communications Officer is to locate the Squadron Telephone Exchange within the Squadron area, and to lay field telphone cable to provide for the following extensions:

a. Command: Commander, CSOC, Ops Officer.

b. Operations: Close Combat Flight Headquarters, Weapons Support Flight Headquarters, all constantly manned observation and listening posts, all constantly manned fixed bunkers, mortar section hqs, APC holding location, officers quarters.

c. Mortar Section Wire Net: The NCO in charge of the Mortar Section is to lay a ring telephone line connecting the FDC, Mortar Section firing pits, and permanent observation posts.

(1) Line work priorities are to be:

(a) Immediate cable connection to switchboard.

(b) Securing lines above or under ground.

d. Squadron Switchboard: The communications officer is to insure that the squadron switchboard is continuously manned, all lines are regularly checked and faults are rectified without delay. Additional telephones may be laid and connected at the discretion of, or with the permission of the officer commanding the Operations Section.

e. External Landline Connections: The Squadron Communications Officer is to insure that connections from the base telephone exchange to squadron [illegible] are provided to meet the administrative requirements, and on application from the flight or section commanders concerned. In addition he will insure that a direct line telephone between the Squadron CSOC and base CSC is installed and maintained.

5-3. (C) (GP-4) Internal Radio Communications: The following six (6) squadron radio nets will be established; Squadron Command Net, Close Combat Net, Mortar Control Net, IRT Net, Base Defense Net and spare net (see Annex K).

a. Squadron Command Net: Details of the Squadron Command Net are as follows:

(1) Frequency: 173.425

(2) Net Identification - FALCON.

(3) Control - CSOC

(4) Out Stations - Commander (Vehicle), Close Combat Flight Hqs, Close Combat Section Hqs (3), Mortar Section Commander (R), FDC (3), Observation posts (as required). The Commander's call sign will be 01 (zero one) prefixed by the identification of the net on which he is operating, see call signs diagramatically shown at Annex D.

b. Close Combat Net: Details of the Close Combat Net are as follows:

(1) Frequency: 173.800

(2) Net Identification - VULTURE

(3) Control - Close Combat Flight Hqs

(4) Out stations - Close Combat Section Hqs (3), and Close Combat Fire Teams (15).

c. Mortar Control Net: Details of the mortar control net are as follows:

(1) Frequency: 173.325

(2) Net Identification - HAWK

(3) Control - Mortar Section Hqs.

(4) Out station - Detachments (2), Observers (2).

d. Immediate Reaction Team (IRT) Net: Details of the IRT Net are as follows:

(1) Frequency: 72.15

(2) Net Identification: EAGLE

(3) Control - CSOC

(4) Out station - Each M-113 APC

e. Base Defense Net: Details of the Base Defense Net are as follows:

(1) Frequency: (Not yet assigned)

(2) Net Identification: BLUE JAY

(3) Control - CSOC

(4) Out station - Each Base Defense Zone Headquarters and JDCP.

f. Spare Net: Details of the Spare Net will be advised when available. The net identification will be SPARTA.

5-4. (C) (GP-4) External Radio Communications: (See Annex F)

a. Direct Air Support Communications:

(1) Control: JDCP

(a) Out station: CSOC

(b) Forward Ground Controllers (Normally IRT)

(2) Frequency: 43.40

42.90

(3) Net Identification: SLIM JUDGE

CSOC SLIM JUDGE ALPHA

Forward Controllers: SLIM JUDGE 01, 02, 03

b. B Troop, 1st US Air Cavalry Squadron:

(1) Frequency: 41.2

(2) Net Identification: CHARGER

c. A Troop, 1st US Air Cavalry Squadron:

(1) Frequency: 41.2

(2) Net Identification: APACHE

d. C Troop, 1st US Air Cavalry Squadron:

(1) Frequency: 41.2

(2) Net Identification: FIGHTER

e. 37th Air Police Squadron Security Net:

(1) Frequency: 173.425

(2) Net Identification: CHECKMATE

(3) Control: CSC

f. Phu Cat Sub-Sector Net:

(1) Frequency: 43.60

(2) Net Identification: KICKING RACKS LIMA

(3) Control: Phu Cat Sub-Sector

(a) Out stations: CSC - KICKING RACKS LIMA ALPHA
CSOC- KICKING RACKS LIMA ALPHA ONE

g. An Nhon Sub-Sector Net:

(1) Frequency: 43.60

(2) Net Identification: KICKING RACKS X-RAY

(3) Controls: An Khe Sub-Sector

(a) Out stations: [illegible] - KICKING MARE X-RAY ALPHA
CSOC- KICKING MARE X-RAY ALPHA ONE

h. 1st Squadron, 9th US Air Calvary Regiment Net:

(1) Frequency: 48.00

(2) Net Identification: SABER

(3) Controls: Hq 1st Squadron

i. [illegible]OK Nets: (Pending)

5-5. [illegible] ([illegible]-4) [illegible]. [illegible] required [illegible] officers. Signal [illegible] may be made [illegible] reply from the [illegible] indicated below. Tables will be changed [illegible] as directed by the operations officer.

a. TABLE #1:

Ø A - [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible] - IBTVY
1 B - [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible] - ZHOJW
2 C - OVQ[illegible]E - [illegible] - W[illegible]IS - ZTSMH
3 D - [illegible] - [illegible]Z - A[illegible]YV - RKSOJ
4 E - [illegible] - LSA[illegible]V - D[illegible]G - [illegible]
5 [illegible] - Q[illegible]DBRZ - [illegible]PWHS - [illegible]VNJ - [illegible]ECAU
6 G - [illegible]CL - D[illegible]NEA - [illegible] - [illegible]Z
7 [illegible] - Q[illegible]ZVR - J[illegible] - [illegible]CK - S[illegible]
8 I - SJEQU - P[illegible]BD - [illegible] - G[illegible]
9 J - [illegible] - IRAZM - [illegible]S - PE[illegible]

b. TABLE #2:

Ø A - [illegible] - RQ[illegible]A - [illegible]SX - [illegible]
1 B - [illegible]N - DOHZT - ESN[illegible] - R[illegible]Y[illegible]
2 C - [illegible]QD - SFEND - Y[illegible]RJ - [illegible]
3 D - CU[illegible]NE - [illegible]MPQG - F[illegible]YI - [illegible]AZTO
4 E - PFABD - WAIYT - [illegible] - [illegible]V
5 F - [illegible]X - GCYZ[illegible] - PNSIE - J[illegible]
6 G - BLYKW - JH[illegible] - CACPQ - [illegible]S
7 H - OS[illegible]P - WODNL - A[illegible]F - IK[illegible]
8 I - [illegible] - FCHLI - [illegible]ZOAQ - VNGBT[illegible]
9 J - TS[illegible]D - QRZ[illegible] - [illegible] - E[illegible]PKA

c. Use of the authentication table.

(1) Select any random test sample (Example: Line #3, Table , authenticate D5).

(2) Locate the first element (D) in the column of row designators (line #3).

(3) Proceed across the row designated by the first test element (D) until the second test element (B) is reached.

(4) The letter immediately to the right of the second test element (B) is the authenticator (in this example "G" is the authenticator). When the second test element is the last letter in the row, the first letter in the same row becomes the authenticator (i.e., Line #3 - DJ, the authenticator becomes "T").

Ko

5-6. (C) (GP-4) Pyrotechnics. The use of Pyrotechnics, flares, hand popped flares, very pistol, smoke, etc., will be used as indicated below.

Green star cluster	Medical Evacuation (night)
Red star cluster	Distress signal (day and night)
White	Illumination (night)

SECTION V

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

This page is Unclassified

SECTION I -- COMMAND AND SIGNAL
TAB C -- Challenge, Pass Words
and Codes

5-7. (C) (CP-4) Challenge, Pass Words and Codes. The primary challenge will consist of a sign and countersign. The challenger will give the challenged party a word and the challenged party must respond with the proper countersign which is a word, i.e., challenger - "Weld", challenged party - "Deck".

a. The alternate challenge will consist of a number between one and twenty. The challenger will give the challenged party any portion of the number and the challenged party must respond with a number that adds up to the number for that day. Example: The number for the day is seven. The challenger gives the challenged party six and the challenged party must respond with one making the total of seven.

b. The Combat Operations Officer shall publish a list of signs, countersigns and codes of the day by the 1st of each month. JDCP will be furnished one copy, 37th Security Police Sq and a copy to appropriate sub-units within the 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron. The signs, countersings and codes will be rigidly controlled to prevent compromise.

5-8. (C) (Gp-4) Codes: When the security of a given situation precludes voice transmission in the clear, code(s) will be used to protect the information being transmitted. The following codes are established and will be used by all personnel.

a. Location Code Words: In a situation where the security of locations is essential the following method will be used to indicate such locations.

(1) The nearest of the landmarks as listed below will be identified. The location to be identified will be stated in reference to the landmark; e.g., "200 meters south of FLORIDA", or "1 click (1,000 meters) east of WASHINGTON", or "The nearest hill south of ARIZONA", etc. Landmarks and their assigned code names are indicated below:

LANDMARK	GRID COORDINATE	NORMAL USE	CODE NAME
Water tower hill	BR90434220	37th APS Strongpoint & OP	ALABAMA
Hill	BR88924157	1041st OP/LP	ALASKA
Hill	BR89124205	1041st OP/LP	ARIZONA
Hill	BR88854206	1041st OP/LP	ARKANSAS
Base Camp	BR87704240	11th Company (ROK) Camp/CP	CALIFORNIA
Base Camp	BR88554520	1041st Base Camp	D.C.
Hill	BR89424564	1041st OP/LP	DELAWARE
SE Corner, 3,000' dirt strip	BR89794083	Landing Strip	FLORIDA
Tower	BR90724186	1041st OP & TSSE Monitor	KENTUCKY
Hill, w/tower	BR89884528	1041st OP	HAWAII
Hill (old ROK OP)	BR88204630	1041st OP/LP/IRT Position	MICHIGAN
Hill, w/defensive bunker	BR91024414	37th APS Strongpoint/OP	MONTANA
Hill	BR86824522	1041st Strongpoint/OP/LP	OHIO
Hill	BR87004376	1041st Strongpoint/OP/LP	OKLAHOMA

LANDMARK	GRID COORDINATE	NORMAL USE	CODE NAME
Hill (#151, Pictomap 1:25,000)	BR85994479	ROK Strongpoint/OP	OREGON
Hill (south of Thiet Trang (1)	BR89573955	ROK/104lst Strongpoint/OP	TEXAS
Gate	BR91144237	Main Gate, Phu Cat Airbase	TENNESSEE
Hill	BR87704454	104lst OP/LP	UTAH
Prominent bend in Song La Vi River (Approx. 1,160 meters NNE of HAWAII	BR90344642	Landmark reference point	VIRGINIA
Hill (#64, Pictomap 1:25,000)	BR86504689	Future 104lst Strongpoint /OP	WASHINGTON

b. Duty Titles: In order to avoid disclosing the nature of a headquarters or unit by referring to specific appointments, such as Co, Adjt, etc., and to provide a form of low grade security concerning various duty titles and tasks to be performed, standard radio appointment titles are used throughout a field force. These titles are not secret and only conceal the level of the headquarters or the nature of the duty involved. The titles used and their appointment are given below:

APPOINTMENT	TITLE
Comd	SUNRAY
Executive Officer	MOONBEAM
Ops Officer	SEAGULL
Intelligence Officer or NCO	ACORN
Administrative Staff	MANHOLE
Logistic Staff	NUTSHELL
Armor Rep	IRONSIDES
Artillery Rep	MALLARD
Counter Battery	CRACKER
Engineer Rep	HOLDFAST
Signals Rep	PRONTO
Infantry Rep	FOREGROUND
Medical Rep	STARLIGHT
Provost Rep	WATCHDOG
Army Aviation Rep	HAWKEYE

The titles will not be qualified in any way except:

(1) To indicate junior appointments, minor may be added.

(2) My, Your, His, Ours, Their, may be used before the titles.

(3) The call sign may follow the title. Example: "Sunray minor call sign Falcon".

MISUSES: There is no security value in talking of tanks as "IRONSIDES", infantry as "FOXHOUNDS", artillery support as "SHELLDRAKE Support", or in asking for "STARLIGHT" when medical aid is required. These are examples of typical misuses of the titles which stem from a misunderstanding of their purposes and which give a false sense of security which may lead to disastrous results. The procedure to be used when employing the appointment titles is given below.

If it is desired to speak to a person holding an appointment covered by the appointment title list then the prowords "Fetch and Speaking" will be used.

Example: One commander wishes to speak to another commander, e.g., Co wishes to speak to a sub-unit commander.

Co: Falcon Control this is Falcon 01, Fetch Sunray 10, over.

sub-unit

Commander-Sunray 10 speaking, over

Example: Operations Officer wishes to speak to Signal Officer

GSO2 - Falcon Control, Fetch Pronto, over

Operator - Wait

Signal Officer - Pronto Speaking, over

ANNEX A TO SECTION II

1041ST TAOR TAKEN FROM PICTOMAP SUPPLEMENT 1:25,000 SHEET 6836 IV N

SOUTH: BR90444063, 110 meters NW to BR90384069; SW 1,100 meters to BR89224030. BR90203906, 650 meters on AZ 320 to BR89803960; 100 meters on AZ 5 to BR89823970; following the northern base of Hill "Texas" to BR89623974; 340 degrees for 100 meters to BR89543986; 420 meters on AZ 270 to BR89123990.

WEST: From BR89123990 generally north along the boundary river to BR 89224030. BR89224030, generally NW along the west side of a river, approximately 2,280 meters to BR87924132; NW approximately 310 meters to BR87754159. Generally east on a fair or dry weather loose surface road approximately 600 meters to BR88264165; NW approximately 490 meters to BR88124215. NNW approximately 1,090 meters to BR87984321. West along a fair or dry weather loose surface road approximately 1,240 meters to BR86804305; NNW approximately 510 meters to BR86714354; generally north along the base slope of Hill 151 approximately 3,100 meters to BR86564592.

NORTH: BR86564592 - ENE approximately 2,110 meters to BR88664649; generally east along the north side of the Song La Vi River approximately 1,825 meters to BR90324638.

EAST: BR90324638 - Generally south along the east side of the Song La Vi River approximately 1,460 meters to BR90904531; generally south along the east side of the railroad tracks approximately 570 meters to BR90804475; SW approximately 1,200 meters to BR90044387; NW approximately 1,700 meters to BR88564474; west approximately 380 meters to BR88204474; SE along the west side of the new runway approximately 3,500 meters to BR89934168; SSW approximately 900 meters to BR89544086; SE approximately 400 meters to BR89884073; NNE approximately 980 meters to BR90084172; NNW approximately 230 meters to BR89964191; NNE approximately 18 meters to BR90144205; generally east along a loose surface road approximately 1,000 meters to BR91124237; west along the east side of the railroad tracks approximately 1,460 meters to BR91444110; generally southwest along the SE side of the Song Cau Dai River approximately 1,220 meters to BR90444063; approximately 1,220 meters to BR 90444063; generally south following the Song Cau Dai River for 1,920 meters to BR90203906.

APPENDIX 1
to Annex A
Section II

Edition I AMS Map 1:50,000 Vietnam

(Binh Dinh Province)

Sheets Number:

BR 6836 I through IV
BR 6736 I through IV
BR 6636 I & II
BR 6837 III & IV
BR 6737 I through IV
BR 6637 I & II
BR 6638 I & II
BR 6838 III
BR 6738 II & III

APPENDIX 2
To Annex A
Section II

Edition I AMS Map 1:25,000 Vietnam

Picto Map Supplement to Standard

1:50,000 Scale Map (10,000 Meter

Radius of Phu Cat Air Base)

Sheets Numbers:

BR 6636 IV N & IV S
BR 6637 III S & II S
BR 6736 I N & I S

APPENDIX 3
To Annex A
Section II

Base Layout, Phu Cat Air Base

Drawing #005

ANNEX A
to Appendix 3,
Annex A,
Section II

Normal Base Perimeter Defense

and Close-In Security, Phu Cat Air Base

OVERLAY B
To Appendix 3,
Annex A,
Section II

Base Defense Zones

(Emergency Conditions)

ANNEX B
APPENDIX 1

ORGANIZATION CHART FOR BASE DEFENSE FORCES



*The Base Director of Security Police is responsible to the Base Commander for all security, defense and law enforcement matters and for the coordination of all Project Safe Side Matters.

**The Commander, 37th Air Police Squadron is responsible for internal close-in security of priority resources, administrative and personnel security matters and all law enforcement matters.

***The Commander, 104lst USAF Security Police Squadron is responsible to the Base Commander through the Base Director of Security Police for the perimeter defense of Phu Cat AB as stated in Base Commander's letter of 18 Feb 67, subject: Air Base Security Concept.

Appendix I to
Annex B, Section III

OPERATIONS ORDER FORMAT

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: Changes from last order

b. Friendly Forces: Changes from last order

c. Attachments: Details available concerning direct ground or air support.

2. MISSION: A statement of the task to be performed and the period covered.

3. EXECUTION:

a. General outline: A brief statement of how the mission is to be accomplished. Provide detailed information as applicable.

b. Specific Tasks: Detailed tasks of each flight or section, including TSSE, IRT and reserve forces.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Patrol details: Routes, timing, etc., both the 1041st and other friendly forces involved.

(2) Priorities:

(3) Orders for Opening Fire:

(4) Deception Measures:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Ammunitions:

b. Rations and water:

c. Prisoners:

d. Captured Equipment and Documents:

e. Medical Evacuation:

f. Supply Allocation:

g. Vehicles:

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Details of any moves at Flight or Section Hq locations.

b. Communications:

(1) Details of net manning:

(2) Authentication Procedures:

(3) Communications Code Words (additional to standard codes).

c. Landlines to be laid:

d. Location of Commander and Key Officers:

e. Contact with Supporting Forces:

f. Pass Words:

APPENDIX 1 to
ANNEX C
SECTION III

CONFIDENTIAL (NATO)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1041st USAF Security Police Sq (T) (HQ COMD)
APO San Francisco 96368

AMENDMENT_____TO FRAGMENT ORDER #_____

_____
DATE

1. SITUATION: See current frag order.

2. MISSION: See current frag order.

3. (C-MHA) (GP-4) EXECUTION: Effective From:
To:

a. General:

b. Specific:

(1) The Close Combat Flight Commander will:

(2) The Weapons Support Flight Commander will:

c. Coordinating Instructions:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: See current frag order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See current frag order.

This ammendment will be downgraded upon expiration.

FOR THE COMMANDER

RALPH E. FISHER, Major, USAF
Executive Officer

Cy to: Commander/Ops Analysis - 1
Commander, 37th SPS - 1
Flight Commanders - 1 each
Intelligence - 1
Support Section - 1
Operations - 1

CONFIDENTIAL (MHA)

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ANNEX D to
SECTION III

1041st USAF SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

AFTER-ACTION COMBAT REPORT

1. Sub-unit directly involved:

   a. Composition:

   b. Commander:

   c. Special Weapons and support:

2. Mission at time of engagement:

3. Location of engagement:

4. Time of engagement:

5. Brief report of engagement (attach diagram if appropriate):

6. Own Casualties (include personal details and causes if known):

   a. KIA:

   b. WIA:

   c. MIA:

7. Enemy Casualties (detail reasons for claims and cause of injuries if known):

   a. KIA:

   b. WIA:

   c. Captured:

This page is Unclassified

8. Civilian and other force casualties (brief statement):

9. Enemy:

a. Strength:

b. Weapons:

c. Support fire:

d. Morale:

e. Identification factors:

f. Comment on tactics:

10. Equipment lost or captured:

a. Own losses:

b. Captured equipment:

11. Details of and comments concerning own external support:

12. Recommendations:

a. Tactical:

b. Materiel:

c. Other:

13. Personnel commendations:

14. Other submissions:

Signature:_____

DTG:

ANNEX D to
SECTION III

[illegible] MSR SECURITY FORCE [illegible]

[illegible] COMBAT REPORT

1. Sub-unit directly involved: No. 3 Section, Fire Team 7 & 8.

   a. Composition: Section Hq plus 2 fire teams of 6 members.

   b. Commander: TSgt Brown.

   c. Special weapons and support: 81mm mortar illumination in support.

2. Mission at time of engagement: Blocking Force.

3. Location of engagement: BM772639 west side of Hill 42.

4. Time of engagement: 29 April 2315 to 2321 approximate.

5. Brief report of engagement (attach diagram if appropriate): Force was in position astride track, 7 team left and 8 team right, Section hq to rear and astride the track. Enemy approach was not detected owing to silence and darkness until they opened fire on inner flanks of both teams. Fire promptly returned and enemy attempted to outflank to our left. Section sent to left flank and illumination called for. Enemy withdrew when illuminated.

6. Own Casualties (include personal details and causes if known):

   a. KIA: A2C Green - gsw thorax

   b. WIA: A2C Blue - gsw right arm, A2C Red - gsw left leg

   c. MIA: Nil

7. Enemy casualties (detail reasons for claims and nature of injuries if known):

   a. KIA: One officer - body recovered.

   b. WIA: At least two - seen during illumination period and two blood trails from at point of action.

   c. Captured: Nil

8. Civilian and other force casualties (brief statement): Nil

9. Enemy:

   a. Strength: Estimated 10

   b. Weapons: One LMG, SMG's and rifles.

c. Support fire: Nil.

d. Morale: Appeared to be high. Aggressive action taken.

e. Identification factors: On illumination enemy were seen to be wearing VC main force uniform.

f. Comment on tactics: When ambush encountered, enemy maintained frontal fire over attempted outflanking movement.

10. Equipment lost or captured:

a. Own losses: Nil

b. Captured equipment: One pistol and personnel equipment on recovered body.

11. Details of and comments concerning own external supports: Mortar fire (illumination) received within 2 minutes of request.

12. Recommendations:

a. Tactical: Blocking forces should use Claymores [illegible] and on flanks.

b. Material: Nil.

c. Other: Nil.

13. Personnel Commendations: A/C Green (KIA) maintained LMG fire until fatally wounded despite his exposed position.

14. Other submissions: Blocking forces should consist of at least 3 fire teams to provide for reserve.

Signature: /s/ G. BLOCK, CPT, USAF

DTG: 292359 Apr 67

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
COMBAT SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER
PRC-25
PRC-10
KR
LIMA
1
CHECKMATE
37TH
SLIM
JUDGE
173.425
FALCON
PRC-10
BLUE
JAY
PRC-25
EAGLE
APC NET
PHU
CAT
SUB
SECTOR
43.60
CSC
163.475
42.40
43.40
A
B
C
D
M
E
F
G
JDCP
31
32
33
72.15
(VRC-46)
01
40W
1041ST COMMAND NET
20
10/40
21
2/40
22
2/40
23
2/40
40
2/40
41
10
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55
10
56
10
57
10
58
10
60
10
VULTURE
175.800
C
10
70
80
64
63
62
61
73
72
71
84
83
82
81
CLOSE COMBAT
NET
173.325
10W
HAWK
MORTAR NET
42
2
43
2
44
2
45
2

JOINT DEFENSE COMMAND POST



1091ST COMBAT SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER



= CONTROL STATION

= OUT STATION

ANNEX G

US ADVISORY TEAMS

US ADVISOR	OPS/INTEL	OTHER STAFF
Lt Col Lindsey Ripple Asst: Major David Baumacher	Maj John Simmons	Maj Kite Capt's Fleming & David
Maj Max Satchell Asst: Captain Luther Powell	Sgt Estep	Sgt Menard Sgt Johnson
Maj Roy Atkins Asst: Capt Robert Sheriff	Sgt Cooper	Sgt Quinone
Maj Daniel Dienst Asst: Capt John Isackson	Sgt Witt	Sgt Solis Sgt Williams
Maj John Maley Asst: Capt Robert Guadette	Sgt Mino	Sgt Aubrey Sgt's Millette & Lilly
Maj Robert Wolf Asst: Capt Robert Miller	Sgt Jackson	Sgt Johnson Sgt Fankel
Maj Freddie Jones Asst: Capt Edward Strombeck	Sgt Gore	Sgt Fortier Sgt's Pamatian & Fernandez
Maj Rex Vandergriff Asst: Capt Brynildsen	Sgt Blanton	Sgt Chambliss Sgt's Logan & Sherrod
Major Elden Wright Asst: Capt Robert Powell	Sgt Ramirez	Sgt Wet Sgt's Cutchin & Maley

ANNEX G

BINH DINH PROVINCE

PROVINCE/DISTRICT	CHIEF	S2	POLICE CHIEF
[illegible] PROVINCE	Lt Col Tran Dinh [illegible] Dep: [illegible]	[illegible]	________
[illegible] District	Capt Truong [illegible]	[illegible]	Vo [illegible]
[illegible] (Hoai Nhon) District	Mr Pham [illegible]	Lt [illegible]	Tran Le Tien
[illegible] District	Mr Tran [illegible]	Lt [illegible]	Phan Dinh [illegible]
[illegible] District	Capt Le Nam Hai	________	Nguyen Xuan
[illegible] District	Capt Vi Van Nguyen	[illegible]	[illegible]
Phu Cat District	Capt Pham Van Khoi	[illegible]	Le Van Nguyen
[illegible] My District	Maj Cao Van Chow	[illegible]	Nguen Dinh
Tuy Phoac District	Capt Pham Gia Tung	Lt Anh	Huynh Ngoc Chau
Van Canh District	________	________	Le Van Thanh
	________	________	Hoang Hoa No
[illegible] Thanh District	________	________	Nguyen Thai Nguyen

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ANNEX C

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

ORGANIZATION CHART

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON ORGANIZATION CHART



ANNEX C

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ANNEX D

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

PERSONNEL CHARTS

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

PERSONNEL CHART I

	OFFICERS				AIRMEN						
UNIT TITLE	L/C	Maj	Capt	Lt	CMS	[illegible]	[illegible]	QS	SS	A1/2C	Total
Squadron Cos.	1	1	1		1					3	7
Field Flight		1	1	4		1	4	12	15	129	167
Field Flight		1	1	4		1	4	12	15	129	167
Field Flight		1	1	4		1	4	12	15	129	167
HQ Flight								6	12	33	51
Squadron Total	1	4	4	12	1	3	12	42	57	423	559

ANNEX D

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL -RN

	OFFICERS				AIRMEN						
UNIT TITLE	L/C	Maj	Capt	Lt	CMS	SMS	MS	TS	SS	1/2	Total
Squadron Ops.	1	1	1								3
NCO					1						1
Comms/Drivers										3	3
Total											7
Headquarters Flt											
Admin. Personnel								1	2	6	9
Cooks								1	2	6	9
Medics										6	6
Vehicle Maint. Pers.								1	2	6	9
Comm. Maint. Pers.								1	2	3	6
Weapons Maint. Pers.								1	2	3	6
Suppliers								1	2	3	6
Total								6	12	33	51
No. 1 Flight											
Flight HQ											
Leader		1									1
Deputy			1								1
NCO						1					1
Comms/Dvr.										1	1

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL

	OFFICERS				AIRMEN						
UNIT TITLE	L/C	Maj	Capt	Lt	CMS	SMS	MS	TS	SS	A1/2	Total
Flight HQ Total		1	1			1				1	4
Field Sections (x3)											
HQ's											
Leaders				3							3
NCO's							3				3
Comms/Dvr										3	3
Elements (x9)											
Leaders								9			9
Deputy									9		9
Riflemen										54	54
LMG Ops.										18	18
Total				3			3	9	9	75	99
Support Section											
Section HQ											
Leader				1							1
NCO							1				1
Comms/Dvr										1	1
Weapon Element											
Leader								1			1
4 Mortar Teams									4	8	12
3 MMG Teams									1	9	10

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL

	OFFICERS				AIRMEN						
UNIT TITLE	L/C	Maj	Capt	Lt	CMS	SMS	MS	TS	SS	A1/2	Total
4 Anti-Tank Tm.									1	8	9
Surveillance El.											
Leader								1			1
3 Radar Op. Tm.										6	6
3 IDE Op. Tms.										6	6
3 IDE Monitor Tms.										6	6
Scout Dog El.											
Leader								1			1
9 Dog Teams										9	9
Total				1			1	3	6	53	64
FLIGHT TOTAL		1	1	4		1	4	12	15	129	167
No. 2 Flight		1	1	4		1	4	12	15	129	167
No. 3 Flight		1	1	4		1	4	12	15	129	167
SQUADRON TOTAL	1	4	4	12	1	3	12	42	57	423	559

ANNEX E

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

INDEPENDENT FIELD FLIGHT PERSONNEL CHART

	OFFICERS				AIRMEN						
SUB-UNIT TITLE	L/C	Maj	Capt	Lt	CMS	SMS	CS	TS	SS	1/2	Total
Flight HQ		1	1			1				1	4
Field Section HQ				1			1			1	3
3 Elements								3	3	24	30
Field Section HQ				1			1			1	3
3 Elements								3	3	24	30
Field Section HQ				1			1			1	3
3 Elements								3	3	24	30
Support Section											
HQ				1			1			1	3
Weapons Element								1	6	25	32
Surveillance El.								1		18	19
Scout Dog Element								1		9	10
*Headquarters Section								2	4	11	17
Total	-	1	1	4	-	1	4	14	19	140	184

*When the Flight operates independent of its parent Squadron it receives one-third of the Squadron's administrative personnel

ANNEX B

ANNEX F

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT SUMMARY

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT SUMMARY

1. The majority of this is equipment issued commonly to all assigned personnel as indentified in annex 1a to AP 66-4, dated 15 July 1966. The equipment was used during the training phase of Operation SAFE SIDE as well as being used in the operational phase. It has been therefore subjected to approximately eight months continuous use. It has for the most part stood up to the rough treatment encountered through training and combat operations, e.g., low crawling, obstacle course, all kinds of weather, continued dampness, thick and heavy vegetation, combat tactics, etc. The following is a breakdown by items:

a. Stock Number 5110-813-1286, Machete, Jungle. The quantity should be reduced and the basis for issue changed to one per every five individuals assigned. Should be considered organizational equipment.

b. Stock Number 5120-289-0540, Intrenching Tool, Hand (COM). The quantity should be reduced and basis for issue changed to one per every five individuals assigned. Should be considered organizational equipment.

c. Stock Number 6230-264-8261, Flashlight, right angle tubular case, MIL-F-3747 (AFD). No change recommended.

d. Stock Number 6645-066-4279, Watch, wrist, hack, type DTU-2A/P (GSA). For precise and effective combat security operation, the basis for issue should be changed to one per individual assigned.

e. Stock Number 7210-266-9736, Insect bar, field type, nylon cloth netting, 200 in. lg, 68 in. h (CY). No change recommended.

f. Stock Number 7210-267-5641, Pole, folding cot. Future units will not require this item.

g. Stock Number 7210-282-7590, Blanket, wool. Eliminate and replace with camouflage poncho liners. Basis for issue - one per individual assigned (see paragraph b).

h. Stock Number 7340-240-7436, Knife, field, mess, CRES, alum, handle MIL-F-284 (CX). No change recommended.

i. Stock Number 7340-243-5390, Spoon, Field Mess, unplated CRES, MIL-F-284 (CX). No change recommended.

j. Stock Number 7340-243-5391, Fork, Field Mess, unplated CRES MIL-F-234 (CX). No change recommended.

Annex F

k. Stock Number 7350-242-5110, Pan, mess kit, CRES MIL-P-89 (CX). No change recommended.

l. Stock Number 8340-223-7849, Pole, section, tent, wood, 15 in. lg (CY). The quantity requested and received was excessive. The basis for issue for this item should be one per individual assigned.

m. Stock Number 8240-261-9749, Pin, tent, aluminum, 9 in. lg, (CY). No change recommended.

n. Stock Number 8340-577-4168, Shelter, half tent, cotton duck mildew resistant and water repellent, olive green army shade 107, w/triangular closing flap at both ends, w/guy line and 5 foot stop. No change recommended.

o. Stock Number 8415-268-7868, Gloves, quantity 17 pair
Stock Number 8415-268-7869, Gloves, quantity 37 pair
Stock Number 8415-268-7870, Gloves, quantity 40 pair
Stock Number 8415-268-7871, Gloves, quantity 4 pair
Stock Number 8415-268-7872, Gloves, quantity 7 pair

These gloves are all the same except pair sizes and they are used for rappelling. Should be issued on the basis of one per individual assigned. Also, only the two most common sizes should be obtained.

p. Stock Number 8415-261-6833, Cover, helmet, camouflage. The basis for issue should be changed from two to one per individual assigned.

q. Stock Number 8405-290-0550, Poncho, coated cloth, nylon twill, coated both sides, synthetic resin coated, solid color, olive green, snap fastener slide fastening, w/hood, non-detachable (INDEX SERIES 51900) (CY). No change recommended, however, the poncho liner should be obtained and issued on the same basis (see para b).

r. Stock Number 8415-753-5792, liner, soldier's steel helmet, cotton sheeting and/or drill basic mtl, phenolic resin impregnating comp., olive drab, type I (INDEX SERIES 369100) (CY). No change recommended.

s. Stock Number 8415-153-6671, Head Band. No change recommended.

t. Stock Number 8415-753-6166, Neck band. No change recommended.

u. Stock Number 8415-255-8579, Helmet, soldier's steel, olive drab, w/release chin strap, w/o parachutist type chin guard, mod M-1, w/flex loop (INDEX SERIES 345000) (CY). No change recommended.

v. Stock Number 8465-237-8719, Case, sleeping bag, snap fastener closure, cotton, wind resistant, oxford, water repellent treated, olive drab (INDEX SERIES 604500) (CY). No change recommended.

w. Stock Number 8465-242-7013, Cup canteen CRES, w/folding handle (INDEX SERIES 605424) (CY). No change recommended.

x. Stock Number 8465-254-8887, Mattress, pneu., nylon cloth, two sides coated with natural and/or synthetic rubber, olive green (INDEX SERIES 608725) (CY). No change recommended.

y. Stock Number 8465-261-6909, Bag , waterproof, clothing (INDEX SERIES 600925) (CY). No change recommended.

z. Stock Number 8465-264-5085, Sleeping bag, single bag, outer 2 ply cotton balloon cloth mattress casing, water repellent treated (INDEX SERIES 610675) (CY). No change recommended.

aa. Stock Number 8465-542-5842, Carrier, intrenching to[illegible] cotton duck and cotton webbing, water repellent and mildew resistant, olive drab (INDEX SERIES) (CY), regular size. The quantity should be reduced and the basis for issue changed to one per every five individuals assigned. Should be considered organizational equipment.

bb. Stock Number 8465-577-4922, Suspenders, field pack, modified "H" back type, cotton webbing, olive drab, adj (pr) (INDEX SERIES 612250) (CY), regular.

cc. Stock Number 8465-577-4923, Suspenders, long size. The quantities of regular and long should have been reversed. For convenience sake they should all be the long size since they can be adjusted to the shortest size required.

dd. Stock Number 8465-577-4924, Belt, pistol, cotton webbing, mildew resistant and water repellent treated, olive drab (INDEX SERIES 602200) (CY), large.

ee. Stock Number 8465-577-4925, Belt, medium. The quantities of large and medium should have been reversed. For convenience sake they should all be the large size since they can be adjusted to the smallest size required.

ff. Stock Number 8465-577-4926, Cover, water canteen, cotton, duck body, wool felt lining, water repellent treated, olive drab (INDEX SERIES 605250) (CY). No change recommended.

gg. Stock Number 8465-577-4927, Case, field, first aid dressing unmounted magnetic compass cotton duck, mildew resistant and water [illegible]ellent treated, olive drab (INDEX SERIES 604350) (CY). No change recommended, however, it should be pointed out that although the first aid dressing case was received the first aid dressing was not included. (see para 2).

hh. Stock Number 8465-647-0851, Carrier, sleeping bag, (INDEX SERIES 612120) (CY). No change recommended.

ii. Stock Number 8465-647-0852, Case, small arms ammunition, universal (INDEX SERIES 604550) (CY). This item should be changed since an M-16 magazine carrying case is now available. (see para 2).

jj. Stock Number 8465-823-7622, Field pack, canvas, olive drab, Army Shade 7, mildew resistant, scrub resistant and water repellent, treated flap closure with buckle straps (INDEX SERIES 606200) (CY). This item should be replaced by the Rucksack. Stock Number 8465-782-3248 (see para 2).

kk. Stock Number 8465-889-3744, Canteen, water, plastic, 1000 cc capacity approximately, rigid single wall construction w/o cup and cover, MIL-C-043103 (INDEX SERIES 603550) (CY). No change recommended.

ll. Stock Number 6605-846-7618, Compass, magnetic, unmounted, lensatic type, wet or dry type, top reading w/luminous dial, sighting vane on lid of case (ENG). The basis of issue should be determined by the individuals assigned duty, e.g., fire team leader, observation or listening patrol leader or assistant patrol leader, etc. Should be considered organizational equipment.

mm. Stock Number 8465-161-9415, Glasses, sun, spectacle type, plastic frames, w/carrying case (pr) (CY). No change recommended.

nn. Stock Number 8465-257-4321, Sheath, machete, plastic, size of blade 18 in. lgth, (INDEX SERIES 610215) (CY). Basis of issue should be changed to one per every five individuals assigned. Should be considered organizational equipment.

oo. Stock Number 8465-270-0415. Packboard, cargo attachment (INDEX SERIES 609075) (CY). This item should be replaced by the Rucksack, Stock Number 8465-782-3248 (see para 2).

pp. Stock Number 8465-244-0737, Pad, packboard. This item should be replaced by the Rucksack. Stock Number 8465-782-3248 (see para 2).

qq. Stock Number 8465-360-0233, Straps, quick release, packboard, cotton webbing, olive drab, 59 inches long, 1 inch wide, w/buckle, MIL-S-10055 (INDEX SERIES 612000) (CY). This item should be replaced by the Rucksack, Stock Number 8465-762-3248 (see para 2).

rr. Stock Number 8465-656-0663, Packboard, aluminum, with one (1) lashing rope, 24 inches long, 15 1/8 inches wide, (INDEX SERIES 608950) (CY). Eliminate (see para 2).

ss. Stock Number 1095-392-4102, Knife, combat, 7 inch blade, w/sheath (AFD). Eliminate this item, it is too long and gets in the way of other equipment. Should be replaced by the 5 inch survival knife. Stock Number 7340-098-4327, (see para 2). Basis of issue should be one per individual assigned.

2. In addition to the above list of individual issue item the following should be added:

a. Camouflage fatigues - six sets per individual assigned.

b. Jungle Boots - three per individual assigned.

c. 8405-889-3683 - Liner, poncho, camouflage, one per individual assigned.

d. Elastic band for the camouflage helmet cover - two per individual assigned.

e. 7340-098-4327 Survival knife, 5 inches, one per individual assigned. (Replaces knife, combat, line item ss).

f. First aid dressing kit for the first aid case - two per individual assigned.

g. 6545-526-1887 - Kit, snake bite, one per individual assigned.

h. 8465-782-3249 - Rucksack, one per individual assigned (replaces packboard, field pack, etc.).

i. 1005-856-6885 - Rifle, M-16, 5.56mm - one per individual assigned.

j. 1005-992-6645 - Bayonet, knife, M7 - one per individual assigned.

k. 1095-508-0339 Scabbard, bayonet, M7, one per individual assigned.

l. 1005-056-2237 Magazine assembly, 20 cart capacity, six per individual assigned.

m. 8465-890-2014 Pocket, ammo, magazine, M-16, three per individual assigned.

n. 1005-903-1296 Brush, cleaning, 5.56mm, two per individual assigned.

o. 1005-903-1296 Rod, cleaning, 5.56mm, one per individual assigned.

3. Uniform Evaluation: Three types of field uniforms, two types of combat boots and the baseball type hat were evaluated by approximately 25% of assigned personnel including all ranks from lower grade airmen, NCO's, junior and field grade officer. Evaluations were based on employment, performance, suitability and durability.

a. US Army Combat Tropical Uniform: This is a two piece, dark green uniform consisting of trousers with six pockets (two rear pockets with flap, two normal front pockets and two pleated side pockets with flaps covering the buttons and tie down straps) draw strings at end of each trouser leg, and bush type tropical coat with four pockets (two breast and two side pockets with flaps covering buttons).

(1) Employment. Upon arrival in country all assigned personnel were issued two sets of this uniform. These uniforms were worn primarily during night operations. However, due to the limited number of camouflage field uniforms available the combat tropical uniform has on occasion been worn during daylight operations.

(2) Performance: Excellent for which it has been worn, e.g., rice paddies, heavy scrub brush, thorn infested hedge rows, light precipitation and heavy jungle rain. It does not tear easily and dries fairly quickly.

(3) Suitability: This uniform could serve as an excellent second uniform for a combat security unit such as the 1041st. However, due to the environmental conditions in which a unit of this type must operate the camouflage uniform is more suitable. The tropical uniform would be an excellent uniform for the normal Security Police unit providing certain modifications were made. (e.g., remove pockets from lower part of jacket and tie down straps from trouser pockets.)

(4) Durability: This uniform has held up very well in the type terrain and under the conditions it has been worn (e.g., rice paddies, heavy scrub brush, thorn infested hedge rows, light jungle precipitation and during severe jungle rain and monsoons). It does not tear easily and dries quickly.

b. Camouflage Uniform: This is a two piece, multicolored, uniform consisting of trousers with six pockets (two rear pockets with flaps, two normal front patch pockets, and two pleated side pockets with flaps with covers and buttons), draw strings at end of each trouser leg; and bush type tropical coat with four pockets (two breast and two side pockets with flaps covering buttons).

(1) Employment: Upon arrival in country all assigned personnel were issued two sets of this uniform. This uniform is worn during night and day operations, for it easily blends in with surrounding terrain.

(2) Performance: Excellent. The uniform has held up very well in the type of terrain in which it has been worn, e.g., ride paddy, heavy scrub brush, thorn infested hedge rows, light precipitation and heavy jungle rain. As well as blending in with the surrounding terrain, it does not tear easily and it dries fairly quickly.

(3) Suitability: In a unit of this type under the environmental conditions it operates, the camouflage uniform is more suitable.

(4) Durability: This uniform has held up very well in the type terrain and under the conditions it has been worn (e.g., rice paddies, heavy scrub brush, thorn infested hedge rows, light jungle precipitation and during severe rains and monsoons). It blends well with the terrain, does not tear easily and dries quickly.

c. Regular AF Fatigues: This is a two piece, slightly dark green uniform consisting of trousers with four pockets (two rear pockets with flaps and two normal front patch pockets) and jacket to be worn inside of trousers. It has two patch type breast pockets rectangular shape with flaps and buttons exposed.

(1) Employment: All assigned personnel had this uniform prior to coming into this unit. This uniform was used during training and is used for utility duties in the base camp area. For an operational unit of this type, this uniform is not practical.

(2) Performance: This uniform is made of heavy material which when used in our operating environment tends to hold moisture, does not dry very fast and is uncomfortable due to excessive heat.

(3) Suitability: This uniform has little use in a unit of this type. Our requirements call for a uniform which is light and capable of withstanding rough wear and tear. The jungle and camouflage fatigues do fit our needs.

(4) Durability: This uniform has not held up under the conditions and type of terrain in which it has been used (e.g., rice paddy, heavy vegetation, severe rains and monsoons). The material itself is too heavy. It makes one much hotter and more uncomfortable. It holds moisture and does not dry very quickly. The pockets are too small and there is not enough of them. It is hard to launder. This uniform would be good for areas having four seasons.

d. Baseball type hat: This hat is slightly dark green in color made of a heavy material with a stiff bill and top front. It has six eyelet air holes for ventilation.

(1) Employment: This type hat was used in training and at the test site. It was used during all operations both day and night.

(2) Performance: This type hat should not be worn for this type environmental conditions. The material is too heavy and doesn't keep the sun off back of neck. The bill is too long and stiff. A hat made of soft material with both jungle and camouflage fatigue colors and a bill all around the hat would be more suitable.

(3) Suitability: This type of hat is not suitable for the operation of a unit of this type.

(4) Durability: This type of hat is not durable enough for the environmental conditions this type of unit works in. A hat of lighter weight material, shorter bill all around the hat and made of wash and wear material would be better. The baseball type hat is awkward and in thick brush is always being knocked off ones head.

e. Combat Boot: This is a black leather boot with rubber sole and heels.

(1) Employment: This type boot was used in training and at the test site. They were worn primarily for utility duty in the base camp area.

(2) Performance: This type boot, in the terrain and conditions it was worn, did not stand up very well. It had no ventilation for the feet to breathe and the leather had a tendency to mildew and rot.

(3) Suitability: This boot would be an excellent second boot for a unit of this type to be used for utility duties. Due to the operating conditions the jungle boots would be more suitable.

(4) Durability: This boot has not held up very well under the conditions in which it has been worn (e.g., rice paddy, heavy scrub brush, thorn infested hedge rows, light jungle precipitation and severe rains). It doesn't have the proper ventilation and once it becomes wet it takes too long to dry. After being wet a few times the leather tends to rot. It is hot and uncomfortable.

f. Jungle Combat Boots: This boot is made of black leather around the lower sides front and heel. The top portion of the boot is made of green canvas type material. Each boot has two eyelets on the inner side near the bottom of the instep covered with perforated metal disks. They allow ventilation and drainage but prevent small objects from entering the boot. It has a washable nylon foot pad insert which aids ventilation and increases comfort. The entire boot is washable.

(1) Employment: Upon arrival all assigned personnel were issued two pair of these boots. These boots were primarily worn on combat operations, both day and night, outside of base camp.

(2) Performance: This boot has held up very well in the type of terrain it has been worn. They dry quickly and do not rot.

(3) Suitability: In this type of unit, this boot is more suitable than the regular combat boot. The jungle boot is lighter weight, coolor and mildew and rot resistant.

(4) Durability: This boot is excellent for the environmental conditions in which it has been worn. It is comfortable, lighter weight, dries quickly and excellent for general SEA use.

ANNEX G

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

VEHICLE SUMMARY

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

VEHICLE SUMMARY

1. Truck, Utility, 1/4 Ton, 4 x 4, M151A1, FS 2320-763-1092:

a. Employment: The 28 jeeps assigned this unit were in constant use. Thirteen (13) were assigned on permanent dispatch to tactical missions, e.g., motorized security patrols, TSSE Section, etc. Four (4) were used as a tactical reserve, for the Close Combat Reserve Force, five (5) for maintenance reserve, and the remaining seven (7) were used for administrative purposes, such as Flight Commander, Intelligence and Liaison and Operations functions.

b. Performance: All vehicles performed very satisfactory under the conditions of roads or no roads at all, deep mud or sand, rice paddies, etc. The vehicles averaged 800 miles per month. Major breakdowns amounted to five (5) clutch assemblies, two (2) complete brake repairs and one (1) differential assembly.

c. Suitability: Under the concept of operations for this unit, the jeep, equipped as it is now with 730 pounds of armor plating and M-60 gun mounts, is a vital piece of equipment, ideally suited for the mission. Future vehicles allocated units of this type should have heavy duty springs, heavy duty clutch assemblies and puncture proof tires.

d. Durability: The 1/4 ton 4 x 4 jeep is constructed for durability and the jeeps assigned to this unit have held up remarkably well, in view of the extremely rough roads and terrain they were required to negotiate.

e. Conclusions: A durable, dependable and reliable vehicle. Armor plating and machine gun mounts, in addition to the recommended mechanical modifications should be on all 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 vehicles.

2. Truck, Cargo, 3/4 Ton, 4 x 4, M37, FS 2320-542-4636:

a. Employment: Seven (7) of these vehicles were assigned to this unit. Four (4) were used for tactical purposes, e.g., Close Combat Reserve Forces, troop deployment, etc., three (3) were used for general cargo purposes.

b. Performance: Th e vehicles averaged 700 miles a month with the very minimum of maintenance required. Vehicle failures were limited to one (1) water pump and one (1) radiator assembly.

c. Suitability: A very suitable general purpose vehicle for a unit of this type. Its varied applications make it a valuable asset to the tactical mission.

d. Durability: An extremely durable vehicle. Its low maintenance rate with this unit is a good indication of its heavy duty mechanical construction.

e. Conclusions: A very durable and reliable vehicle. Its multi-purpose construction makes it a valuable vehicle for this type of unit, and its low maintenance rate is remarkable.

3. Carrier, Personnel, Armored, Track, M-113A1, FS 2120-968-6321:

a. Employment: The three (3) Armored Personnel Carriers assigned to this unit had varied tasks during the operational phase. Primary employment was as a vehicle for the Immediate Reaction Team (IRT), but employment also included troop carrier, vehicle recovery and fence repair or installation.

b. Performance: These vehicles averaged 290 miles per month. Breakdowns were limited to one (1) blower drive shaft, one (1) left rear idler wheel and spindle, three (3) idler wheel seals for a total out of commission time of 52 hours. The APC can negotiate the roughest terrain and provides a reliable heavy machine gun mobile capability.

c. Durability: The APC is designed for use in the roughest terrain, including rice paddies, mud, sand and heavy vegetation. It can negotiate rivers and streams. In view of the use in rugged terrain it has a very low maintenance record. Definitely has the durability required for this type of mission.

d. Suitability: The APC has proven itself during this unit's operational phase. Its rugged construction lends itself to all phases of our activities, and it has even been used to demolish houses and abandoned villages within our Tactical Area of Responsibility. Has a functional and realistic application for providing 50 caliber heavy machine gun support for fire teams deploying under fire.

e. Conclusions: A reliable, durable and rugged vehicle, capable of operating over any terrain and in any weather. However, since its bulk and weight do not meet the tactical mobility requirements, the APC is considered unsuitable for deployed security operations.

4. Truck, Cargo, 2-1/2 Ton, 6 x 6, M35, FS 2320-540-9363:

a. Employment: The two (2) cargo trucks assigned to this unit were used for general cargo and troop hauling.

b. Performance: These vehicles were good performers throughout the operational phase. Each vehicle averaged 500 miles per month. One (1) engine assembly was replaced. This vehicle was out of commission for 34 days.

c. Durability: Designed for use in rough terrain and poor roads, these vehicles have fulfilled their function with this unit. Although subjected to poor driving conditions throughout the operational phase, these vehicles have held up very well due to their rugged construction and cargo hauling capability.

d. Suitability: A durable and rugged vehicle ideally suited for squadron logistic tasks.

e. Conclusions: This vehicle has very limited tactical use, therefore, the 3/4 ton cargo truck is favored for combat security squadrons.

5. Trailer, Cargo, 1 Ton, 2w MI05A1, FS 2330-541-6466:

a. Employment: The two (2) 1 ton trailer units assigned to this unit are used to move general cargo, ammunition, personnel gear, weapons, and for fence installation and repair.

b. Performance: These trailers have been pulled through extremely rough terrain and have served a multitude of uses with the organization. There has been no down time other than preventive maintenance.

c. Durability: These trailers have proven to be extremely durable and hold up well under rough use.

d. Suitability: Definite application in a unit of this type operating under field conditions.

e. Conclusions: A durable and useful hauling vehicle. Virtually maintenance free. One of these trailers should be assigned for each vehicle capable of pulling it.

6. Trailer, Cargo, 3/4 Ton, M10/A, FS 2330-738-9509:

a. Employment: The two (2) three quarter ton trailers assigned to this unit are used for moving cargo, ammunition, personnel gear, and weapons.

b. Performance: Estimated mileage 50 to 100 miles per month. No down time other than preventive maintenance.

c. Durability: Extremely durable. Has been pulled through rough terrain and has remained maintenance free.

d. Suitability: Definite application with this unit, suitable for hauling heavy loads and can negotiate the rough conditions without breakdown.

e. Conclusions: A durable and valuable piece of equipment, virtually maintenance free. This trailer should be retained for each piece of equipment used to tow it.

7. Trailer, Cargo, 1/4 Ton, 2W, M-416, FS 2320-706-5495:

a. Employment: This unit has used its six (6) one quarter ton trailers to move small cargo, personnel gear, ammunition and weapons.

b. Performance: Good performance. Estimated mileage per month: 100 to 200 miles, with no down time other than preventive maintenance.

c. Durability: Extremely durable. Capable of withstanding excessive use in rough terrain.

d. Suitability: Very suitable for operations of this nature.

e. Conclusions: A rugged and durable vehicle, capable of sustaining maximum use in bad terrain. Virtually maintenance free. This trailer should be retained for each piece of equipment used to tow it.

8. Trailer, Tank, Water, 200 Gallons, AR 10, FS 2330-060-6511:

a. Employment: The three (3) water tank trailers assigned to this unit have been used for the shipping and storage of potable water. Two (2) were used in the base camp and one (1) in the scout dog kennel area.

b. Performance: Very adequate if not moved over rough terrain and a necessary piece of equipment for a unit of this type. Leak badly if moved constantly.

c. Durability: Not very durable if moved constantly.

d. Suitability: Not very suitable for field operations, however, four (4) of these trailers are needed to supply an organization of this size.

e. Conclusions: Could be a satisfactory container for storage of potable water providing it does not require movement over rough terrain and poor roads.

9. Trailer, Fuel Servicing, 2 W, 600 Gallon, M-A1B, FS 2330-289-8934:

a. Employment: The two (2) fuel trailers assigned to this unit have been used to maximum advantage. One (1) trailer was used for gasoline, and one (1) trailer for diesel fuel.

b. Performance: Excellent performance from these trailers. Trailers travel 30 to 50 miles per month on poor roads and only preventive maintenance has been required.

c. Durability: Well constructed and extremely durable.

d. Suitability: Suitable and satisfactory for an operation of this nature.

e. Conclusions: An excellent performance record. Durable and require no maintenance. Valuable piece of equipment.

ANNEX H

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

WEAPONS SUMMARY

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

WEAPONS SUMMARY

1. M-16 Rifle, 5.56mm:

a. Employment: Basic weapon of the organization. Used in all tactical operations except by crew served weapons personnel and M-113 APC crews.

b. Performance: Outstanding performance record. Many individual weapons have fired well over 2000 rounds without a major malfunction. Four weapons inspected had excessive corrosion in the buffer extension. Upon inspection of all 250 weapons, approximately 40% showed a slight corrosion in the buffer extension (a UR report is being submitted).

c. Suitability: Excellent for a unit of this type. With maximum effective range of 460 meters, the weapon provides an excellent base of fire when used by a six man fire team or larger unit.

d. Durability: This weapon is extremely durable. Very few weapons have suffered damage during the operational phase.

e. Conclusions: The M-16 Rifle has proven to be an ideal weapon for use by combat security units. It is a lightweight, durable weapon with an excellent performance record.

2. 38 Caliber Revolver:

a. Employment: Basic sidearm of the organization. Used by crew served weapons personnel and M-113 APC crew members as a supplementary individual weapon.

b. Performance: Poor performance record. Instances of malfunction have been reported by personnel assigned to activities in the field where the slightest amount of dirt getting into the cylinder and trigger housing area have made the weapon inoperable. It is not possible to interchange all parts from one weapon to the other.

c. Suitability: Not suitable for a unit in an infantry role. The shocking power is limited, and since the weapon is exposed to dust and grime, it is not dependable in areas where ideal conditions do not exist.

d. Durability: This weapon cannot stand up to sustained field use in combat areas. It is easily made inoperable by foreign matter in its working parts and cannot be easily repaired except by having small parts re-supply capability or a large bench stock of space parts on hand.

e. Conclusions: Due to limited shocking power and high maintenance rate, the 38 caliber revolver is not an adequate sidearm for this type of unit. Since it is not a "closed" weapon by design, and most parts of the weapon are exposed to dirt, it is not a dependable weapon for ground combat units.

3. M-60 (7.62mm) Machine Gun:

a. Employment: The M-60 Machine Gun is employed as a crew served weapon with each Close Combat Fire Team. It is used on patrols and in fixed defensive positions.

b. Performance: Outstanding performance record. To date, this weapon has not had one malfunction. One weapon has had 90,000 rounds fired through the barrel. The weapon still functions effectively.

c. Suitability: The M-60 Machine Gun provides the ideal light machine gun capability for a unit of this type. It is light, has remarkable firepower for a weapon its size and has interchangeable barrels.

d. Durability: This weapon can sustain hard field treatment for indefinite periods and still not malfunction. It is a "long life" weapon and is constructed to be used both as a weapon that can be easily carried by patrols and also is effective in permanent defensive positions.

e. Conclusions: Except for the fact that it requires a different caliber ammunition than the basic weapon (7.62 vs 5.56mm), the M-60 is an ideal light machine gun for an organization of this type. It is durable, can withstand heavy use and hard treatment without

malfunction, has interchangeable parts and outstanding firepower. Its construction and attachments make it a weapon that can be used both for mobility and defensive employment.

4. 50 Cal Heavy Machine Gun:

a. Employment: The 50 Cal HMG is employed in fixed defensive positions and is also mounted on the M-113 APCs.

b. Performance: 50 Cal HMG performance has been extremely satisfactory, although its deployment with this unit has been limited.

c. Suitability: This weapon is extremely effective but has limited applications in this organization. Its size and weight do not lend itself to mobility, with the exception of APC deployment. Due to its maximum range, it cannot be used in areas closely supported by other friendly forces.

d. Durability: Due to its heavy construction, the 50 Cal HMG is a very durable weapon and this unit has experienced a very low malfunction rate.

e. Conclusions: It can be effectively used as a defensive weapon under certain conditions, but because of its maximum range, its use is limited in an organization such as the 1041st.

5. 81mm Mortar:

a. Employment: Employed in fixed positions in support of patrol operations, for both illumination and high explosive light artillery capability. Used for harassment and interdiction firing on areas most susceptible to enemy infiltration.

b. Suitability: This weapon has proved itself in this unit as an effective weapon for providing swift pin-point illumination and H & I fire.

c. Performance: With the exception of a problem with a few defective rounds limiting the range and accuracy by permitting gas to escape the tube, the 81mm Mortar has had a very satisfactory performance record.

d. Durability: A very durable weapon, designed for field use in bad terrain and weather. Well constructed.

e. Conclusions: The 81mm Mortar has proven itself to be a durable and effective weapon. It is dependable, accurate and relatively maintenance free.

6. Shotgun, Rior, 12 Gauge:

a. Employment: Employment was limited, but it is an effective weapon for close-in fighting in heavily vegetated areas and during the hours of darkness.

b. Performance: Very satisfactory performance record in limited use, very reliable.

c. Suitability: Can be effective as a counter-ambush weapon. Useful in areas where close-in combat is in progress. Killing radius well spread, and does not require great skill to use.

d. Durability: A very durable and reliable weapon. Easy to use, safe to carry and deploy.

e. Conclusions: Can be used effectively as a counter-ambush weapon. It is easy to use, durable, reliable, and maintenance free.

7. XM-148 Grenade Launcher:

a. Employment: Issued to personnel trained as Grenadiers on the basis of one per fire team. Also used in fixed defensive positions.

b. Performance: An excellent weapon, with a high performance and low malfunction rate. Extremely reliable and requires little or no maintenance.

c. Suitability: The XM-148 is an ideal grenade launcher for a unit of this type. It is easy to use, easy to train with, and is mounted directly on the M-16 Rifle for immediate use and ease of carrying. The simple and effective sighting mechanism makes it a very safe and accurate weapon to use.

d. Durability: Well constructed and very durable. Does not easily malfunction or suffer the effects of hard use.

e. Conclusions: An excellent weapon that is accurate, dependable and requires little maintenance. It is simple to operate and easy to instruct others to use.

8. 0-4 Composition:

a. Employment: Used to destroy unexploded ordnance, booby traps, tunnels and spider holes within our TAOR.

b. Performance: Safe, easy to use, easy to instruct others to use. Easy to carry and can be cut into block sizes for specific charges.

c. Suitability: This explosive is not as effective as other types of explosives for destroying buildings and tunnels. However, it is safe, and can be used very effectively for destroying unexploded ordnance.

d. Conclusions: Due to its varied use, 0-4 has a good application for destroying unexploded ordnance and booby traps. It is safe and application is simple and effective and it is needed in a unit like the 1041st.

9. M-14 Anti-Personnel Mines:

a. Employment: Base Camp and permanent defensive position protection. Mines are ground planted and pressure activated.

b. Performance: Reliable and easily installed.

c. Suitability: Excellent for perimeter or base camp protection for small areas. Mines will activate when stepped on, and will kill or cripple an intruder. Serve a double purpose as a warning that area is being infiltrated.

d. Conclusions: An excellent anti-personnel device, easy to install, very effective against infiltration. Has a very definite application in a unit of this type.

10. M-26 Hand Grenade:

a. Employment: Issued to personnel participating in area recon patrols and fixed defensive positions. Useful for blowing tunnels before entry and spider holes.

Dc6

b. Performance: Reliable and dependable, safe to use. Effective for close-in fighting. Kill radius of 5 meters.

c. Suitability: Ideal hand grenade for unit participating in ground combat activity. Supplements the XM-148 grenade launcher as a close-in fragmentation explosive.

d. Durability: Well constructed and able to withstand effects of weather for long periods.

e. Conclusions: The M-26 Fragmentation Hand Grenade is a valuable, safe, dependable and reliable weapon for close-in fighting, and has a very definite application in a unit such as the 1041st.

ANNEX I

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

RADIO SUMMARY

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

RADIO SUMMARY

1. The success of base defense efforts depends to a large degree on effective control of combat elements and a capability for immediate coordination via communications systems with friendly US and free world forces, close air support in the form of helicopters and/or AC-47 aircraft and other USAF Forces with defense and security responsibilities. Due to the large volume of radio traffic in a situation involving large numbers of defense forces it is imperative that tactical radio systems with multiple frequency capabilities be made available. Since most US ground force units utilize tactical radio systems which are compatible with those radio systems used by Free World Forces it then becomes necessary for Air Force units charged with ground defense responsibilities to have the same tactical radio capability in order to affect proper coordination, obtain fire support and other assistance as necessary. Commercial radio equipment such as used during Operation SAFE SIDE does not provide an organization of this type with the proper communications capability.

2. 70 WATT BASE STATION:

a. EMPLOYMENT: Two (2) 70 watt base station Motorola Radios have been installed inside a tightly bunkered position known as the Combat Security Operations Center (CSOC). The first radio was installed 15 Jan 67 and is the primary station for the control of the 1041st tactical operations. The second base station was installed 13 Mar 67 and is used to monitor the 37th Security Police Squadron Operations and to control Joint Defense Command Post (JDCP) operations.

b. PERFORMANCE: Both of these radios have been located during the operational phase of this unit in the CSOC and are protected from the effects of the climate. Both stations have been used on a 24 hours per day basis, and little or no maintenance problems have been encountered.

c. SUITABILITY: This radio set is a satisfactory performer, however, it is recommended that a multi-channel, lightweight, vehicle mounted dual purpose set be procured for combat security use. This will allow increased tactical mobility and flexibility since any one of the unit's vehicle mounted radios could be used as a base station with the addition of a telescopic mounted, fixed aerial array.

3. 40 WATT VEHICLE RADIOS:

a. EMPLOYMENT: There are a totla of forty-six (46) 40 watt vehicle radios mounted in "M" Series vehicles.

b. PERFORMANCE: During an initial performance test conducted on 17 Jan 67, twenty-one (21) of these 40 watt radios failed to operate. These failures were attributed primarily to moisture condensation within the radios themselves. The total number of radios that have required repair or major maintenance to date is 45.

ANNEX I

c. SUITABILITY: These radios were used on the average of 10-12 hours a day. Breakdown was largely due to breakage of parts while the vehicle negotiated rough terrain.

4. PORTABLE RADIOS (10 WATT):

a. EMPLOYMENT: Primarily used as fixed stations, these twelve (12) radios have been used in the Fire Direction Control (FDC), Observation and Listening Posts, and in other defensive positions. Only six of the twelve assigned radios could be used because of the lack of crystal compatibility.

b. PERFORMANCE: Generally, the 10 watt portable Motorola unit has been dependable. However, personnel using these radios in rough terrain encounter considerable transmission problems, due to "dead space" where transmissions cannot reach the base station control center.

c. SUITABILITY: Adequate communications for fixed defensive positions. Due to their construction and the way they must be carried, they have little value for a unit moving in the field. They are susceptible to "dead" transmission areas.

5. TWO WATT PORTABLE RADIOS:

a. EMPLOYMENT: This unit primarily uses the seventy-five (75) two watt radios in its inventory for the tactical foot patrols conducting area reconnaissance within our TAOR. They are used not only for communications with the Net Control Station but also for intra-patrol communications.

b. PERFORMANCE: This portable radio unit has a poor performance record. The major problems have been technical failure. These radios have a limited capability because they have line of sight transmission and any obstructing terrain will cause interruption or complete blocking of the transmission. This has created many communication problems for the patrols. The 2 watt radio can receive transmissions from the net control station, but the NCS cannot receive transmissions from the 2 watt radio in the field. Considerable relaying of transmissions through Observation and Listening Posts is required in order to establish contact with distant patrols, resulting in lost time. Particular emphasis has been placed on patrols carrying extra portable radio batteries however, this has not solved the problems encountered with this radio unit.

c. SUITABILITY: These radios have been subject to inclement weather and rough handling. They are too fragile and were not designed to withstand treatment of this nature. Damage to these radios under field conditions was unavoidable due to the nature of the duties of personnel of this unit. Average daily use for these radios was 20 hours per day with a battery life of eight hours before needing to be charged.

ANNEX J

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

EQUIPMENT LIST

COMBAT SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON

EQUIPMENT LIST

PART A	-	INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
PART B	-	ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
SECTION 1	-	VEHICLES AND VEHICLE SUPPORT
SECTION 2	-	WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SUPPORT
SECTION 3	-	HOUSEKEEPING EQUIPMENT
SECTION 4	-	RADIO AND LANDLINE EQUIPMENT
SECTION 5	-	GENERAL EQUIPMENT
PART C	-	TACTICAL SECURITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

PART .

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
1	UNKNOWN	FATIGUES, CAMOUFLAGED	3354	6 PER OFF & EM	40,248
2	8415-255-8579	HELMET, STEEL	559	1 PER OFF & EM	2,124
3	8415-753-5792	LINER, SOLDIER'S STEEL HELMET	559	1 PER OFF & EM	3,801
4	UNKNOWN	BOOTS, JUNGLE	1118	2 PR PER OFF & EM	14,534
5	UNKNOWN	BOOTS, COMBAT, LEATHER	559	1 PR PER OFF & EM	6,205
6	8415-261-6833	COVER, HELMET, CAMOUFLAGED	559	1 PER OFF & EM	425
7	UNKNOWN	FIRST AID KIT, INDIVIDUAL	559	1 PER OFF & EM	8,161
8	UNKNOWN	BAND, ELASTIC, HELMET COVER	559	1 PER OFF & EM	67
9	6545-526-1887	KIT, SNAKE BITE	559	1 PER OFF & EM	895
10	8465-782-3248	RUCKSACK	559	1 PER OFF & EM	13,919
11	7210-266-9736	INSECT BAR	559	1 PER OFF & EM	5,422
12	7340-240-7436	KNIFE, FIELD MESS	559	1 PER OFF & EM	1,973
13	7340-243-5390	SPOON, FIELD MESS	559	1 PER OFF & EM	89
14	7340-243-5391	FORK, FIELD MESS	559	1 PER OFF & EM	112
15	7350-242-5110	PAN, MESS KIT	559	1 PER OFF & EM	727
16	8340-577-4168	SHELTER, HALF TENT	559	1 PER OFF & EM	4,360
17	8340-223-7849	POLE SECTION, TENT	1677	3 PER OFF & EM	252
18	8340-261-9749	PIN, TENT	2795	5 PER OFF & EM	363
19	8405-290-0550	PONCHO, COATED CLOTH	559	1 PER OFF & EM	3,186
20	UNKNOWN	PONCHO LINER, CAMOUFLAGED	559	1 PER OFF & EM	5,199
21	7340-098-4327	KNIFE, SURVIVAL	559	1 PER OFF & EM	1,957

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT (CONT'D)

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
22	8465-264-5085	SLEEPING BAG	559	1 PER OFF & EM	16,267
23	8465-237-8719	CASE, SLEEPING BAG	559	1 PER OFF & EM	4,528
24	8465-254-8887	MATTRESS, PNEUMATIC	559	1 PER OFF & EM	4,360
25	UNKNOWN	COT, SLEEPING	559	1 PER OFF & EM	8,385
26	8465-261-6909	BAG, WATERPROOF	559	1 PER OFF & EM	1,118
27	8465-242-7843	CUP, CANTEEN	559	1 PER OFF & EM	671
28	8465-577-4927	CASE, FIRST AID	559	1 PER OFF & EM	157
29	8465-577-4926	COVER, CANTEEN	559	1 PER OFF & EM	498
30	8465-889-3744	CANTEEN, WATER	559	1 PER OFF & EM	140
31	8465-647-0852	CASE, SMALL ARMS AMMO	559	1 PER OFF & EM	839
32	UNKNOWN	CARRIER, SLEEPING BAG	559	1 PER OFF & EM	839
33	8415-153-6671	HEAD BAND	559	1 PER OFF & EM	240
34	8415-753-6166	NECK BAND	559	1 PER OFF & EM	67
35	8465-577-4924	BELT, PISTOL	559	1 PER OFF & EM	783
36	1005-992-6645	BAYONET	559	1 PER OFF & EM	1,235
37	1095-508-0339	SCABBARD, BAYONET	559	1 PER OFF & EM	866
38	1005-856-6885	RIFLE, M-16	559	1 PER OFF & EM	58,695
39	UNKNOWN	MAGZINE, M-16, 30 ROUND	2795	5 PER OFF & EM	4,220
40	UNKNOWN	KIT, CLEANING, M-16 RIFLE COMPLETE	559	1 PER OFF & EM	2,141

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
VEHICLES & VEHICLE SUPPORT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
41	2320-763-1092	TRUCK, UTILITY, ¼ TON 4 X 4 M-151 OR EQUAL WITH CAMOUFLAGE NET, SHOVEL, PICK, 2 JERRY CANS AND ARMOR PLATING	46	1 SQ COMDR 1 2D IN COMD & INTEL OFF 1 SQ CP 3 FLT COMDR'S 3 FLT NCO'S 12 SECTION COMDR'S 3 IDE OPR'S 4 RADAR OPR'S 3 GRENADE CANNON 3 MINI GUN 12 MORTAR TEAMS	138,276
42	2320-289-9108	TRUCK, CARGO, 3/4 TON, 4 X 4 M-37 OR EQUAL W/CABLE WINCH, CAMOUFLAGE NET, SHOVEL, PICK 2 JERRY CANS & TOW BAR	8	1 SQ SUPPLY 1 VEHICLE MAINT NCO 6 FLT VEHICLES	34,400
43	2320-706-5495	TRAILER, CARGO, ¼ TON	20	2 SQ HQ 6 PER FLT	8,000
44	2330-738-9509	TRAILER, CARGO, 3/4 TON	8	1 PER 3/4 TON TRUCK	4,400
45	2330-289-8934	TRAILER, TANK, GASOLINE, 600 GAL	1	SQUADRON	2,600
46	UNKNOWN	TRAILER, TANK, WATER, 600 GAL	1	SQUADRON	2,600
47	5180-408-1859	TOOL KIT, AUTOMOTIVE MINOR REPAIR W/¼" CHUCK ELECTRIC DRILL	9	1 PER VEH MAINT MECH	32
48	6625-092-7929	TESTER, BATTERY	3	1 PER FLIGHT	888

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
VEHICLES & VEHICLE SUPPORT (CONT'D)

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
49	4910-509-1514	TESTER, GENERATOR	3	1 PER FLIGHT	2,214
50	6130-669-6659	CHARGER, BATTERY	3	1 PER FLIGHT	NOT AVAILABLE
51	4910-516-5806	JACK, FLOOR, 4-TON	3	1 PER FLIGHT	681
52	5120-293-1439	VICE, BENCH	3	1 PER FLIGHT	52
53	4910-355-6190	GAUGE, COMPRESSION	3	1 PER FLIGHT	225
54	4910-649-4551	LIGHT, TIMING	3	1 PER FLIGHT	84
55	UNKNOWN	MACHINE, VEHICLE LUBRICATING	3	1 PER FLIGHT	855
56	6625-724-8582	MULTIMETER	3	1 PER FLIGHT	345
57	UNKNOWN	COMPRESSOR, AIR*	3	1 PER FLIGHT	NOT AVAILABLE

*TIRE PRESSURE TANK

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
WEAPONS & WEAPONS SUPPORT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
58	1005-731-2036	SHOTGUN, 12 GAUGE, 8 SHOT CAP SLOT MUZZLE W/CLEANING KIT	18	6 PER FLIGHT	720
59	1005-605-7710	MACHINE GUN, LIGHT, 7.62 MM M-60 W/CLEANING KIT	54	1 PER 5-MAN FIRE TEAM	31,212
60	1005-710-5599	MOUNT, TRIPOD FOR M-60 MG	9	3 PER FLIGHT	972
61	1005-973-2833	MOUNT, PEDESTAL FOR M-60 MG*	45	15 PER FLIGHT	14,490
62	1010-912-3014	LAUNCHER, GRENADE 40 MM M-148	54	1 PER 5-MAN FIRE TEAM	4,131
63	1005-322-9715	MACHINE GUN CAL 50 W/TRIPOD W/CLEANING KIT	9	3 PER FLIGHT	6,948
64	UNKNOWN	GRENADE CANNON 40 MM ELEC DRIVE W/VEHICLE PEDESTAL**	3	1 PER FLIGHT	40,380
65	UNKNOWN	MINIGUN 5.56 MM ELEC DRIVE W/VEH PEDESTAL**	3	1 PER FLIGHT	
66	1015-673-2038 (ACCESSORIES UNDER OTHER STOCK NOS.)	MORTAR, 81 MM M-29 COMPLETE WITH SIGHTS, FUZE SETTERS, MUZZLE COVER, CLEANING KIT, TOOLS, FIRING TABLES & PLOTTING INSTRUMENTS	12	4 PER FLIGHT	33,708
66A	5180-408-1863	TOOL KIT, ARMORERS, SMALL ARMS	6	2 PER FLIGHT	900

*FOR ¼ TON FLIGHT VEHICLES
**WEAPON EVALUATION

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
HOUSEKEEPING EQUIPMENT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
67	7110-663-6362	FILING CABINET, 4-DRAWER W/3-COMBINATION LOCK	1	SQUADRON	530
68	7110-847-5316	FILING CABINET, 2-DRAWER W/3-COMBINATION LOCK	3	1 PER FLIGHT	951
69	7110-282-6109	SAFE, 2 SHELVES	3	1 PER FLIGHT	690
70	7110-641-8998	DESK, FIELD	2	1 FOR CO 1 FOR 1ST SGT	78
71	UNKNOWN	TABLE, FOLDING, APPROX. 24 X 36	42	6 ORD RM 6 COMM & VEH MAINT 6 MESS 12 FLIGHT TENTS 6 SUPPLY 6 MEDICAL	870
72	8340-285-5599	TENT, LARGE*	12	3 ORD RM 3 SUPPLY 3 MESS 3 FLIGHT TENTS	8,124
73	8340-543-7788	TENT, 6-MAN*	111	6 EM/TENT 2 OFF/TENT 4 NCO/TENT 1 CO/TENT	58,941
74	7105-269-9262	CHAIR, WOOD, FOLDING	84	1 PER TABLE 1 PER OFF 1 PER NCO 5 MEDICO	1,031
75	7430-634-5062	TYPEWRITER, MANUAL	5	1 ORD RM 1 PER FLIGHT 1 SQ CP	800

*PORT-A-TENT

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
HOUSEKEEPING EQUIPMENT (CONT'D)

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
76	6675-286-0603	SET, DRAFTING	1	INTEL O	20
77	7510-198-5831	TABLE, DRAWING	1	INTEL O	120
78	6645-526-9476	CLOCK, WALL, MECH, 8-DAY, 24-HOUR	5	1 FOR CP 1 PER FLIGHT 1 SQ CP	280
79	6260-837-0996	LAMP, KEROSENE	147	1 PER 6-MAN TENT 3 PER LARGE TENT	1,529
80	6115-079-2700	GENERATOR SET, 15 KW	4	1 SQ CP 1 PER FLIGHT	17,500
81	4610-268-9891	BAG, WATER, 36 GAL	9	3 PER FLIGHT	243
82	5180-596-1537	TOOL KIT, PIONEER, FIELD CONST.	3	1 PER FLIGHT	3,057
83	UNKNOWN	REFRIGERATORS, SMALL FIELD	3	1 PER FLT MED SEC	675
84	6665-599-8919	KIT, TEST, WATER PURIFICATION	3	1 PER FLT MED SEC	1,008

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
RADIO AND LANDLINE EQUIPMENT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
85	AN/GRA-53	BASE RADIO STATIONS, TACTICAL, 40-50 MILE RANGE, MULTI-CHANNEL, MULTI-FREQUENCY, FOR ON-BASE, AREA AND GROUND-TO-AIR COMMS. DESIRABLE TO BE VEHICLE-MOUNTED AS WELL AS FIXED-MOUNTED*	4	1 SQ CP 1 PER FLIGHT	31,200
86	UNKNOWN	PORTABLE RADIO SET FOR VEHICLE OR MANPACK. 8-12 MILE RANGE (AN/PRC 25 OR EQUAL)	46	1 PER ¼ TON VEHICLE	39,928
87	UNKNOWN	PORTABLE RADIO, PERSONNEL, 1½ MILE MINIMUM RANGE (AN/PRC 6 OR EQUAL)	81	1 PER 5-MAN FIRE TEAM 1 PER DOG HANDLER	15,714
88	UNKNOWN	TELEPHONE SWITCHBOARDS (20-DROP) MANUAL	3	1 PER FLIGHT	NOT AVAILABLE
89	5805-503-2616	SWITCHBOARD SIGNAL ASSEMBLY TA-207P	6	2 PER FLIGHT	4,944
90	5805-543-0012	TELEPHONE SETS TA-312/PT**	60	20 PER FLIGHT	3,720
91	UNKNOWN	SPLICING KIT, TELEPHONE CABLE MK-356/G	3	1 PER FLIGHT	NOT AVAILABLE
92	UNKNOWN	MANPACK WIRE, FIELD PHONE DISPENSING (LAYING)***	12	1 PER SECTION	NOT AVAILABLE
93	6154-643-4519	WIRE, FIELD PHONE	50 MI	12 X 5-MILE LIGHTWEIGHT DRUMS	31,680
94	TA-665	RADIO SUPPORT, MAINTENANCE, TEST AND CALIBRATION EQUIPMENT SETS	3	1 PER FLIGHT	15,000
95	5180-408-1863	TOOL KIT, TELEPHONE, EQUIPMENT REPAIR	3	1 PER FLIGHT	228

*TO INCLUDE BASE STATION AERIAL ARRAY (35-40 FOOT TELESCOPIC MASTS)

**20 PER 20-DROP SWBD

***WIRE LAYING EQUIPMENT

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
GENERAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
96	8415-268-7868 THRU 7872	GLOVES, WIRING*	50	4 PER SECTION 2 SQ CP	150
97	5120-248-9420	CUTTERS, WIRE, HEAVY**	75	25 PER FLIGHT	15,000
98	5110-813-1286	MACHETTE, JUNGLE, WITH SHEATH	112	1 PER 5 MEN	17,360
99	6230-264-8261	FLASHLIGHTS, LIGHTWEIGHT FIELD	66	1 PER 5-MAN FIRE TEAM (54) 3 SQ HQ (3) 3 PER FLIGHT CP (9)	86
100	6645-066-4279	WATCH, WRIST, HACK, TYPE DTU-2A/P	136	1 PER OFFICER (21) 1 PER NCO (97) 1 PER ADMIN EM (18)	13,192
101	6605-846-7618	COMPASS, MAGNETIC	118	1 PER OFFICER (21) 1 PER NCO (97)	1,050
102	8345-174-6865	PANEL MARKER, AERIAL LIAISON	12	4 PER FLIGHT	48
103	6650-536-0974	BINOCULARS, NIGHT, CROSSHAIR RANGING	60	1 PER OFFICER (21) 1 PER FIRE ELEMENT LEADER (27) 1 PER MORTAR TEAM LEADER (12)	11,580
104	8460-368-4281	CASES, MAP	60	1 PER OFFICER (21) 1 PER FIRE ELEMENT LEADER (27) 1 PER MORTAR TEAM LEADER (12)	468
105	UNKNOWN	TELESCOPE, GRADICULE SCALE 20 POWER WITH TRIPOD	9	3 PER FLIGHT	5,256
106	5830-856-6835	LOUDSPEAKER, MEGAPHONE, BATTERY POWERED. TYPE S-168	10	3 PER FLIGHT 1 FOR 1ST SGT	480

*CONCERTINA WIRE HANDLING
**CONCERTINA WIRE

ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT
GENERAL EQUIPMENT (CONT'D)

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	TOTAL COSTS
107	3695-288-3477	SAW, CHAIN, GASOLINE POWERED	18	6 PER FLIGHT	5,400
108	6665-966-9072	DETECTOR SET MINE, MD-M	18	6 PER FLIGHT	8,118
109	6545-927-4960	SURGICAL INST. & SUP. SET, IND.	6	2 PER FLIGHT	306
110	6545-927-4400	MEDICAL SUPPLY SET, FIELD SUPPLEMENT	6	2 PER FLIGHT	1,494
111	6545-952-6975	SPLINT SET, TELESCOPIC	6	2 PER FLIGHT	480
112	6530-783-7905	LITTER, FOLDING, RIGID POLE, ALUMINUM	18	6 PER FLIGHT	362
				GRAND TOTAL	$868,872

TACTICAL SECURITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	BASIS FOR ISSUE	REMARKS
113		Ground Surveillance Radar System	6	2 Per Flight	
114		Night Observation Device	27	1 Per Fire Element	
115		Starlight Scope	54	1 Per Fire Team	
116		Tunnel Detection Device	3	1 Per Flight	
117		Trace Metal Detection Kit	3	1 Per Flight	
118		Infra-red (Passive) Intrusion Detection System	75 sets	Calculated on the coverage required at a major air base	
119		Seismic Detection System	140 sets	Calculated on the coverage required at a major air base	

ANNEX K

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

TRAINING PROGRAM ANALYSIS

Operation SAFE SIDE

TRAINING PROGRAM ANALYSIS

1. Academics

a. Personal Hygiene and Field Sanitation: Topics like proper care of the feet and wear of socks and boots which ordinarily are taken for granted became very critical in a program like SAFE SIDE. Emphasis was placed on the importance of proper sanitation procedures and the individuals responsibility to the entire squadron to insure that these procedures were followed.

b. First Aid: The first aid procedures taught throughout the Air Force were re-emphasized. In addition such topics as the treatment of gunshot wounds and field expedients for the care and movement of injured personnel were taught.

c. Detection Devices: Seome classroom hours presented by the civilian representatives from RADC was used to familiarize the squadron members with the characteristics and limitations, care and maintenance requirements, methods of installation and tactical employment of each device. This instruction was followed by field demonstration and tests.

d. Communications: The unit's radios did not reach the training site until the unit field training phase. During the interim classes were taught on the proper tactical use of radio and land line communications utilizing the correct pro-words, and procedures.

e. Air-ground Operations: These classes were taught by the 7th DASF, Wheeler AFB and had to be limited to cadre NCOs because of difficulty in coordinating class time with the availability of instructors. A day of classroom work devoted to the procedures involved in requesting air support,

marking targets, and communication between the air and ground forces as well as a detailed explanation of how the Tactical Air Support System operates preceded a day of practical application in which each student actually called in simulated air strikes using equipment provided by 7th DASF and a T-33 flown by 7th DASF pilots to simulate the tactical aircraft.

f. Map Reading; Compass & Land Navigation: A fundamental skill for all personnel down to the lowest grade airman is the ability to properly utilize a map, aerial photograph, or pictomap. In the many hours devoted to teaching this skill each man learned to properly recognize topographic symbols, accurately plot coordinates and read distance and direction. An equally important associated skill to map reading is the ability to use a lensatic compass. Instruction toward this end emphasized the day and night uses of the compass. Combining these two fundamental skills and adding the ability to make an accurate terrain analysis, the training on these subjects culminated with practical application hours where the students were required to negotiate land navigation courses during daylight and darkness.

g. Tactics: The basic principles of all field operations were taught or briefed prior to each field operation in an academic atmosphere. Several sub-topics can be grouped under the heading of tactics including patrolling techniques. Under this sub-topic instruction was presented on the various types of patrols, point and area reconnaissance patrols and raid and ambush combat patrols, covering the organization, preparation and conduct of each of these types. A related sub-topic under tactics was the use of supporting fires from within the unit and other friendly forces. Target detection

training is another sub-topic which was presented. Escape and evasion training was a portion of the tactical training. Field fortifications, both hasty and permanent, were taught in the academic situation prior to the many hours of practical field training which included the use of these fortifications. All of these subjects as they apply to the academic portion of training consisted of an introduction to the actual field training which emphasized these topics.

h. Combat Intelligence: These classes covered the sources of intelligence data, and the proper recording, reporting and evaluation of that data.

2. Weapons

a. Rifle, 5.56 mm (M-16): The M-16 was the basic weapon of the unit and therefore a proportionately greater amount of time was devoted to classes which dealt with this particular weapon than with any other. Immediately following weapons issue a class was held on safety, field stripping, care and cleaning of the weapon functioning and immediate action procedures. Subsequent sessions were held on field stripping until each individual was able to break down and reassemble his weapon blindfolded. The next class held with this weapon was devoted to zeroing each weapon for the individual rifleman and then an initial proficiency evaluation was conducted. Classes in basic marksmanship including proper sight alignment and sight picture were presented in an attempt to improve the individual's knowledge of the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship. Train fire courses with pop up targets at various distances with the individual shooting from several positions, including from in a fox hole, were utilized

to teach each man how to hit a target with a zeroed weapon at different ranges. An assault fire course was used to teach the principals of movement in formation while shooting live ammunition. Night firing was an essential part of the M-16 training program and night fire courses were conducted periodically. Bi-weekly proficiency evaluations were required by the USAF Management Plan and provided additional training for the individual as well as a method of measuring proficiency.

b. 12 Gauge Shotgun: The introductory classes for the shotgun included safety, care and maintenance, functioning and immediate action procedures. Day and night proficiency firing for each man was then held to familiarize each individual with the weapon.

c. Light Machine Gun, 7.62 mm (M-60): Because this is a more complicated weapon than the majority of the weapons used by the squadron, more hours of classroom and crew drill training was required prior to and in conjunction with actual live firing to familiarize each member of the squadron. Detailed instruction in functioning and disassembly was given to include the use of the tripod and traverse and elevation mechanism. Familiarization firing was conducted both day and night with the tripod and bipod and each individual performed as the gunner and assistant gunner in turn. Each individual was also taught the fundamentals of firing from the shoulder, underarm, hip and groin positions. As an adjunct to the M-60 training, the students were introduced to the preparation and use of range cards. Once the squadron was reorganized and each man received his permanent assignment, those personnel who were selected for duty as machine gunners and assistant machine gunners were given extensive training in the

use and employment of their weapon as well as several hours of range time to improve their proficiency in firing the M-60 during the specialized phase of training.

d. Heavy Machine Gun, .50 cal (M-2): This is also a complicated weapon similar in nature to the M-60 light machine gun so the training conducted followed a pattern similar to that presented to that presented for the M-60 that each individual was not taught the detailed disassembly of the M-2, and this weapon was only fired from the tripod using the traverse and elevation mechanism. All personnel participated in familiarization firing both day and night serving as gunner and assistant gunner in turn. Additional training was given on range cards and crew drill for the M-2 was taught. As with the M-60, much more extensive training was conducted for those members of the squadron who were selected as heavy machine gunners and assistant machine gunners during the specialized phase of training including the detailed assembly of the weapons, functioning, care and maintenance, and immediate action procedures.

e. Rocket, 66mm (M-72)(Light anti-tank weapon, LAW): This weapon is extremely simple to employ in that the container for each round also serves as the launcher. Classes in the use of the M-72 were limited to the preparation of the launcher for firing and sighting techniques. Each squadron member then fired only one round for familiarization.

f. Mortar, 81mm (M-29 w/mount M1A1): Because of the nature of the weapon, the training associated with the mortar was divided into three distinct classes. All members of the squadron were given extensive training in Forward Observer procedures, including how to call for mortar support and how to adjust fire on the target. Everyone also received familiarization training in fire direction center procedures showing them how each fire

mission was plotted. Familiarization training was conducted so that all of the students learned the duties of each member of a mortar crew. This portion of the mortar training was devoted to crew drill and conduct of actual fire missions using training/practice ammunition. As with the other crew served weapons much more extensive training was conducted for those personnel permanently assigned as mortar crewmen, fire direction center personnel and forward observers during the specialty training phase.

g. Grenade Launcher (M 148): The unit was able to borrow sufficient grenade launchers (M-79) which is a suitable substitute for familiarization purposes, to conduct a limited amount of training for all squadron members. Each man was briefed on the nature of the weapon and fired several rounds of training ammunition. When the assigned weapons arrived at the operational site, those personnel who were assigned as grenadiers were given complete qualification training on a make shift range.

h. Revolver, .38 caliber: When the weapons were received those individuals who were to carry the weapon because of their position or the nature of their duties were given proficiency training and were required to fire a qualification course.

i. Fragmentation Hand Grenade (M-26): All personnel received training in the proper use of the hand grenade starting with several hours of practice with dummy grenades and finishing with the use of live grenades on a specially prepared range.

3. Field Training

a. Stream Crossing and Patrols: Cadre taught field training included stream crossing techniques in which the students were taught several methods of crossing a stream or river, rappelling as a confidence measure, target detection and the field application of the subjects previously covered in academic classes. In patrol training the instructors organized and lead the first few patrols with the students as the patrol members. Later the students became the leaders of patrols and their performance was monitored and critiqued by cadre instructors.

b. Tactics: After the squadron was reorganized to function as it would in the operational phase, detailed field exercises were planned and conducted to test the tactics to be employed, evaluate the organization command and control and mold each fire team into a harmonious team. A total of four exercises were conducted, three lasted three days each and the fourth lasted six days. The planning involved in each of these exercises included detailed aggressor actions, an intelligence briefing on the current "enemy" situation, tactical motor convoys, close air support and the defenses to be employed. The information and experience gained in these exercises lead to some modifications in the tactics to be used and resulted in a slight squadron re-organization.

4. Specialized Training

a. Tactical Security Support Equipment (TSSE): Many hours of training and testing of equipment were given to the TSSE section members to thoroughly indoctrinate them in the use, employment, installation and operational characteristics of their gear. They began compiling detailed data on each

individual piece of equipment during this training and testing which continued throughout the operation.

b. Armored Personnel Carrier Crew Training: The APC crews spent two weeks learning to drive the vehicles over varied terrain, performing preventive maintenance, and major maintenance on the vehicles and developing the tactical application of the APC to air base defense. In addition, each crew practiced firing the .50 caliber heavy machine gun, the primary armament of the APC from a static position as well as while the vehicle was in motion.

c. Sniper Team Training: One fire team from the Close Combat Flight was designated the Squadron Sniper Team as an additional assignment above and beyond their normal fire team duties. This fire team received training over a three week period on the use of high power rifles, sniper scopes and the techniques of long range marksmanship. They also spent several hours of practical application training, firing on a 1,000 meter range.

d. Demolition Training: During this training, selected students learned to set charges using C-4 compound, TNT, detonating cord, and electrical and non-electrical caps and fuses. They also learned how to employ and set the various mines which the unit had as part of its equipment.

e. Mortar Crew Training: As discussed in paragraph 5.5, the personnel assigned as mortar crewmen and fire direction center personnel received extensive specialized training in the coordinated use of their equipment and practiced the techniques of mortar fire in support of other units and for harassment and interdiction fire. Each Fire Team Leader received additional training as forward observers to increase their ability to call for mortar support and adjust fires. In addition, there were several hours devoted to coordinated training with the three essential elements

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of effective mortar fire, the FO's, FDC and mortar crews trained together to improve the overall efficiency of the mortar section.

f. Communications: All personnel assigned as communicators in the operations section or as Radio Telephone Operators with each fire team were given additional training in the proper use of the equipment available with particular emphasis on proper communication procedures.

g. Machine Gun Crew Training: Specialized training was also conducted for those individuals assigned as light and heavy machine gunmen and assistant gunmen to thoroughly familiarize each man with his weapon and his duties on the machine gun crew. Each crew became responsible for the care and maintenance of their assigned weapon and added training along with daily inspections insured their knowledge of this responsibility. Many hours on various ranges during daylight hours and hours of darkness using range cards, which each crew prepared for their position, polished the proficiency of each crew to a high degree.

h. Weapons Maintenance Course: As a part of the specialized phase of training, each member of the Weapons Support Flight attended a four day course on maintenance of crew served weapons taught by the Schofield Barracks Supply Maintenance Center.

5. Physical Conditioning

a. Group Exercises: Ten exercises taken from US Army Training Manual 21-200 were selected as body builders to loosen and tone the body muscles for the participation of the entire squadron. To build endurance and tone the leg muscles, running in flight formation was included in this portion of the Physical Conditioning program. This entire program was designed on a progressive basis. During the early phases of training calisthenics were

scheduled at the start of each training day. Later in the program these scheduled exercise periods were conducted only while the squadron was in garrison. Also during the early phases of training a second period of exercise was normally scheduled at the close of the training day depending on the days activity.

b. Confidence Course: A confidence course was included in the physical conditioning program to build body muscles, develop endurance and build the individuals confidence in his ability to negotiate simple but physically demanding obstacles. This confidence course consisted of 13 obstacles constructed over 450 meters of hilly terrain. It was run also on a progressive basis. At first the men were required only to negotiate the course to learn the various obstacles and the techniques for negotiating each obstacle. The amount of equipment each man carried was gradually increased to the point where they were wearing their normal field gear and carrying their rifle when the course was run.

c. Road Marches: During the training day the student body was required to move from class to class by marching in formation between training areas. This distance varied from less than a mile to five miles. Forced marches from five to eight miles in distances were added to the training schedule as another means of preparing the men physically and building their endurance. This program culminated with a 28 mile force march which tested the students endurance after participating in a four day field exercise.

d. Combatives: This portion of the physical conditioning program was primarily intended to teach the basic skills of unarmed defense and bayonet fighting. The O'Neal system of Hand to Hand Combat and US Army bayonet

training program were utilized for this purpose. As a secondary benefit the exercises used to loosen the body prior to participation in the O'Neal training and the actual participation in bayonet training also served to tone the body muscles.

e. Swimming Classes: As a result of the Combat Water Survival Tests, a number of the members of the squadron were found to be weak swimmers or non-swimmers. Therefore, swimming classes were added to the training schedule to develop this skill in each individual enabling him to operate in or around bodies of water safely. Swimming also had the additional benefit of being an excellent form of exercise for the entire body.

ANNEX L

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

INDIVIDUAL PROFICIENCY EVALUATION

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

INDIVIDUAL PROFICIENCY EVALUATION

1. Physical Combat Proficiency Test (PCPT): The PCPT, taken from Army Publication TAOG-148C, was selected as the means used to measure each individual's state of physical fitness at the beginning of training and improvement as training progressed. This test measured the physical skills of running, crawling, throwing accuracy, coordination, strength and endurance. The test consisted of five events, the 40-yard low crawl, horizontal ladder, dodge run, and jump, grenade throw and a mile run. During the training period, this test was required every two weeks.

2. Combative Measures: Performance evaluations on the individual's proficiency in combative measures were required every two weeks during the training phase to measure each man's progress in training and monthly, to measure the retention of the skills which were taught.

3. Marksmanship: Marksmanship with the M-16 rifle was also tested every two weeks to evaluate the progress of each man's skill with this weapon during the weapons block of training and to measure the retention of this skill during the later phases of training.

4. Combat Water Survival Testing: This test was administered to all squadron members during the first week of training to determine which of the students would require special safety precautions while operating in or around bodies of water. For the test, the individual was dressed in the standard fatigue uniform with combat boots, field web harness with ammunition pouches, and canteen. Each individual also carried his rifle. The test consisted of three phases. In the first phase, the individual was required to jump into the water and swim 15 meters without losing his weapon. If the weapon was dropped but the individual swam the required distance, he was classified a weak swimmer. The remaining two phases tested the individual's composure in the water. In the second phase, each man was required to jump into the water backwards, surface and regain his composure, then on command submerge and remove his field web harness. For the final phase, each man was blindfolded and required to step off a three meter diving board. Upon entering the water, he removed the blindfold and swam to shore without losing his weapon. The individuals who were identified as weak or non-swimmers were given swimming lessons and then retested.

ANNEX M

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

CADRE TRAINING

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

CADRE TRAINING

1. Ranger Training: On 4 May 1966, 62 selected volunteers began the week of introductory training with the formal course commencing on 11 May 1966. During the course 43 Air Force students were eliminated for various reasons. On 12 July 1966, when General Martin, Inspector General, Hq USAF addressed the graduating class at Eglin AFB, Florida, there were 19 Air Force personnel who had completed the course. As the course was in progress it became apparent that the drop out rate was excessive and a shortage of qualified instructors would be encountered. Therefore an agreement was made with the Department of the Army to allow additional Air Force personnel to attend the school in succeeding classes. On 4 July 1966 six new students and six recycle students began Ranger Training, with four completing the course on 5 September 1966. It was originally planned to recycle several of other previously injured students but the target date for beginning the SAFE SIDE training program was too near, therefore, it was decided that certain of these individuals would be of value to the training program with what limited training they had received, therefore, they were included in the instructor corps.

2. O'Neil Hand to Hand Combat Course: Four volunteers, graduates of the Ranger course, reported to Hurlburt Field, Florida, 14 August 1966 for a two week special instructor course in O'Neil Hand to Hand combatives. The course was designed to teach an individual to defens himself at close range, either armed or unarmed, disabling such an enemy by using only his body, e.g. feet, knees, hands, elbows. This training also included use of the bayonet in the art of self-defense.

3. Intelligence Analysis: During the period of 12 September through 19 October 1966 three SAFE SIDE NCOs completed the US Army Intelligence Course at Fort Holabird, Maryland. This course included planning, collection, analyzing, and dessemination of combat intelligence; various intelligence organization structures, radio operations, photographic map reading, photo interpretation, situation maps, receipt, handling interrogation and disposition of prisoners; sociology of South Vietnam, North Vietnam andpacification programs. During the unit's field training exercises they were used extensively in the patrolling and field exercise training portions to get experience in patrol briefing and debriefing and in establishing a unit intelligence capability including the preparation and maintenance of situation maps.

4. Special Infantry Weapons Course: During the period 10 July through 22 July 1966 two individuals attended US Army Crew Served Weapons Course. Training consisted of basic instruction and live fire with the M-60 and .50 caliber machine guns and 81mm mortar. Mortar training included classroom and field application of Fire Direction Center, and Forward Observer duties.

ANNEX M

5. Weapons Maintenance Course: While at the SAFE SIDE training site arrangements were made for five members of the instructor cadre to attend a resident 40 hour Weapons Maintenance Course conducted by the US Army at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The course consisted of 38 hours of instruction on Weapons Maintenance and detail stripping of the M-16, M-60 machine gun, .50 caliber machine gun and the 81mm mortar and two hours of familiarization firing with the M-60 and .50 caliber machine gun.

6. Scout Dog Course: Since quotas for the existing Department of Army Scout Dog Course, Ft Benning, Georgia, could not be obtained it was necessary for the Air Force to establish its own Scout Dog Training Course. Three US Army instructors and one Air Force instructor with duty at the USAF Sentry Dog School, Lackland AFB, Texas were selected to organize and train 15 airmen with scout dogs. This training was conducted between 8 June through 30 August 1966. All individuals selected for this training had previous instructor duty with the US Army Scout Dog School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Upon completion of the course the Air Force instructor became NCOIC of the Scout Dog Unit and as such became the instructor for the continual proficiency training of the handlers and their dogs.

7. Forward Air Controller Training: During the period 24 through 29 October 1966, 25 cadre instructors received special Forward Air Controller training. Training was presented on Tactical Air Request and Controller duties by key personnel of the 7th Direct Air Support Flight, Wheeler Air Base, Hawaii. Classroom training included Tactical Air Controller Organization, use of forms, advance of tactical aircraft, radio procedures, and jargon. Tactical field training included use of the MRC-108 radio jeep in calling air strikes. Each individual receiving this training actually called for and directed several simulated air strikes.

ANNEX N

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

TACTICAL SECURITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SUMMARY

OPERATION SAFE SIDE

TACTICAL SECURITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SUMMARY

Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detection System (MCID) - Model T-14

1. The MCID system is designed to detect ferrous metal passed over or carried over a buried detection wire. The system consists of four components:

a. Detector - An insulated copper wire, in 1600 foot lengths weighing 30 pounds.

b. Amplifier - The amplifier contains the sealed electronic amplification system which is powered by an internal 2 year life mercury battery. The amplifier has a connection for the detection wire and a connection for the WD-1 wire which leads to the annunciator. The amplifier is 6 inches in diameter, 11.5 inches high and weighs 18.4 pounds.

c. Annunciator - The annunciator is 7 inches long, 7 inches high and 2.7 inches wide and weighs six pounds.

d. Field Phone Wire - WD-1 field phone wire is an essential component but was not supplied by the manufacturer - Honeywell Incorporated, Hopkins, Minnesota.

2. Theory of Operation: A ferrous object carried across the buried wire disturbs the magnetic field and causes an electrical current to flow through the wire to the amplifier. The normal flow of current in the WD-1 wire is broken which causes the annunciator to give a light, audio, meter and counter reaction. The detection wire is buried 4 to 6 inches deep in sections up to 600 feet and the amplifier is buried next to the wire. The WD-1 wire which leads back to the annunciator can be buried to prevent discovery.

3. Test: A total of 30 units were received and at the close of tactical operations 17 were installed. Three units were installed at the training site and later were re-installed at Phu Cat with 14 other units. Three units were installed in the southeastern portion of the base. The remaining 13 units were installed on the north and northwest perimeter of the base. The MCID at both locations was monitored from a tower 200 - 400 meters from the nearest unit. The units were placed in hard and soft soil at various locations along the perimeter and were interlocking to provide a solid line of early warning.

4. Results: Normally the MCID was reliable. Installing the MCID without trench digging equipment was very difficult and time consuming. Thirteen MCID units were found to be defective and the exact cause was unknown. A total of 811 alarms were received of which 90 were possible intrusions. Eight positive sightings of individuals were observed after receiving the alarms. Four new units were inoperative after they were

unpacked and tested. Causes of most malfunctions could not be determined. Lightning caused false alarms and may have caused 6 installed units to malfunction.

5. Conclusions: This system is not easily moved and once installed should remain stationary. It is bulky and weighs 55 pounds per unit. It is durable and well constructed. A break in the buried wire is difficult to locate. The system is beneficial for a permanent base. Camouflage or concealment is difficult unless much time is spent or a large area is cleared of vegetation to blend with the area of the MCID units. Installation of one MCID unit by hand required 8 to 10 hours using approximately 12 to 14 personnel. With trench digging equipment, four personnel were able to install one unit in 4 to 5 hours.

6. Recommendations: The MCID is not recommended for mobile combat security force units. A more expeditious and simple method of installation must be developed.

Infra-red Intrusion Detection System - Model X-4 (Active)

7. The IR system is designed to detect intrusions by means of infra-red beams which cause alarm when interrupted. The IR system consists of 3 components: (1) An infra-red source, (2) An infra-red Receiver-Radio Frequency Transmitter, and (3) An Alarm Annunciator. One IR system contains 6 sensor pairs with each pair consisting of an IR source and Receiver-Radio Frequency Transmitter. These six sensor pairs are monitored by the one annunciator. The IR source and the RF transmitter are both self contained, battery powered units which are 4x4x2 inches and weighing 3/4 of a pound. The annunciator is a self-contained, battery powered unit which is 12x7x4 inches and weighing 8 pounds. The system is a product of Santa Barbara Research Center, Goleta, Cal.

8. Theory of Operation: The source projects the infrared beam effectively under most weather conditions to the receiver RF transmitter which may be up to 1,000 feet away. When an object interrupts the beam it causes the Receiver-RF Transmitter to send signals (line of sight) to the annunciator. The annunciator is activated causing audio and light alarms. A counter on the annunciator panel also indicates the number of times the beam has been interrupted. Simultaneously with the audio, light and counter alarms are activated. By monitoring the needle indicator it is possible to determine the different types of intrusions such as slow or fast moving objects or the size of the object interrupting the beam.

9. Test: Only limited testing was conducted both day and night at various distances with the annunciator up to 500 meters away.

10. Results: The first IR system was returned to RADC in December 1966 and a replacement was received in March 1967. All malfunctions of the IR

unit were with the annunciator. Except for one minor structural defect, the IR source and Receiver-RF transmitter functioned properly. Initially the annunciator functioned properly, however, after several tests one annunciator received no signals from the transmitter. During one night, several hundred false alarms were received. The needle indicator moved to the right of the scale and would not remain settled even when no alarms were received. The base of the annunciator battery compartment is poorly constructed as the bottom came loose when batteries were dropped into the battery compartment. Over-all results have not been satisfactory as the annunciator gives only one alarm when the beam is interrupted. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if there is an intruder or the unit has been blown out of line or a branch or leaf has interrupted the beam.

11. Conclusions: Further improvements are required on this particular system since it is not considered reliable at this time. The only areas where the IR is practical is on leveled flat areas or cleared paths. The system takes at least 5-10 minutes to line up the source and receiver at night even at close range requiring extra movement which is not feasible in a hostile area. The annunciator has no tone control and the lamp is too bright for night operations which requires that the annunciator be monitored from a safe location. In most cases the maximum range of the RF transmitter has been up to 600 meters from the annunciator.

12. Recommendations: The active IR system requires improvement and is not recommended for use by combat security units at this time.

Seismic Detection System (R&I):

13. The seismic system is designed to detect ground vibrations caused by a person or vehicle moving on the ground near a sensor. It is composed of ten battery powered seismic sensors which are monitored by a battery powered annunciator. Each sensor contains 10 batteries and weighs 7 pounds with a geophone sensor spike at the base of the sensor and a telescoping antenna. The sensor has an adjustable sensitivity switch. The annunciator is 4x8x2 inches, self contained, battery powered and weighing 2 pounds. It has an external battery pack which charges the annunciator battery thereby extending operational life of the unit from one to three days. The system is manufactured by R&I Controls of Research Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota.

14. Theory of Operation: An individual moving near the device will cause ground vibrations which are detected by the seismic sensor, which in turn transmits a radio signal (line of sight) to the annunciator. The annunciator gives audio and visual light indications. The ten lights on the annunciator are mated respectively to the ten sensors enabling the operator to distinguish which of the sensors is detecting an intruder.

15. Test: The seismic system was tested at various times and locations. They were used in soft sandy soil and hard clay soil, and in wet and dry

weather. The annunciator was monitored from bunkers, observation positions, and towers located up to 500 meters from the deployed sensor.

16. Results: Generally all tests proved satisfactory. The system was easy to carry, install, and camouflage. Few faults were noted with the sensors. The annunciator has several problem areas such as operation and construction of the unit, which can be corrected by the manufacturer. On a high sensitivity setting various other disturbances such as helicopters, artillery, vehicles, etc., cause false alarms, however, they can be distinguished by a skilled operator. There were at least 8 occasions when alarms were received which were similar to alarms caused by an intruder. The sensors are most effective when buried and using WD-1 wire as an external antenna.

17. Conclusions: When used with an aggressive active defense, this system is most suitable and can be used in a variety of situations. It performed better than other intrusion devices and had the least number of malfunctions.

18. Recommendations: This system should be retained for use by future combat security force units.

Seismic Detection System (Sandia Corp.):

19. The seismic intrusion detector is used to detect intrusion of enemy personnel and vehicles by means of the ground vibrations they cause while moving. The detector is a portable battery powered unit which is 8x7.5x4.5 inches and weighs 15 pounds. The sensor spike is a separate component which must be connected to the detector by wire. The interrogator is a portable, self-contained transceiver with rechargeable batteries, measures 10x8.5x5.5 inches and weighs four pounds.

20. Theory of Operation: The detector when buried will signal the presence of personnel or vehicles within a certain range based upon the sensitivity setting. The signal is transmitted (line of sight) to the interrogator which gives audible tones (beeps) coinciding with the actual movement on the ground. The interrogator can monitor a detector by a second method using a command-readout plug which will enable the detector to store information concerning personnel or vehicular activity. The operator can then send a signal from the interrogator to the detector which will transmit the stored information back to the interrogator. The airborne interrogator operates on the same principle as the portable interrogator but is monitored in an aircraft for greater range and coverage.

21. Test: The six seismic detectors and two portable interrogators were tested in camp and then in the field under actual working conditions both day and night. The airborne interrogator was tested in an AC-47 aircraft while in flight and also on the parking ramp.

22. Results: The two portable annunciators became inoperative within three days after initial testing. The interrogator battery indicated it was not charged. The interrogator received signals from the detector as they occurred but would not receive stored information from the detector. The interrogator was recharged and did not function properly after several additional tests. Battery life of the interrogator is quite short. There were no known malfunctions of the detectors.

23. Conclusions: This system has proved unreliable and further testing and evaluations should be conducted after manufacturers improvement. The system is more difficult to install, operate, and maintain compared to the R&I seismic system. The interrogator can only monitor one of the 6 detectors at a time and the bright yellow lamps are not practical for night operations.

24. Recommendations: Unless improvements are made, recommend this system not be used.

Radar Air Base Intrusion Detection System Raids-1

25. The Raids system can detect moving targets (human or otherwise). It can also be used to detect stationary targets along with moving targets depending on the selected mode of operation. The device consists of three self-contained components, the transmitting/receiving unit, the remote display unit, and a battery pack, with a combined weight of 76 pounds. Since the device is designed to be mounted in a vehicle as well as in a stationary position, a charged vehicle battery may be used 6-10 hours. If desired, the display unit may be remoted up to 50' from the transmitting/receiving and power units. The remote unit consists of two display scopes. The A Scope for range and peaking the signal, and the B Scope for search, crude range and crude azimuth. A manual range gate is provided for more precise measurement of range (+ or - 20 meters) and the transmitter receiver unit provides accurate azimuth information to (+ or - 20 Mils). A set of head phones is also used to determine by characteristic sound what the observed object is and to peak up the signal for accurate range and azimuth determination. If any one or both scopes are inoperable, it is still possible with the use of the headphones to take accurate readings. The device is manufactured by Airborne Instrument Laboratories Incorporated, Deer Park, Long Island, N.Y.

26. Theory of Operation: The device is a standard ground radar with a selection mode that allows for sampling targets and display only if they are moving. The Raids 1 is positioned at a desired location and can cover a narrow 30 degree or a wide 110 degree sector scan. All moving targets within the sector scanned and out to 5000 meters range will show up as bright spots at their appropriate range and azimuth and an aural tone is provided by the headphones. The operator can then stop the antenna and track the target or return it to automatic sector scan.

27. Test: Since the successful use of the device requires the ability to discriminate between sounds, many people were placed at various ranges and did various things that were known to the operator; walking, crawling, running, working, waving arms and moving vehicles. The next stage was much the same except that the operator was unaware of what the target was doing or the direction and the distance. At first, results were poor, but as personnel became familiar with the machine, results improved rapidly with fairly accurate analysis of target information. Further tests were conducted in open areas, wooded areas, hilly areas, rain and high wind.

28. Results: The device is strictly line of sight. Rain affects operation slightly in that it generates a characteristic noise in the headphones and limits range somewhat. In high wind, above 35 knots, the antenna is inoperable. In wind below 35 knots, the effectiveness is proportional to the velocity of the wind in that moving trees become targets and clutter the screen. Although the trees are easily eliminated by their sound, as the velocity of the wind increases so many targets are received that it becomes impossible to pick out a single man moving among other targets.

29. Conclusions: It is concluded that if the device is employed in a proper environment with trained operators it will undoubtedly provide outstanding results. It must be provided security as the antenna cannot be concealed and there is noise involved in operation.

30. Recommendations: It is recommended that the evaluation of the device be continued and later be considered for employment.

Periguard Pressure Intrusion Detector System, Model T-1: (Westinghouse)

31. This system is designed to detect ground pressure waves caused by local disturbances in the sensor area. It consists of two transducer sensors, one alarm console, and two 5/8 inch parallel hoses filled with a liquid (normally water and antifreeze) and located 4 feet apart and up to approximately 700 feet long. The hose weighs $\frac{1}{2}$ pound per foot and is buried 3-12 inches. The Solenoid and Transducer weigh about 9 pounds each and both have dimensions of 4x8x6 inches. They are housed in machined aluminum containers, and located at each end of the hose. The alarm console is a self contained rechargeable, nickel cadmium battery powered unit weighing 24 pounds with 16x7x9 inch dimensions. The unit can be connected to external batteries for longer life. The Solenoid cable connects the Solenoid to the Transducer and is 425 feet. The Transducer cable which connects the transducer with the alarm console is 325 feet.

32. Theory of Operation: The pressure waves created by an individual crossing the system increases the pressure of the fluid in the hose which activates the Solenoid, and the Transducer causes an electrical pulse to be sent through the transducer cable to the alarm console. The gain control of the alarm console controls the desired sensitivity whereby temperature changes, sonic booms, earthquakes, etc., will not cause an alarm.

33. Test: The system was installed on the northern perimeter of the base in sandy clay soil with the aid of a grader to dig the ditches. Several tests were conducted with individuals walking across the system.

34. Results: When the transducer cable was attached to the alarm console it was discovered that the internal battery required changing. Following battery charging, tests were conducted and the system received alarms on a heavy footed person crossing the hose. Therefore, the gain control was adjusted to alarm on a lighter weight. After attempts to adjust the gain control the system received no alarms and became totally inoperative.

35. Conclusions: This system was difficult to install, there are many parts to it, and battery life was rather short. This system may be adapted for a permanent base where time and facilities are adequate.

36. Recommendations: This system is not recommended for mobile combat security force units.

Starlight Scope - Model 6060: (Electrical Optical Systems, Inc.)

37. The Starlight Scope is designed for visual observation and to assist in aimed fire of weapons at night. It is a cylindrical, portable, battery powered, electro-optical scope. It can be mounted on a variety of weapons. It has a 4 power magnification, weighs 5.4 pounds, is 18.5 inches in length, 3.3 inches in width, and 5.5 inches in height. Battery life is approximately 100 hours using a 6.75 volt mercury battery.

38. Theory of Operations: The Starlight Scope uses the natural light (moonlight and starlight) for target illumination. The natural light is intensified by means of electrical and optical components and a green image of the target area is produced.

39. Test: The scope was tested under controlled and field conditions where it would have been impossible for the eye to observe objects unaided. It was also used as a sighting and surveillance device in open and densely vegetated terrain within 1000 meters.

40. Results: Overall results have been excellent. The scope definitely enhances viewing during night combat operations. However, there are some deficiencies in the scope. When a scope is removed from a weapon it must be re-zeroed if the mount is also removed. In conditions of high humidity or moisture, the cardboard battery casings deteriorate. Also some fogging of the lens occurs if the scope is placed or held near the ground. Operators will experience eye fatigue after five or ten minutes of continuous observation through the scope.

41. Conclusion: The scope is excellent and has definitely proved beneficial in combat security operations.

42. Recommendations: The Starlight Scope should be retained for use by combat security units. A five inch lens shade should be added to prevent fogging. A screw on lens cover with a small chain attached would prevent loss of the cover.

Oxford Light Pip Scope (Oxford Corporation):

43. This scope is designed to assist in sight alignment at night. It is a penlight battery operated, plain glass, tubular scope with a pip of light acting as the reticle. The scope is approximately $7\frac{1}{4}$ inches long and approximately 1 inch in diameter.

44. Theory of Operation: The scope is designed to project the light pip which replaces the front and rear sight, allowing the individual to get on target quicker than with iron sights.

45. Test: The device was tested over a 600 meter course and the results compared with results from normal M-16 sights.

46. Results: Results were poor as more hits were scored with the iron sights on the M-16, the zero of the weapon changed while in use, and the test scope fell off the weapon due to the poor mounting arrangement. The sight gave off excessive light at night.

47. Conclusion: The scope is not practical for combat zones.

48. Recommendations: This scope is not recommended for use in a unit of this type.

Hythe Night Sight (British Device - Saunders Roe and Nuclear Enterprises Ltd.)

49. The Hythe Night Sight replaces the foresight blade on the M-16. It is a "Betalight" sealed glass tube, internally coated with a phosphor and filled with tritium gas. The tube is housed in the wedge shaped foresight blade. The sight can be rotated through 90 degrees to provide a narrow blade for daylight use.

50. Theory of Operation. The tritum gas gives off a constant flow of beta particles which bombard the phosphor and cause it to glow. This allows the firer to align his weapon onto the target during periods of low light, for example at dawn and dusk. The sight is an aid to firing and does not illuminate the target.

51. Test. Twelve individuals fired the M-16 with the British sight after the weapon was zeroed and then fired the same course with their personal M-16 weapon. Firing was conducted at night from 30 meters at standard military "E" targets. Visibility varied from almost total darkness to partial moonlight. In very dark nights an 8x10 piece of white paper was placed in the center of the silhouette target which made the target barely visible.

52. Results: A higher percentage of hits were scored with the British sight compared to normal sights. The sight improves a persons sense of direction when aiming or firing and increases his confidence in the weapon. The illumination device cannot be detected beyond 5 meters at night. The rear sight aperture is quite large and could be modified to provide even better sight alignment.

53. Conclusions: The sight is a definite aid in night firing.

54. Recommendations: Recommend the rear sight be modified possibly with another illumination device and further tests be conducted. The sight is recommended for future combat security type units.

Trace Metal Detection Kit (Ultra Violet Products Inc.)

55. This kit is designed to detect traces of metal oxide deposited on an individual after handling metalic objects. It consists of a portable battery, a ultraviolet light (black light), battery charger and bottles os special spray, instructions sheets and color comparison charts.

56. Theory of Operation: When certain chemicals are mixed with a metal oxide they will react with a certain wave length of light and give off various light depending on the type of metal.

57. Tests: Several tests were conducted by this unit which indicated that the device was useful.

58. Results: Results were satisfactory.

59. Conclusions: Based on test results obtained by this unit and the OSI detachment at Phu Cat AB, the device was useful especially when used in conjunction with an experienced interrogator.

60. Recommendations: Recommend this device for initial interrogation by combat security units which are operating in remote areas with experienced interrogators.

Rubidium Magnetometer Tunnel Detection Device (Varian Associates)

61. This device is used to detect underground tunneling and metal objects. It consists of a detector (hand held), annunciator, battery pack (belt worn) and battery charger.

62. Theory of Operation: This device operates on the theory of magnetic anomaly. Usually most soils contain enough ferrous ores that the earth's magnetic field will be affected if the quantity of soil beneath the device is changed (tunnel) or a piece of ferrous metal is present. The device senses these changes and indicates them audibly.

63. Test: Several known tunnels were checked to obtain a familiarity with possible responses of the instrument. Additionally, areas were checked where there was no knowledge that tunnels existed. The operator had less than three hours of training on this device.

64. Results: Where the known tunnels existed the instrument responded indicating that the tunnels existed, but in no case did it indicate the true dimensions of the tunnels. In the check of areas where there was no knowledge of tunnels the instrument did indicate the existence of a tunnel, but again the dimensions were inaccurate. The instrument was strongly influenced by metal objects.

65. Conclusions: The amount of testing was not extensive enough to draw valid conclusions other than that the device is capable of detecting tunnels. The fact that it did not detect accurate dimensions of the tunnels indicates that it is not infallible. Further, it cannot be concluded that the training received by the operator was adequate.

66. Recommendations: This instrument appears to have an application in combat security units inventory, however it is recommended that more thorough testing with an adequately trained operator be conducted.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

28 December 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR DTIC-RS
Attn: Kelly D. Akers
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

FROM: HAF/ICIOD (FOIA)
1000 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1000

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act Request – DTIC # 2001-160 (Lathrop)

1. Reference the attached DTIC referral of the report AD-384659, "U.S. Air Force Combat Security Police Forces for Air Base Defense, SAFE SIDE," which was forwarded to this office for review and release determination.

2. The document was released to the requester on 28 December 2005. As a result of this public release there are no restrictions on future releases in response to requests. A copy of the cover page with the appropriate markings is also enclosed.

PENNY JENKINS
Freedom of Information Act Manager

2 Atch
As stated